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ABSTRACT
PERCEPTIONS OF TEIE US INVOLVEMENT
BY ATHENS AND ANKARA
IN THE GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE (1954-1999)
Kalaitzaki, Theodora
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Dr Hasan Ünal 
September 2004
Greek-Turkish relations became strained a few years after the starting of the Cold War 
despite that both countries have become parts of the same alliance, NATO, and belonged 
to the western camp against the Soviet Union. The eruption of the Cypms conflict was 
the main reason for worsening the relations between the two states. In the decade of 
1970s additional problems in the Aegean deteriorated relations further, and both states 
have almost come to the brink of a war several times. The United States as the most 
powerful ally has always needed to be involved in order to keep NATO’s cohesion and 
preserve stability in the southeastern flank of the Alliance.
I l l
The aim of this study is to analyze the American involvement towards the Greek- 
Turkish dispute which includes the Cyprus problem and the Aegean issues from 1954 
until 1999 emphasizing in the most serious Cyprus crises (1963-64, 1967, 1974, 1997) 
and the Aegean crises (1976, 1987, 1996). Further, this study will attempt to analyze the 
Greek and the Turkish perceptions of the American involvement, and to evaluate to what 
extent the United States presence has affected the course of the long-standing Greek- 
Turkish dispute.
Keywords: Greek foreign policy, Turkish foreign policy, Greek-Turkish dispute, Cyprus, 
United States involvement
IV
ÖZET
ATİNA VE ANKARA’NIN 1954-1999 
YUNAN-TÜRK UZEAŞMAZLIĞINDA 
AMERİKAN GİRİŞİMLERİNİ ALGILAMALARI
Theodora Kalaitzaki 
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi:Yrd. Doç. Dr. Haşan Ünal 
Eylül 2004
Türk-Yunan ilişkileri, iki ülkenin Sovyetler Birliği’ne karşı NATO ittifakı ve Batı 
kampında yer almalarına rağmen Soğuk Savaş başladıktan birkaç yıl sonra gerginleşti. 
Kıbrıs Sorunu’nun patlak vermesi ilişkilerin kötüleşmesindeki en önemli nedendi. 
1970’lerde Ege’de ortaya çıkan diğer problemler ilişkileri daha da kritik bir hale getirdi 
ve iki devlet birkaç kez savaşın eşiğine geldiler. İttifakın en güçlü müttefiki olarak 
Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, NATO’nun bütünlüğünü korumak ve ittifakın Güneydoğu 
kanadındaki istikrarı devam ettirmek için her zaman Türk-Yunan ilişkilerine müdahil 
olmaktadır.
V
Bu çalışmanın amacı, 1954-1999 yılları arasında, Kıbrıs sorunu ve Ege meselelerini de 
içine alan Türk-Yunan anlaşmazlığı hakkındaki, varlığını bilhassa en ciddi Kıbrıs (1963- 
64, 1967, 1974, 1997) ve Ege (1976, 1987, 1996) bunalımlarında gösteren Amerikan 
siyasetini analiz etmektir. Daha sonra bu çalışmada, Türkiye ve Yunanistan’ın bu 
Amerikan girişimlerini nasıl algıladıkları incelenecektir. Amerikan varlığının bu uzun 
süreli Türk-Yunan anlaşmazlığını nasıl etkilediği de değerlendirilecektir.
Anahtar sözcükler: Yunan dış politikası, Türk diş politikası, Türk-Yunan anlaşmiizlığı, 
Kıbrıs, Amerikan girişimleri
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INTRODUCTION
Greece and Turkey emerged from the Second World War as solid members of the 
Western alliance and their bilateral territorial disputes appearing settled. The historic 
conflicts dating back to Ottoman times seemed memories, fading into a new tradition 
of peace and friendship established in the early 1930s in the historic reconciliation 
between the two neighboring states.
In the post war era Greece and Turkey sided with the western countries and with 
their participation in the western European institutions (Council o f Europe, NATO) 
became “officially” part of the Western block led by the United States (US) against 
the Eastern block of the Communist states led by the Soviet Union.
In the first years of the Cold War, the two countries concentrated their efforts to 
improve their bilateral relations as allies and to strengthen their ties with the US. 
Both Greece and Turkey received significant financial and humanitarian support to 
recover from the war, and were under the security umbrella of the US. In return, the 
US was allowed to install military bases with special privileges for the American 
personnel in both countries. In the difficult Cold War environment the three allies
seemed to have harmonious relations focusing on the external communist danger
coming from the north .
This cordial era was ended in 1954 with the internationalization of the Cyprus 
problem at the UN forum by the Greek government. Greece and Turkey had 
“legitimate rights” over the island because of the presence of the Greek and Turkish 
populations. However, Greece and Turkey had completely divergent perceptions 
over the future of the British colony“. In 1955 after the failure of the Greek appeal to 
the UN, Greek Cypriots started a national struggle against the British with indirect 
Greek support aiming at Enosis with Greece. Turkey, on the other hand, opposed the 
Greek Cypriot movement and adopted the Taksim thesis.
Each of the three NATO countries felt that their vital interests were at stake, and they 
soon entered into a dangerous collision course. The task for the United States-then 
the unquestioned leader of the Western Alliance- was to carve out policies that would 
lead to peaceful settlement that would not simultaneously rupture the cohesiveness of 
the strategic southern flank of NATO^.
In August 1960 Cyprus emerged as an independent state. Both Greek and Turkish 
sides came to a compromise abandoning their extreme positions {enosis or taksim). 
The leaders of the two Cypriot communities put their signatures on the treaty, which
T. Couloumbis, 1983. The United States, Greece and Turkey The Troubled Triangle (New York: 
Praeger Publishers), pp. 7-21; M. Hatipoğlou, 1997. Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923- 
1954 (Modern History of Greece and Turkey) (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi), pp. 262-289.
S. Torun, 1956. Türkiye İngiltere ve Yunanistan arasında Kıbrıs’ nın Politik Durumu (Turkey, 
England and Greece and the Political Situation in Cyprus) (Istanbul: Gazeteciler Matbaası); A. 
Vlachos, 1982. Deka xronia Kipriako (Ten Years of Cyprus Problem) (Athens: Estia Publications).
 ^ C. Nicolet, 2001. United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek- 
Turkish Bone of Contention (Bibliopolis Mannheim und Mohnesee).
foresaw vast security guarantees for the Turkish Cypriot community, providing for 
greater representation in political institutions and in the army, than their percentage 
of population would have allowed. The diplomatic settlement was a positive 
development for the US, as it seemed to eliminate a serious friction point in the 
relations of two of its allies.
The outbreak of violence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island in 
1963 led the US involvement in the Cyprus issue for the first time, since in George 
Ball’s words “Cyprus was merely one more step in Britain’s painful shedding of the 
empire, and London had no longer the will or the resources to preside over such a 
quarrel”'*.
During the 1960s the US had to intervene several times directly and on its own to 
prevent a renewed outbreak of war on the island and between Greece and Turkey. 
The danger of a Greek-Turkish war, and thus dissolution of NATO’s southeastern 
flank as a consequence of disagreement over the status o f Cyprus was the main 
reason of American involvement in Cyprus after 1960. However, regarding the level 
of involvement the US was dependent on the cooperation of its NATO allies: Greece 
and Turkey. In 1964 despite the determination of the US diplomacy to settle matters 
once and for all and to eliminate a situation which could be exploited by the Soviet 
Union, Greece and Turkey could not agree on the proposed Acheson plans^.
The July 1974 coup d’etat organized by Greek junta against President Makarios as 
the later had increasingly differentiated by the idea of Cypriot union with Greece.
G. Ball, 1982. The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: W.W. Norton), p. 340. 
C. Nicolet, United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974, pp. 247-290.
The Turkish army intervened in order to protect its minority and the Turkish strategic 
interests as there was the danger the island to go under total Greek control* .^ Once 
again, the US’s close relationship with Greece and Turkey and its concern for 
stability in the region led it become involved in prevention of another crisis in 
Cyprus. When a compromise between Greece and Turkey could not be reached 
during the following weeks, the Turkish army advanced further, conquering more 
than a third of the island, formulating the situation that stands today.
From the 1970s onwards as the Aegean dispute^ emerged between the two countries, 
the scope of US involvement rose, as the dangers of a Greek-Turkish war increased. 
The poisonous political climate created by the conflict in Cyprus increased the 
tension in the common sea of the Aegean.
Gradually Greek policy makers, especially in the 1980s under PASOK government, 
became convinced that Turkey had been an aggressor and perceived the Turkish 
claims over the Aegean as a threat to its territorial integrity. Turkey, on the other 
hand adopted a hard-line attitude affected by Greece’s intention to extent its 
territorial waters from six to twelve miles, disputing the territorial status quo of the 
Aegean in an effort to escalate pressure upon Greece.
For the Greek side there was only one and real problem in the Greek-Turkish 
relations, that is the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf which Greece
* S. Bolukba?!, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations, p. 195.
 ^The Aegean dispute includes the question of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea; the 
militarization of the eastern Aegean islands; the limits of the Greek national air space, the Flight 
Information Region (FIR) and air operational control' within NATO; and the extent of the Greek 
territorial waters. See for details. Chapter IV, pp. 110-122.
and Turkey should solve by appealing to the International Court of Justice in The 
Hague. Instead of the mediation of The Hague, Turkish side insisted on bilateral 
negotiations over the continental shelf and all the other Aegean problems.
The first serious incident in the Aegean occurred in August 1976 over the exploration 
and exploitation of resources in the continental shelf. The US did not get involved 
directly as it was not much welcomed in the region due to the recent developments in 
Cyprus. Greece attempted to internationalize the problem of the Aegean continental 
shelf by appealing to the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice. 
Turkey for its part, proposed bilateral negotiations, an idea which was totally rejected 
by the Greek side. However, as the danger of a clash minimized, all the efforts for a 
resolution were abandoned.
The second Aegean crisis of March 1987 was again over oil explorations in disputed 
waters and as the crisis escalated rapidly, NATO Secretary General was mobilized at 
the time to end it. The two parties finally backed off and a process of dialogue 
started between the two countries searching for a solution which again led nowhere.
The end of the Cold War with the collapse and dismantling o f the Soviet Union and 
the Communist Bloc brought about some important changes in the security 
perceptions of the US. The Containment policy was no longer relevant, since the 
Soviet threat had disappeared and the US remained the only hegemonic power.
However, the end of the Cold War did not diminish the US strategic interests in the 
Mediterranean* as Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish dispute is concerned.
Regarding the Greek-Turkish dispute in the post-Cold War era, it did not change 
substantially. However, new challenges and problems came up for the two allies in 
their foreign policies. Antagonism increased between Ankara and Athens in the 
post-communist Balkans. It seemed that both states exported their rivalry in the 
Balkan region competing to extend their influence in the Balkan states.
/
Tension was constant throughout the first decade of the post-Cold War era in both 
the Aegean and Cyprus. In December 1995 an incident which seemed a usual Greek- 
Turkish episode in the Aegean became the most serious Aegean crisis between the 
two states. The eruption of Imia/Kardak crisis in January 1996 over two uninhabited 
islets brought to the surface the depth o f the old feud between the two NATO allies, 
put the stability in the Aegean into danger and caused immediate intervention of the 
US which prevented a full-scale war between Greece and Turkey at the eleventh hour.
In Cyprus, the US’s abilities in crisis mediation tested again when a new crisis 
erupted over the Greek Cypriots’ decision in January 1997 to purchase S-300 anti­
aircraft Russian missiles in order to achieve quantitative and qualitative 
improvements in the country’s defense capabilities vis-à-vis Turkey, seen as the 
single major external threat. The rising danger posed by the Greek-Cypriot 
rearmament in the eastern Mediterranean alarmed Turkey which stated that it would 
not allow the weapons to be deployed in the island, threatening to move militarily.
I. Lesser, 1992. Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for US Policy 
(Santa Minica; RAND), p.3
With the opposition of the Greek government led by Kostas Simitis over the issue of 
the missile deployment, the Greek Cypriot side withdrew and finally the missiles 
deployed in Crete. However, the latest Cyprus crisis urged the US to initiate a new 
diplomatic attempt with the goal of reaching a long-lasting settlement.
Having set the origins and the course of the deterioration o f the Greek-Turkish 
relations, this study analyzes the American involvement in the Greek-Turkish dispute 
from the beginning of the Cyprus issue in 1954 until the decision of the European 
Council in 1999 to accept Turkey as a candidate state in the European Union, 
depending the progress of accession upon the progress of a resolution in Cyprus and 
the Aegean dispute. The present study focuses on the most dangerous crises over 
Cyprus (1963-64, 1967, 1974, 1997) and over the Aegean (1976, 1987, 1996). The 
reasoning behind the US involvement was mainly to prevent a war between the two 
allies Greece and Turkey and to maintain the cohesion of NATO’s southeastern flank. 
Additionally, the US concentrated their efforts aiding both sides to resolve the 
dispute and to reduce tension.
This study is focused on how the Greek and Turkish political elites perceived the 
American involvement in the Greek-Turkish crises. Therefore, it is important to put 
emphasis on the Greek and Turkish perceptions of the US involvement, to 
understand expectations of both sides from the US in this long-standing dispute.
The main argument of this dissertation is that as soon as the Cyprus crisis erupted in 
1955 the “mother countries”, namely Greece and Turkey concentrated on the 
problem and undervalued their priorities and commitments in the NATO alliance. It 
was the first clear indication for both NATO allies and the US that, when their vital
interests were at stake, the alliance solidarity and the common perception o f the 
Soviet threat became a back-burner. Meanwhile, both were expecting at least the 
understanding and the support of the United States against one another. When the 
expectations of each country were not met by the US in accordance with their 
national interests they would take their distance from their major ally. This was the 
case for Turkey in 1964, when the Turkish government prepared to land forces on 
Cyprus as a result of the intercommunal conflict, but was stopped by the US. 
President Johnson had sent a letter to the Turkish Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü 
declaring that the US would cease to support Turkey, if the Turkish intervention in 
Cyprus could lead to an involvement of the Soviet Union. As a result, the Turkish 
landing did not take place. But Turkey realized that the US was not as reliable an 
ally as it thought, and Turkey started to improve her relations with the Soviet Union^.
Ten years later, in 1974, it was Greece’s turn. The coup organized by the Greek 
dictatorship against Cypriot President Makarios caused the Turkish military 
intervention. The US stepped in to persuade the Greek government not to declare 
war against Turkey and due to that involvement a full-scale Greek-Turkish war was 
avoided. But the Greek side was disappointed by the US stance, withdrew from the 
military wing of NATO, and started to improve her relations with the European 
Community and strengthened her efforts to become a full member'®.
Nevertheless, both Greece and Turkey had recognized the importance of being allies
of the US. But as the first problems appeared in their bilateral relations, these
became priorities in their foreign policies and not the alliance’s commitments.
’ S. BolUkba?], 1988. The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and 
Cyprus (Lanham: University Press of America), pp. 65-79.
C. Rozakis, 1986. Eliniki Exoteriki Politiki (Greek Foreign Policy) (Athens: Maliaris-Paidia).
Moreover, both states realized that their vital ally’s attitude in the dispute was 
motivated by its strategic considerations without taking into account the vital 
interests of each country. Additionally, both states consistently held the view that the 
United States was in favor of the other.
Having set the scope and the purpose of this study, the basic questions arise in this 
work are: which were the changing patterns of the Greek and Turkish perceptions of 
the US; which were the results of the American involvement in the dispute; and if the 
US involvement has perpetuated the dispute or whether it has eased the tension 
between the two allies.
In order to seek the answers to the above questions the primary sources consulted 
were the Greek and Turkish newspapers and interviews with Greek and Turkish 
officials who served in the Greek and the Turkish Foreign Ministry holding political 
and diplomatic positions. The Greek newspapers used more for this study are: 
Kathimerini. To Vima, Ta Nea, Eletherotipia. From the Turkish side, Turkish Daily 
News and the periodicals Briefing and Turkish Probe have been used.
Covering the Greek side, mostly benefited works were the books written by Greek 
Foreign Ministers. Evagelos Averof-Tositsa’s book, Istoria Xamenon Efkerion: 
Kipriako 1950-1963 (History of Lost Opportunities: Cyprus Problem 1950-1963), 
covering the period of 1955-1963; Dimitrios Bitsios’s books Cyprus; The 
Vulnerable Republic and Pera apo ta sinora (Beyond the Borders) covering the 
period from 1974 until 1977. Additionally Pavlos Petridis’s book O Georgios 
Papandreou kai to Kipriako Zitima 1954-1965 (George Papandreou and the 
Cypms Question 1954-1965) is important for getting information about the period
1963-1965. Then the book by Yiannis Kapsis Oi tris meres tou Marti (The three 
days of March) is quite useful for the 1981-1989 period.
The book by Alexandrakis, Menelaos, Vyron Theodoropoulos, and Efstathios 
Lagakos. To Kipriako 1950-1974 :Mia Endoskopisi (Cyprus Problem 1950-1974: 
An Introspection) is also important as the three authors were senior Greek diplomats 
and all o f them spent significant part of their career dealing with the Cyprus problem 
and the Greek-Turkish dispute. A thorough analysis for the Greek-Turkish dispute is 
offered in Vyron Theodoropoulos’ book Oi Tourkoi kai Emis (The Turks and Us), 
in Theodoropoulos, Vyron et al. Skepseis kai Provlimatismoi gia tin Exoteriki mas 
Politiki (Thoughts and Concerns for our Foreign Policy) and in Alexis Alexandris, A 
(ed.) Oi Elinotourkikes Sxesis 1923-1987 (Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1987). 
Another noteworthy work is the Theodoros Couloumbis’ book The United States, 
Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle covering the Cold War period.
From the Turkish side, important works include Suat Bilge’s chapter “The Cyprus 
Conflict and Turkey” in Karpat, Kemal, (ed.) Turkey’s Foreign Policy in 
Transition 1959-1974. Bilge’s writing is important because he was a diplomat 
dealing with Cyprus problem in the 1950s. Other useful works are Suha Bölükbasi’s 
The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and 
Cyprus and Faruk Sönmezoğlu’s book Türkiye ve Yunanistan İlişkileri Büyük 
Güçler (Turco-Greek Relations and the Great Powers) along with the Şükrü Sina 
Gürel’s books Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960) (History of Cyprus) and Tarihsel Boyut 
içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993) (Turkish-Greek Relations in a Historical
10
Context). A detailed analysis of the Greek-Turkish dispute both in Aegean and in 
Cyprus is offered in Tozun Bahçeli’ s book Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955.
Existing literature is quite rich for the analysis of the evolving US policy towards 
Cyprus from 1954 onwards. The most noteworthy examples based on American and 
British archives are Sotiris Rizas’s books Enosi, Dixotomisi, Anexartisia: Oi 
Inomenes Polities kai i Bretania stin Anazitisi lisis gia to Kipriako 1963-1967 
(Union, Division, Independence: United States and Britain Seeking for a Solution for 
the Cyprus Problem 1963-1967), and Oi Inomenes Polities, I diktatoria ton 
Sintamatarxon kai to Kipriako Zitima 1967-1974 (The United States, the 
Dictatorship of the Colonels and the Cyprus Problem 1967-1974) and the Claude 
Nicolet’s work United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the 
Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention.
After the 1974 crisis several articles appeared in political and historical periodicals, 
some of which criticized the US policy in Cyprus. The most worthy contributions 
are the articles by Van Coufoudakis, “ US Foreign policy and the Cyprus Problem: 
An Interpretation”, Laurence Stem’s “Bitter Lessons: How we failed in Cyprus” and 
Ivar-Andre Slengesol’s “A Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Crisis”. 
Slengesol criticizes US for not having averted the Greek coup in Cyprus which 
caused the 1974 crisis.
A detailed, critical analysis of American policy towards the countries of NATO’s 
southeastern flank is offered in Monteagle Stearns’s book Entangled Allies: US 
Policy towards Greece and Turkey, and Cyprus. Steams worked for the State
11
Department since 1955 and served as ambassador in Greece from 1981 to 1985. His 
findings based on personal experience are considered as quite useful.
For the post-Cold War era the most useful works were Morton Abramovitz’s book 
Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy, Sabri Sayari’s article “Turkish 
Perspective Toward German and US Foreign Policy” in The Parameters of 
Partnership: Germany, the US and Turkey, Challenges for German and 
American Foreign Policy, along with Barry Rubin and Kemal Kiri§ci’s book 
Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power .
From the Greek side important works were Coufoudakis, Van.; Harry, Psomiades. 
and Andre Gerolymatos’ book Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and 
Opportunities, Theodore Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, Fotini Bellou’s book 
Greece in the Twentieth Century and Christodoulos Yialouridis and Panayiotis 
Tsakonas’ book Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War.
This study is structured chronologically. The four main chapters analyze the 
reasoning of the American involvement, and how this involvement was perceived by 
the Greek and the Turkish side; and the impact of this involvement upon the Greek- 
American relations, the Turkish-American relations and the dispute itself
Chapter I starts with a brief evaluation of the Greek-Turkish relations after the 
Lausanne Treaty in 1923. Both states pursued to develop good and stabilized 
relations, which was achieved due to the common perception of their security 
interests in the interwar period. The collaboration continued after the end of the
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Second World War and it was only interrupted with the eruption of the Cyprus 
problem in 1954.
Chapter II focuses on the American perception of post-war Greece and Turkey. The 
Americans committed to their Cold War strategy decided to provide all the necessary 
humanitarian, military and political support to both Greece and Turkey to secure 
these countries positions in the western camp. This support was welcome in both 
countries as both expected containment of the Soviet penetration in their domestic 
affairs (Greece) and in their external affairs (Turkey).
Chapter III discusses the outbreak of the Cyprus conflict in the early 1950s, and how 
this issue deteriorated the relations between the two countries. In the first phase of 
the dispute until the signing of the Zurich (1959) and London (1960) Agreements the 
United States were attending cautiously but as outsider. During the independence 
period until 1974 the US involved as both communities did not manage to govern the 
island peacefully. In this chapter the American involvement in 1963-64, 1967, 1974 
crises and its mediation efforts will be analyzed and the perception of the Greek and 
the Turkish side to that involvement will be evaluated.
Chapter IV analyzes additional problems which appeared in Greek-Turkish relations 
in the beginning of 1970s over the Aegean and the United States’ attitude. The 
second part of chapter IV will focus on the Aegean crises of 1976 and 1987. The 
disagreement between Greece and Turkey about their sovereign rights over the 
Aegean continental shelf brought twice the two countries close to a war.
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Chapter V starts with a discussion of Greek-American and Turkish-American 
relations in the post-Cold War era. The new challenges and priorities in the Greek- 
American relations and Turkish-American relations respectively are examined. Then 
in the last chapter of the dissertation, the US role in the Greek-Turkish dispute is 
discusses, focusing on the Imia/Kardak crisis in the Aegean in 1996 and the S-300 
missiles crisis in Cyprus in 1997.
The final part of this study is devoted to the analysis of the Greek and the Turkish 
perceptions of the US towards the Greek-Turkish dispute. The similarities and 
differences in the perceptions of the two parties and how these perceptions have 
affected the long-standing dispute will be discussed. Finally, this study concludes 
that the US involvement aiming to prevent a war between the two allies Greece and 
Turkey was successful. It has also eased the tension caused during the Cyprus and 
Aegean crises between the two NATO partners to a manageable level. But the 
diplomatic efforts conducted by the US, concerning a solution of the problems 
between the two neighboring countries failed to produce any substantial results.
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CHAPTER I
GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER LAUSANNE TREATY
(1923)
The settlement reached at Lausanne (July 24, 1923), after the Greek-Turkish war 
(1919-1922)” solved the territorial and minority issues and laid the foundations for 
peaceful relations between Greece and Turkey. Exhausted by many years of wars, 
both countries faced enormous problems of domestic reconstruction.
Greece had to recover from a ten-year of constant war, reconstruct its economy and 
provide aid to the refugees who came from Anatolia'^. Turkey, for her part, under 
the leadership of Kemal Atatürk pursued essential reforms to transform Turkey into a
" In Lausanne, Turkey’s boundary with Greece was set at the Maritsa river which separates Western 
and Eastern Thrace. Greece retained her sovereignty over the Aegean islands except for Imvos 
(Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada); these islands, which guard the entrance to the straits, were 
restored to Turkey (Lausanne Treaty: Part I: article 2). The islands of eastern Aegean because of the 
Turkish security concerns decided to be demilitarized (Lausanne Treaty: Part I: article 13). In 
addition, Lausanne Treaty arranged the fate of the Greek and Turkish minorities. The Protocol signed 
on the 30'*' of January 1923 at Lausanne provided for the compulsory exchange of the Greeks of the 
Asia the Minor and the Turks of Greece, with two exceptions - the Greeks of Istanbul and the Muslim 
Turks and Pomaks of the western Thrace in Greece (articles 1-2). The Treaty safeguarded the cultural 
and educational rights of the minorities (Part III: articles 40-43). See I sinthiki tis Lozanis (Lausanne 
Treaty) (Athens:Papazisis Publications), pp. 45-50 ,71-86; F. Vali, 1971. Bridge Across the 
Bosphorus (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press), pp. 220-223; Ş.S. Gürel, 
1993. Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkile (Turkish-Greek Relations in a
Flistorical Context) (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık), pp.30-34;M. Gönlübol, et. al.l996. Olaylarla Türk 
Dış Politikası (1919-1995) (Turkish Foreign Policy in Cases), 9th Edition (Ankara: Cem Ofset), pp. 
48-59; K. Ari, 1995. Büyük Mübabele Türkiye’ye Zorunlu Göç 1923-1925 (The Great Exchange. 
The Forced Migration to Turkey) (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları).
H. Psomiades, 1968. The Eastern Question: The Last Phase A Study in Greek-Turkish 
Diplomacy (Institute for Balkan Studies: Thessaloniki).
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modem nation-state . Thus the two states were interested in having good and 
stabilized relations and both pursued this during the interwar years'"*.
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An additional factor in the development of eventual détente between Greece and 
Turkey which gained ground in the late 1920s was a growing perception of common 
defense interests. While Greece and Turkey still mistrusted each o t h e r ' b o t h  of 
them had serious concerns for Bulgaria’s ambitions to gain access to the Aegean, as 
well as about Italy’s intentions in the eastern Mediterranean'^.
After the electoral victory of Eleftherios Venizelos in 1928, the path for a Greek- 
Turkish rapprochement seemed more prosperous. In July 1929, the new Greek 
ambassador Spyridon Polychroniades, was accredited in Ankara with personal 
instmctions from Venizelos to intensify the peace efforts. Likewise, President 
Kemal Atatürk directed the Turkish Foreign Ministry to eliminate all the obstacles 
hindering a peace treaty with Greece'^.
B. Lewis. 1968. The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford : Oxford University Press), pp. 323- 
480.
T. Veremis, 1993. Ellada-Evropi. Apo ton Proto Polemo eos ton Psixro Plemo (Greece-Europe. 
From the First War to the Cold War) (Athens: Plethron Publications); M. Gönlübol, et. al. Olaylarla 
Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995), pp.60-70.
A number of irritants still existed in the years after Lausanne treaty. For instance, each side 
accused the other of maltreating its minorities during the mid-1920s. Relations became tense when, 
during the brief dictatorship (1925-26) of Theodore Pángalos in Greece, threatened war and 
contemplated an attack on Turkish Thrace. In the same period, also the election of the Patriarch 
became a quarrel between the two states. See with details, M. Hatipoğlu. 1997. Yakın Tarihte 
T-9.Lİyi?..-Vfi.-Xlinanistan 1923-1954 (Modem History of Greece and Turkey) (Ankara: Siyasal 
¿itah.eyi),.pp, 65-77; A. Alexandfis, 1983. The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish 
Relations 1918-1974 (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies), pp. 149-159.
'®K. Svolopoulos, 1994. I Eliniki Exoteriki Politiki 1900-1945 (Greek Foreign Policy 1900-1945) 
(Athens: Estia Publications), pp. 211-232; M. Hatipoğlu. 1997. Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve 
Yunanistan 1923-1954, pp. 24-25; M. Türkes, 1994. “The Balkan Pact and its Immediate 
Implications for the Balkan States”, Middle Eastern Studies 30:1, p. 130.
’’ A. Alexandris, 1983. The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974, 
p. 176.
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In June 1930 the Greek ambassador Spyridon Polychroniades and the Turkish 
Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras signed the first Greek-Turkish agreement in 
Ankara. The Ankara Agreement dealt exclusively with the remaining disputes 
arising from the implementation of the Lausanne Treaty and of the Protocol on the 
exchange of populations. On the thorny issue of property belonging to 
exchangeables, both governments came to the conclusion that it was impossible to 
reach at a just and accurate estimate. Thus, each government undertook to 
compensate its own refugees'^. Although the terms of the agreement were criticized 
in Greece as too favorable to Turkey, Venizelos attached a high priority to a policy 
of conciliation with the Turks.
A few months later, in October 1930 the Greek Premier accompanied by his Foreign 
Minister, Andreas Michalakopoulos, arrived in Ankara On the 30‘^  o f October 1930 
Venizelos and the Turkish Premier ismet İnönü signed a Treaty of Neutrality, 
Conciliation, and Arbitration, as well as a protocol providing for parity of naval 
armaments and a commercial c o n v e n t i o n ' W h i l e  in Ankara, Venizelos reportedly 
declared that his presence there “signified the end of a conflict between Greece and 
Turkey which had lasted for ten centuries” "^.
A. Tounta-Fergadi, 1986. Themata Elinikis Diplomatikis Istorias (Issues in Greek Diplomatic 
History) (Athens: Paratiritis Publications), pp. 243-249; Ş.S. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk
Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993), pp.35-52; O. Sander, 1998. Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası (Turkish 
Foreign Policy) (Ankara; İmge Kitabevi), pp.161-172.
See with details, M. Hatipoğlu. Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954, pp. 79-106; A. 
Alexandris, 1983. The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974, pp. 
178-180; 1. Anastasiadou. 1980. “0  Venizelos kai to Elinotourkiko Simfono Filias tou 1930” 
(Venizelos and the Greek-Turkish Friendship Pact of 1930) in Meletimata Giro apo ton Venizelo 
kai tin Epoxi tou (Studies For Venizelos During his Time) (Athens: Filipotis Publications), pp. 309- 
476.
“  T. Bahcheli, 1990. Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955 (Boulder: Westview Press), p. 14.
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After the 1930 Friendship Pact the diplomatic relations between Greece and Turkey 
entered a cordial phase. Even after the fall o f Venizelos government in 1932, the 
subsequent administrations of Panagis Tsaldaris (leader of the Conservative party) 
and loannis Metaxas^' carried on the policy o f rapprochement. In September 1933, 
the two countries signed a Defense Pact guaranteeing the inviolability of their 
borders and committing them to consult each other on matters of common interest^".
During the following year, the two countries took another step in collaboration when 
they joined the Balkan Entente in 1934 with Yugoslavia and Romania. By joining 
the Balkan Entente, Greece and Turkey hoped to discourage anticipated pressures 
from Italy and Germany^^. However, neither this, nor subsequent bilateral Greek- 
Turkish agreements deterred Italy and Germany from pursuing their ambitions to 
penetrate and control the Balkans. In any case, Greece and Turkey were unprepared 
to undertake obligations that might involve them in war with a great power (i.e Italy). 
So, when German troops occupied Greece, following the unsuccessful Italian 
invasion in October 1940, Turkey remained neutral.
Turkey’s decision to stay neutral during the Second World War disappointed Greece. 
Greek leaders felt that Turkey was under an obligation to come to Greece’s aid under
■' Metaxas was a predominant military official who established a dictatorship between 1936 until 
1940. See with details T. Veremis, 1983. Oi Paremvaseis tou Stratou stin Elliniki Politiki Zoi 
1916-1936 (The Interferences of the Military in Greek Political Life 1916-1936) (Athens: Odysseas 
Publications), 189-229); T. Veremis and R. Higham, (eds.) 1993. Aspects of Greece 1936-40: The 
Metaxas Dictatorship (ELIAMEP-Vrionis Center).
■"F. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus, pp. 224-225. D. Kitsikis, 1981. Istoria tou Elinotourklkou 
Xorou apo ton Venizelo eos ton Papadopoulo 1928-1973 (History of Greece and Turkey from 
Venizelos until Papadopoulo 1928-1973) (Athens: Estia Publications), pp. 17-25; M. Gönlübol, et. al. 
Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, pp.99-105.
K. Svolopoulos, 1974. To Valkaniko Simfonon kai I Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki 1928-1934 (The 
Balkan Pact and the Greek Foreign Policy 1928-1934) (Athens: Estia publications); See also A. 
Korozis, Ta stena kai ta Pepromena mas: Ellinotourkikoi Agones kai Fillies kata epitagi (The 
Straits and our Faith: Greek-Turkish Antagonism and Friendships by order), pp. 559-602. D. Kitsikis, 
1981. Istoria tou Elinotourkikou Xorou apo ton Venizelo eos ton Papadopoulo 1928-1973, p.46.
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the terms of the Balkan Entente and subsequent Turkish assurances to help Greece^'^. 
However, Turkey continued to recognize the Greek government in exile, and offered 
Greece help in terms of food and other relief items . One other issue that strained 
Greek-Turkish relations during the Second World War was Turkey’s imposition of 
an emergency capital levy called Varlik Vergisi on non-Muslim communities in 
Turkey including the Greeks in November 1942^“. The Turkish government justified 
the tax on the grounds that it needed to raise revenue to finance Turkey’s growing 
military expenditures. However, Greeks and members of other minorities complained 
that they were assessed higher levies than Turks, and the Greek government in exile 
lodged protests to Ankara. The Turkish government removed the tax a year after its 
imposition^’ .
In general terms, despite the suspicions and irritants experienced during the Second 
World War, bilateral relations were stabilized and after the war the same concerns 
over the Soviet expansion in the Balkans, prompted Greece and Turkey to act in 
concert in their external relations. An axis between Ankara and Athens was essential 
to counter-balance the weight of the other Slav states in the Balkans, especially as 
these were now dominated by the Soviet Union.
A. Alexandris, 1988. “To Istoriko Plaisio ton Elinotourkikon Sxeseon, 1923-1955” (The Historical 
Context of Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1955) in A. Alexandris, (ed.) Oi Elinotourkikes Sxesis 
1923-1987 (Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1987) (Athens: Gnosi Publications), pp. 84-89; D. Kitsikis, 
Istoria tou Elinotourkikou Xorou apo ton Venizelo eos ton Papadopoulo 1928-1973, pp.92-101.
“  Ibid,pp. 120-132.
B. Lewis. 1968. The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford : Oxford University Press), pp. 296- 
298.
■’a . Alexandris, 1983. The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974, 
pp. 211-233.
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The announcement of the of the Truman Doctrine^®, with its implied assumption that 
Greece and Turkey were targets of the same international forces, paved the way for 
the strengthening of ties between the two countries. In May 1947 a committee for 
Greek-Turkish cooperation was formed in Athens under the then deputy Prime 
Minister, Sophocles Venizelos, while in Ankara President İnönü spoke of the urgent 
need for close consultation and unity. In the following months negotiations were 
held between representatives of the two General Staffs. The Turks had given up their 
misgivings about the cession of the Dodecanese islands to Greece^'^ and began to 
view the Aegean islands as convenient bridges between Greece and Turkey.
Gradually, the ground was prepared for closer cooperation^®. In June 1950 the two 
governments pledged to promote unity and confidence between their two nations. 
The two governments also worked closely together to present their cases for joining 
the Atlantic Alliance. Similarly, their applications were viewed as one, and officially 
on 15 October 1952, both became members of NATO^’.
Meanwhile, closer political ties discussed in length when Prime Minister Sophocles 
Venizelos visited Ankara in February 1952. During his talks with the Turkish 
leaders it was decided that a permanent mixed Greek-Turkish committee should be 
established to deal with questions of common interest, such as encouraging trade and 
commercial relations. However, the main topics o f the talks were the questions of
See for details in Chapter II, p. 13.
The Dodecanese islands were annexed to Greece under the Paris treaty in 1947. In order to 
alleviate the Turkish fears due to their proximity in the Turkish shores, the Dodecanese were to be 
demilitarized. See for details, C. Rozakis, 1988. “To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou kai 1 
Elinotourkiki Krisi” (The International Legal Status of the Aegean and the Greek-Turkish Crisis) in 
Alexandris, A. (ed.) Oi Elinotourkikes Sxesis 1923-1987 (Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1987) 
Athens: Gnosi Publications, pp. 407-444.
“  J. latrides, 1968. Balkan Triangle: Birth and Decline of an Alliance Across Ideological 
Boundaries (The Hague), pp. 76-78.
Ibid.
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security and integration to NATO while there was a general agreement that both 
sides would seek to induce the Yugoslav government to join them in a regional 
defense agreement^^.
In the official visit of the Turkish Premier Adnan Menderes in Athens in April 1952 
this issue was discussed further. Finally in February 1953 in Ankara a Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation Assistance signed between Yugoslavia, Greece and 
Turkey. This was followed by the conclusion of a formal treaty of alliance of the 
three countries in August 1954 at Bled in Yugoslavia^^.
These developments provided for a substantial degree of confidence both for military 
and political cooperation. The warming trend in Greek-Turkish relations was 
reflected in the statement by Turkish President Celal Bayar during a state visit to 
Greece in November 1952, when he described Greek-Turkish cooperation as “the 
best example of how two countries who mistakenly mistrusted each other for 
centuries have agreed upon a close and loyal collaboration as a result of recognition
of the realities of life»34
For nearly a decade after the Second World War both countries developed a warm 
relationship based on their common interests (fear of the Soviet Union and 
commitment to the Western Alliance). However, when the vital interests of one
A. Alexandris, 1983. The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974, 
pp. 234-236; M. Hatipoğlu, 1997. Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954, pp. 287-289.
”  M. Gönlübol, et. al. Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, pp. 237-244; M. Hatipoğlu, Yakın Tarihte 
Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954, pp. 287-289.
F. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus, p. 228; K. Gürün, 1983. Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Politikası 
(Foreign Relations and Turkish Policy) (Ankara; Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi 
Yayınları), pp.376-378.
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seemed to be threatened by the other, as happened with the Cyprus issue^^ during 
1954-1955, the progress attained in Greek-Turkish reconciliation and collaboration 
was seriously threatened.
N. Güvenç, 1983. Kıbrıs Sorunu, Yunanistan ve Türkiye (The Cyprus Problem, Greece and 
Turkey) (İstanbul: Çağdaş Politika Yayınları); S. Torun, 1956. Türkiye İngiltere ve Yunanistan 
arasında Kıbrıs’ ın Politik Durumu (Turkey, England and Greece and the Political Situation in 
Cyprus) (Istanbul: Gazeteciler Matbaası); A. Vlachos, 1982. Deka xronia Kipriako (Ten Years of 
Cyprus Problem) (Athens: Estia Publications).
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CHAPTER II
THE US AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AFTER
THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
2.1 The US Involvement After the End of the Second World War
At the end of the Second World War the foreign policy of the United States, 
dominated by the personality and rhetoric of President Roosevelt, displayed a sense 
of mission and a dedication to certain political and economic ideals (the right o f self- 
determination , economic integration) concerning the international system in general, 
as well as its member-states. Rooted in America’s unique historical experience and 
political-economic legends, many of these ideals were incorporated in the wartime 
pronouncements, such as the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration on Liberated Europe,
and the United Nations Charter .
Taken together, these principles appeared to summarize the ideological justification 
for America’s involvement in the war and suggested the broad parameters of the 
political and economic conditions that the United States desired to be adopted 
abroad, especially in those European states that the Allies liberated from Nazi
36 H. Kissinger, 1994. Diplomacy (London: Simon & Schuster), pp.401-402; J. L. Gaddis, 1997. VVe 
Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 36-37.
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Germany . The declaration on Liberated Europe, incorporated in the Yalta Accords 
in February 1945 at the insistence of the American government, spoke of assisting 
these European states “to solve by democratic means their pressing political and 
economic problems”, to “create democratic institutions of their own choice”, and “to 
form interim governmental authorities broadly representatives of all democratic 
elements in the population and pledged the earliest possible establishment through 
free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people” '^^  These US 
declarations emphasized its intention to support the restoration of “sovereign rights” 
and “self-determination” of the liberated European countries.
In addition, the United States emerged from the war, insisting that intervention in the 
domestic affairs of non-enemy states was reprehensible, undemocratic, and 
dangerous, giving rise to international tension and violence. As stipulated in the 
Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, the Allies would play a role in the internal 
politics of the liberated countries but only for the purpose of assisting in the 
restoration of order and of the democratic process'*®.
Soviet Union’s tactics in Eastern Europe served as the most important initial cause of 
anti-Soviet feelings in Washington, despite the fact that several of the states 
concerned had until recently belonged to the enemy camp'*'. Thus, on April 1945, 
Roosevelt wrote to Stalin that while he was particularly preoccupied with the
17
As Kissinger pointed out, the promotion of democracy was also valuable as a propaganda tool in 
Europe at the time when countries in Eastern Europe were rapidly being turned into Soviet satellite 
states. H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 419.
^®Ibid, pp. 415-418.
”  J. latrides, 1980. “American Attitudes Toward the Political System of Postwar Greece” in T. 
Couloumbis, and J. latrides, (eds.) Greek-American Relations. A Critical Review (New York: 
Pella), p. 51.
H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 415-418.
■*' J. L.Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 40-43.
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problems encountered in establishing a democratic government in Poland, “I must 
make a brief mention of our agreement embodied in the declaration on Liberated 
Europe. I frankly cannot understand why the recent developments in Romania 
(where Vyshinsky had forced King Michael to dismiss the government of General 
Radescu and replace it with one under the communist Petru Groza) should be 
regarded as not failing within the terms of that agreement”'*". President Truman 
expressed to Stalin the same concern; the Romanian and Bulgarian governments he 
wrote on June 7, 1945, "do not accord to all democratic elements of the people the 
rights of free expression and... are, in my opinion, neither representative of nor 
responsive to the will of the people”'*^
The Soviet Union was not the only one to be lectured on the subject of people’s 
rights. Britain’s role in India, the Middle East, and elsewhere received much 
unfavorable attention in the United States and prompted Winston Churchill to warn 
Roosevelt (on August 9, 1942) that the “proposed application” of the Atlantic 
Charter “to Asia and Africa requires much thought”'*'*.
In southeastern Europe, British domination of Greek affairs was viewed with similar
disapproval, and the American government repeatedly stressed that liberated
countries should be allowed to search for their political destinies without outside
interference. Thus, in December 1944, unhappy with British policies in Italy and
Greece, the Department of State released a statement as follows;
“ the United States policy has always been to refrain from any interference in 
the internal affairs of other nations. In conformity with this policy, the United 
States scrupulously refrained from interfering in the affairs of other countries
Ibid.
J. latrides, “American Attitudes Toward the Political System of Postwar Greece”, p. 56 
Ibid.
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which have been liberated from the Germans. The United States Government 
will continue to refrain from interference in the affairs of other countries. 
Unless the military security of the allied armies is at stake, the United States 
will make no attempt to influence the composition of any government in any 
friendly country. The American people have naturally viewed with sympathy 
the aspirations of the resistance movements and the anti-fascist elements in
liberated countries )?45
While admonishing both its principal allies not to seek to dominate the internal 
affairs of liberated states, Washington appeared confident that after the war the 
United States would play a key role in influencing not merely the international 
political system but also the internal development of the liberated nations. This 
would be done not through unwelcome interference in their affairs, as Moscow and 
London appeared to be doing, but through America’s tremendous prestige as the 
world’s greatest democracy and military power. Its political system model, 
flourishing economy, dynamic leadership, and armed strength would be the
instruments of American influence abroad
Despite the strong but ineffective protests o f the United States, Eastern Europe was 
soon compelled to adopt Moscow’s version of a “Peoples’ Democracy”, the very 
antithesis of the American ideal. Truman’s efforts, prompted by ideological as well 
as strategic considerations, to browbeat the Soviet government into honoring the 
Declaration on Liberated Europe, were counter-productive. Moscow proceeded to 
challenge the United States not merely over Eastern Europe but, more importantly.
L. Wittner, 1982. American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949 (New York: Columbia University 
Press), p. 25.
46 J. latrides, “American Attitudes Toward the Political System of Postwar Greece”, p. 55.
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over Germany as well. The ensuing Cold War brought about a drastic reordering of 
American priorities, with security considerations becoming paramount"*’.
As the US gradually realized the real intentions of Stalin, it initiated the policy of 
“Containment’ The idea of “Containment” was based on the proposition that it 
was necessary to keep the peace while preserving the balance of power. The gap that 
had developed during the 1930s between the perceived requirements of peace and 
power was not to happen again"*^ . If geopolitical stability could be restored in 
Europe, time would work against the Soviet Union and in favor of the western 
democracies’**.
The instruments in the strategy of Containment were the Truman Doctrine and the 
Marshall plan. At that time, in the mid of the Greek civil war, early in 1947 Britain 
notified the United States of their inability to continue assistance for Greece and 
Turkey^'. The declining British Empire made it clear that the US should support
"” j.L. Gaddis, 1992. The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implication, 
Reconsiderations, Provocation (New York; Oxford University Press), pp. 22-23.
J. L. Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 37-38; D.H. Allin, 1995. Cold War Illusions: America, Europe 
and Soviet Power, 1969-1989 (New York; St. Martin Press)
■*’ For the Interwar period see, R. Albrecht-Carrie, 1958. A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the 
Congress of Vienna (New York; Harper & Row Publishes), pp. 484-540.
George Kennan, an American diplomat, believed in this, from studying the history of empires. E. 
Gibbons wrote in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire that the Roman Empire fell because its 
sphere of influence was too huge. Kennan believed that Stalin’s empire would have the same fate. The 
territorial acquisitions and spheres of the Soviet Union had made would ultimately become a source of 
insecurity. This would take place for two reasons, because o f the resistance to Moscow’s control that 
was sure to grow within those regions and because of the outrage the nature of that the control was 
certain to provoke in the rest of the world. G. Kennan also believed in the philosophical and 
conceptual framework for interpreting Stalin’s foreign policy. In an embassy report which became 
known as the Long Telegram (1946) Kennan maintained that the US should stop blaming itself for 
Soviet intransigence; the sources of Soviet foreign policy lay deep within the Soviet system itself 
Soviet foreign policy was an amalgam of communist ideological zeal and old-fashioned tsarist 
expansionism. According to Kennan, communist ideology was at the heart of Stalin’s approach to the 
world. Stalin regarded the western capitalist powers as irrevocably hostile, the friction between 
Washington and Moscow but inherent in the Soviet Union’s perception of the outside world. See with 
details for the policy of Containment, H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 446-472.
Ibid, pp. 452-453.
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these two countries and not abandon them to their fate; otherwise, they would face a 
sort of Finlandization in the periphery of Soviet power.
Since Britain had expressed its decision to abandon its military and economic 
support in Greece and Turkey, the US government responded with the historic 
proclamation of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947. The Truman Doctrine 
despite considerable skepticism^^ among some members of the US administration^^ 
was announced by President Truman, declaring that the United States was to support 
free peoples who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by 
outside pressures^'*. If Greece fell under the control of an armed minority, its effect 
on Turkey would be immediate and serious, and the ensuing confusion and disorder 
might well spread through the Middle East. For this purpose he asked an allocation 
of four hundred million dollars of aid to be spent for supporting the shattered 
economy of Greece and provide military aid both to Turkey and Greece.
Washington was becoming convinced that the communist danger was spreading, 
feeding on poverty and despair, and that the US should act to “contain” this menace.
In June 1947, G. Marshall, Truman’s Secretary of State, announced an extensive 
recovery plan to hail Europe to its feet. A massive aid package was offered to all
D. Acheson, 1969. Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department (New York: 
W.W. Norton), pp. 197-198.
George Kennan one of President Truman’s major foreign policy advisors was of the opinion that 
emphasis should have been placed on “firmness of diplomatic stance, not on military preparations”. 
His fear was that US military aid might provoke Soviet aggression. See S. Taşhan, 1979. “Turkey’s 
Relations with the USA and possible future developments”, Foreign Policy 8:1-20 (Ankara), p.l7.
For the Truman Doctrine see for details H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 453; 0. Sander, 1979. Tiirk- 
Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964 (Turkish-American Relations 1947-1964) (Ankara: Ankara 
Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları), pp.I2-16; G. Gianoulopoulos, 1992. O 
metapolemikos kosmos. Eliniki kai Evropaiki istoria 1945-1963 (The Post War World: Greek and 
European history 1945-1963) (Athens: Papazisis Publications), pp. 81-89; G. Me Ghee, 1990. The 
US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection (New York: St. Martin Press).
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European powers who were having great difficulty recovering from the war. This 
plan had three complementary aims: to help the Europeans; to sustain lucrative 
export markets for US industry; and to eliminate poverty as a breeding ground for 
communism. The Americans were convinced that economic stability would secure 
democracy in the European states, including the defeated Germany^^.
In the post-war era soon the US realized that Soviet Union had different perceptions 
of how the new world would and should be. Cold War came about because there 
was a cultural gap between the US and the USSR (different ideologies and political 
systems). In the end, both of them found a consensus by dividing the European 
continent silently in two different blocs. By implementing the policy of Containment 
the US wished to restrict Soviet Union’s hegemonic control and dominance in 
Central Europe, and Southeastern Europe as Greece and Turkey were concerned.
2.2 An Overview of the US Perception of Greece and Turkey after the End 
Of the Second World War
2.2.1 The US Perception of Greece
In October 1944, Greece after experiencing four years of repressive and extractive 
occupation was evacuated by the German forces. Throughout the occupation years 
two significant resistance movements developed and gained control of certain parts
In the Marshall plan the US invited Stalin to participate but he was suspicious about the whole idea. 
Thus the Soviet representatives and the other Eastern European representatives abandoned the 
negotiations. By that time, Stalin had consolidated his influence with the coup in Czechoslovakia in 
1948 and had established control over other eastern Europeans states like Poland, Hungary and the 
Soviet occupied eastern Germany. See for details, J. L. Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 40-50; P. 
Duignan, and L.H. Gann, 1992. The Rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the Democratic 
World, 1945-1958 (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers), pp. 303-326.
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of Greece . Both carried out acts of sabotage and harassment against the German 
supply lines leading to northern Africa that passed down through Greece. The first 
movement was called EAM (National Liberation Front), and its military arm was 
ELAS (National Popular Liberation Army). The EAM and ELAS were dominated at 
the leadership level by members of the Greek communist party however, other 
parties, agrarian and socialist groups, participated in EAM and the overwhelmincr 
majority of the rank and file were not communists^^.
The second resistance group was republican and anticommunist in orientation. It was 
called EDES (National Republican Greek League), whose power base was in north­
western Greece. The British had been in contact and were quite supportive o f both 
groups so long as their primary objective was the resistance against the German 
occupation and harming the German forces^*.
Meanwhile, outside Greece operated a government in exile nominally headed by 
Greece’s King George II, but substantially functioning under the shadow and 
protective umbrella of the British command structure. During a meeting with Stalin 
in Moscow in October 1944, Churchill made an offer to Stalin for percentages of 
influence in countries of importance to them. The Soviet Union was to get 90 
percent control in Rumania and the 75 percent of Bulgaria, and Britain was to get 90 
percent control of Greece. Yugoslavia and Hungary were to be 50-50^^. King 
George, who ruled Greece under a system of shared dictatorship with General
G. Gianoulopoulos, O Metapolemikos Kostnos: Eliniki kai Evropaiki Istoria 1945-1963, pp. 
191-221.
”  S. Grigoriadis, 1982. Sinoptiki Istoria tis Ethnikis Antistasis 1941-45 (Short History of National 
Resistance 1941-45) (Athens: Kapopoulos Publications).
*^A. Vakalopoulos, 1993. Nea Eliniki Istoria 1204-1985 (New Greek History 1204-1985) 
(Thessaloniki: Vanias Publications), pp. 420-428.
H. Kissinger, Diplomacy p. 413.
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loannis Metaxas from 1936 to 1941*''^ , was not a popular figure in Greece and had 
little contact with the occupied Greece. The British, however, under the strong- 
willed leadership of Winston Churchill, had been clear their oft-repeated preference 
of restoring King George to his throne. This policy had predictable polarizing
consequences on the Greek political horizon®'.
Under the British influence, a Greek government -in  exile headed by George 
Papandreou®“ was formed. Royalist and Republicans politicians as well as five EAM 
ministers participated in the first Greek government after the end of the war.
The first Greek government arrived in Athens on the 12*'’ o f October 1944. As the 
euphoria of liberation began to fade away practical problems were compounded by 
political ones. The situation was indeed so volatile that only a spark could set off a 
major explosion. The spark came during an antigovemmental demonstration in 
Athens’ Constitution square on the 3’® December 1944, and hostilities that quickly 
spread in the Athens region between ELAS arm forces and the British troops®®. 
Papandreou resigned as he could not run the cabinet as a true national unity
“  See Chapter I, footnote 11.
For the British role in Greek politics see T. Couloumbis, 1983. The United States, Greece and 
Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York:Praeger Publishers), p.9; W.H. McNeill, 1947. The 
Greek Dilemma War and Aftermath (London: Victor Gollancz ltd), pp. 212-214; P. Papastratis, 
1984. British policy Towards Greece during the Second World War (Cambridge).
George Papandreou was a predominant figure of the Liberal Venizelist party. See A. Vakalopoulos, 
Nea Eliniki Istoria 1204-1985, pp.434-438.
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government and EAM forces left Athens to continue fighting against British and 
Greek governmental forces in the mountains^'*.
While the Greek civil war was real and Greece was considered under the British 
influence according to the “percentage agreement” between Stalin and Churchill^^, 
American attitudes toward Greece were in fact influenced by the liberal ideas and by 
the belief that the United States government could play a major role in bringing 
about significant changes in the Greek political system. Thus, the Department of 
State had disapproved the Greek monarchy both as an institution and as personified 
by King George II. The institution was viewed as foreign to Greek traditions, highly 
politicized, therefore, the cause of perermial division, suspicion, and violence. King 
George was thought to be a man of limited vision and the legacy of the Metaxas
fascist dictatorship^^.
Similarly the State Department was highly critical of Britain’s continued support for 
the Greek king and repeatedly expressed the view that the Greek people had the 
exclusive right to decide their constitutional questions, including that of the 
monarchy’s fate, without outside interference. In particular, the State Department 
objected to London’s declared intention to preserve king’s position and strongly
^^The communist and anti-communist resistance groups had been waging a conflict, building on an 
atmosphere of mutually paranoid reverence. Most of the countryside was in the hands of communist 
controlled resistance groups while the British troops were in Athens and Thessaloniki. See with details 
R. Clogg, 1992. A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press), pp. 136- 
143; M. Themis, 2003. O Efialtis tis Ethnikis Antistasis (The nightmare of the National Resistance) 
vol. 2, (Athens: Papazisis Publications).
See footnote 21.
^  L. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949, pp. 71-72.
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questioned British assertions that in Greece the monarchical system was a better 
guarantee of stability than a republican regime*^ .^
American officials were similarly critical of Greek political leaders, regarding them 
as unrepresentative of the people, small-minded, incompetent, and extremist. While 
the principal targets of disapproval were men of the right (Mavromichalis, Tsaldaris, 
Zervas)^** in the American view the country was without able democratic leadership 
no matter what the party affiliation. Thus the American embassy in Athens 
commented in October 1946;
“Lack of leadership is certainly what principally ails this country at the 
present time-leadership which can see beyond political problems which are 
not only local in character but also completely out of date. The five-year 
Metaxas dictatorship seems to have effectively prevented the rise of a new 
generation of politicians to take the place of the oldsters, who have now come 
back into the political scene, for lack of other leaders, and who still in terms 
of the old struggle between Royalists and Venizelists, entirely missing the 
meaning of the developments in Europe and the world which World War II 
and the rise of Russia have brought about. Small men, old men, and men 
entirely lacking in the sense of realism which the situation requires, are what 
we are having to deal with now. In addition, the king who has been brought 
back as a “solution” for the problems which the politicians will not tackle is 
the same old muddled indecisive figure that he always was”^^ .
When civil war broke out in Athens in December 1944, American officials had 
blamed the British as well as both extremes of the Greek political spectrum: “at 
bottom,” MacVeagh wrote to Roosevelt, “the handling of this fanatically freedom- 
loving country as if it were composed of natives under the British Raj, is what is the 
trouble, and Mr. Churchill’s recent prohibition against the Greeks attempting a
J. latrides, “American Attitudes Toward the Political System of Postwar Greece”, p. 57.
C. Tsaldaris was the leader of the Populist party (Laiko komma) and Mavromichalis was one of the 
most important members inside the party. N. Zervas was the leader of EDES, the resistance rightist 
group against the German forces and after the war became a predominant figure in Greek politics. See 
with details, G. Gianoulopoulos, 1992. O Metapolemikos Kosmos: Eliniki kai Evropaiki Istoria 
1945-1963 pp. 254-259.
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political solution at this time, if a blunder, is only the latest o f a long line of blunders 
during the entire course of the present war” °^. Once the fighting had stopped 
MacVeagh had been anxious to be helpful but carefully avoided becoming entrapped 
in British efforts to make it appear that in crushing the Greek left they had been 
pursuing an Anglo-American policy. Instead, the United States pressured the Greeks 
to hold national elections at the earliest opportunity so as to legitimize the Athens 
government, and through a testing of the nation’s will and the establishment of a 
parliament provide the needed mandate for a program of reconstruction and 
reconciliation. Until conditions of political stability had been achieved, until the 
Greek government could be made democratic and responsive to the popular will, and 
until it had learned to manage its financial affairs, American economic assistance 
would not be forthcoming.
Washington considered it imperative that the approaching elections be fair and free 
of coercion and to accomplish this, the Department of State insisted on the need for 
foreign supervision. If the Greeks objected to foreign observers, Washington was 
prepared to argue that the Declaration on Liberated Europe had mandated such 
international action. Through the 1945-46 winter, American officials warned the 
Greeks against rumored rightist coups, hinting that the United States would find it 
impossible to recognize a government installed by military action or other illegal 
means. Similarly, they insisted that every Greek was to be permitted to express his 
political views freely and no one prosecuted except for the commission of a definite 
crime. Once the elections were held on March 31, 1946 the United States sought to
70 Ibid, p. 60.
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emphasize that they had been reasonably fair, and to discount claims that, since the 
leftist parties had abstained, the results had seriously distorted the popular wilP'.
The American government’s opposition to the reactionary features of the Greek 
political system was destined to be short-lived. At the very moment that the United 
States was committing itself to a policy of massive support to Greece, its devotion to 
the ideals of Liberal Democracy was being eclipsed by other, more urgent 
considerations.
With the wartime alliance discredited by growing disagreements and the Soviet- 
American confrontation assuming a dangerous character, the United States began to 
shift its priorities and objectives. What mattered now was not Greece’s political 
system but its security from what was perceived as a Moscow-directed campaign of 
aggression.
In the spring of 1947 the US government had convinced itself that Greece was 
directly in the path of Soviet expansion. Accordingly military and security 
considerations dominated by the Truman Doctrine and concern for the spreading of 
democratic principles faded away^^. The shift of the American preferences to the 
solution of Greece’s political problems included the political, economic and
L. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949, p.34; See also V. Kontis, 1986. I 
Aggloamericaniki Politiki kai to Eliniko Provlima 1945-1949 (The English-American Policy and 
the Greek Problem 1945-1949) (Athens: Paratiritis Publications).
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administrative control over the Greek state. The United States undertook the 
principal responsibility of the Greek economic and security affairs^^.
The American Ambassador was assigned as the Chief of the United Stated Economic 
mission by the State Department in July 1947 having the authority and the dominant 
voice on the following; a. Any action by the United States representatives in 
connection with a change in the Greek cabinet; b. Any action by the United States 
representatives to bring or prevent a change in the high command of the Greek armed 
forces; c. Any substantial increase or decrease in the size of the Greek armed forces; 
d. Any disagreement arising with the Greeks or British authorities which, regardless 
of its source, may impair cooperation between American officials in Greece and 
Greek and British officials; e. Any major question involving the relations of Greece 
with the United Nations or any foreign nation other than the US; f  Any major 
question involving the politics of the Greek government toward Greek political 
parties, trade unions, subversive elements, rebel armed forces, including questions 
involving the holding of elections in Greece
2.2.2 The US Perception of Turkey
Turkey remained neutral during the Second World War. Despite the British efforts to
get Turkey to enter the war, the latter resisted^^. After the Moscow Foreign
”  V. Kontis, I Aggloamericaniki Politiki kai to Eliniko Provlima 1945-1949.
J. latrides, “American Attitudes toward the Political System of Postwar Greece”, p. 66.
In 19''' of October 1939, the Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty of mutual support was signed. Turkey 
received financial aid for the purchase of military equipment. In a separate protocol attached to the 
treaty, Turkey was excused from any obligation which could involve her in a war with the Soviet 
Union. The treaty stipulated that Turkey would “collaborate effectively” with France and Britain in 
the event of an act of aggression of a European power leading to war in the Mediterranean (a clear 
reflection to Italy). However, after Italy declared war on France and Britain in June 1940, Turkey 
stayed out of the war, invoking the separate protocol. Despite that pressures upon Turkey increased
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Ministers Conference in October 1943, an allied delegation was sent to Turkey to 
urge the Turks to side with the allies. George Allen representing the State 
Department told Turkish Foreign Minister Menemencioglu that unless Turkey 
entered the war, it “could not assume a respected position in the postwar world” *^^.
The pressure increased even further at a Conference o f İnönü, Churchill and 
Roosevelt in Cairo in December 1943. The allies now clearly held the winning hand 
and they pointed out that, if Turkey stayed out of the war for much longer, it risked 
being isolated after the war. The implied threat was that it would have to face the 
Red Army and any demands Stalin might make on its own. İnönü finally accepted 
that Turkey would become an active belligerent on the allied side, but he asked for 
an overall campaign plan for the allied conquest in the Balkan first. This was a 
clever tactic because the allied powers differed widely about the desirability of a 
Balkan campaign since Stalin objected to any British or American interference^^.
Throughout 1944, the Turks kept stalling, although it broke its diplomatic relations 
with Germany in August 1944. Their attitude led the British and the Americans to be 
more sympathetic to Soviet demands. In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference,
after the German occupation of Greece in April 1941 and the German invasion in Soviet Union in 
June 1941 Turkey kept up a neutral position, pleading lack of preparation and the need for supplies 
with the British governments. Turkish stance was considered in a large extent as immoral from the 
allies and country’s international reputation was damaged, but for Turkey having the recent 
experience of the First World War and the disasters brought upon the country, was a satisfactory 
development. See with details, S. Deringil, 1989. Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World 
War: An “Active” Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 71-116; F. Weber, 
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they agreed in future changes in the Montreux Treaty^*. Shortly, afterwards, on the 
23''‘* of February 1945, Turkey officially declared war on Germany’ .^ This last move 
provided Turkey with a seat at the United Nations Organizational Conference in San 
Francisco^®.
Throughout the war İsmet İnönü who was the successor of Kemal Atatürk after his 
death in 1938 ruled the country. The end of the war signaled the beginning of 
important changes in the Turkish political system . President İnönü announced in 
the Turkish Assembly on November 1945, that he was prepared to make major 
adjustments in the political system and to bring it in line with the changed 
circumstances in the world, a reference to the victory of the democracies over 
fascism. The main deficiency in the Turkish system, he noted was the tack of an 
opposition party and he was prepared to allow it* .^ Though external factors were 
significant in pushing Turkey towards political change, it was the erosion of the 
political alliance between the military -bureaucratic elite and the landlords that made 
the status quo difficult to remain .
During 1945 new political parties appeared. The most important was the Democratic 
Party (DP) which was formed by important former members of the RPP. The leader
H. Howard, 1974, Turkey, The Straits and US policy (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins 
University Press).
”  S. Bôlükbaçi, “The Evolution of a Close Relationship: Turkish-American Relations”, p. 86.
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of the party was the former Prime Minister Celal Bayar . Another important change 
took place in the RPP itself In its congress in May 1946, it took a number of 
liberalizing measures: it accepted direct elections and the position of permanent 
chairman of the party was abolished, as was the title of the “Milli Ş ef’ (National 
Leader)**^ .
Along with the policy of liberalization in the internal scene immediately after the 
war, Stalin’s aggressive behavior towards Turkey facilitated the rapprochement with 
the West in general and the United States in particular.
At the Yalta Conference, Stalin raised the issue of the Straits*® on lO'® of February 
1945 and argued that the Montreux treaty (1936) was absolute and a product o f a 
period when the USSR was weak. He suggested that “it was impossible to accept a 
situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia’s throat*’. Without discussing the 
merits of this argument, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin agreed to leave the issue to 
the negotiations of the foreign ministers.
On the 7'® of June 1945 Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov informed Selim Sarper, the 
Turkish Ambassador to Moscow that the USSR wanted revisions in the 1921 Treaty
Y Saribay, 1991· “The Democratic Party, 1946-1960” in M. Heper and J. M. Landau, Political 
Parties and Democracy in Turkey (London : LB. Tauris & Co Ltd), pp. 119-130.
F Bahrampour, 1967. Turkey: Political and Social Transformation (New York:Theo.
Gaus’Sons), pp. 19-21.
When Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu visited Moscow in September 1939, the Soviets 
demanded from Turkey the adoption of a new straits regime which would be favorable to them. Since 
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of Friendship which ceded the provinces of Kars and Ardahan to Turkey. He also 
demanded the revision of the Montreux Convention by Turkish-Soviet agreement 
and the joint defense of the Straits by Turkey and the Soviet Union^^ When the 
State Department was informed about this conversion, let Turkey know that it 
considered the Molotov-Sarper conversation as informal and exploratory; and that it 
saw no need to protest “a preliminary exchange of views’’*'^ .
The United States detachment towards Turkey’s security problems continued at the 
Potsdam Conference in July 1945. American policy makers considered Turkey “an 
area of diplomatic, economic and military conflict between the USSR and Great
Britain ,90
At Potsdam, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov once more stated that the Straits 
should be jointly defended by Turkey and the USSR. In his reply, Truman objected 
to Soviet bases in the Straits, but he proposed to replace the Montreux Convention 
with an international regime which would guarantee all states free access to the 
Straits. At the end of the Conference, the Big Three agreed that the Montreux Treaty 
should be revised and that all three governments should discuss the matter with 
Turkey individually. Truman’s Straits proposal indicates that he believed that Soviet 
concerns were justified. He hoped to alleviate Soviet anxieties concerning the Straits 
and save the wartime cooperation in the postwar period^'. *
** Ibid p. 86; E. Athanassopoulou, 1999. Turkey-Anglo- American Security Interests 1945-1952. 
The First Enlargement of NATO (London: Frank Cass), pp. 38-50.
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Gradually, the US became more supportive of the Turkish position. When the Soviet 
demands were communicated officially to Turkey in August 1946, the US advised 
Turkey to take a firm lineal Thus encouraged Turkey to refuse the Soviet demands, 
but it did so in conciliatory terms. The Soviet note to the Turkish government came 
at a time when the United States was beginning to question its policy vis-à-vis the 
USSR in the face of Soviet actions establishing communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe. This led Washington to re-evaluate the strategic importance of Turkey. The 
turning point in US foreign policy towards Turkey was the announcement of the 
d'ruman Doctrine. The US no longer expected that an accommodation with the 
Soviet Union would be possible, and there was no reason to fear that American aid to 
Turkey may alienate the Soviets.
In the American eyes, Greece and Turkey looked quite differently at the end of the 
war. Greece’s internal political situation was totally unstable and the country was in 
the middle of a tragic civil war. This gave to the United States the “right” to involve 
and later on almost to decide for the developments in the Greek internal affairs. The 
Americans in the beginning thought that they could apply the principles of liberal 
democracy but soon after they realized that it was impossible because the situation in 
Greece was chaotic and in the fear of the Soviet expansionism.
In Turkey they were never allowed to be involved in the domestic affairs Turkish
political system took important steps towards democratization in an effort to be
closer to the changes of the post-war environment. With regard to Turkish security
concerns vis-à-vis Soviet Union, the US was not very sensitive. They even voiced a
K. Kirişçi, 2001. “US-Turkish Relations; New Uncertainties in a Renewed Partnership” in B. 
Rubin, and K. Kirişçi, (eds.) Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p. 130.
41
willingness to accept changes in the regime of the Black Sea Straits established by 
the Montreux Treaty of 1936. Only when they realized the danger of the Soviet 
revisionism, they shared the Turkish concerns and decided to include Turkey under 
their security umbrella.
2.3 Greek and Turkish Perception of the US at the End of the War to the 
Eruption of the Cyprus Conflict
2.3.1 Greek Perception of the US Involvement
Immediately after the end of the war the civil strife erupted in Greece created a deep 
political division in the political scene. The Greek government and public were too 
preoccupied in 1947 with the ranging civil war to raise any objections to what would 
prove to be pervasive American interference in their domestic affairs^^ The 
American support was essential improving the strength and fighting capabilities o f 
the Greek armed forces so that they could go on the offensive and defeat the 
communist insurgency quickly and decisively.
After the American involvement in 1947 the government forces overpowered, 
defeated the co-called Democratic Army (the Communist forces) in less than two 
years. Americans helped in the modernization of the Greek armed forces, but at the 
same time the powerful Greek army was involving in politics and military secret
93.T. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey, p. 15.
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organizations continued to regard themselves as a praetorian guard and arbiters of 
legitimacy of the nation’s governing authority^'*.
However, significant part o f the American aid was the financial support and technical 
guidance needed to repair the country’s devastation and build the foundation for 
longer lerni development. As the country was included in the Marshall plan, whose 
primary purpose was to restore Europe’s economy by providing the necessary 
working capital. Serious work was done to build the foundations for 
industrialization, by repairing and expanding the road and rail systems, introducing a 
countrywide network of electrification, and strengthening the health services^^.
Greece with the proclamation o f the Marshall Fund in June 1947 received 1.7 billion 
dollars in economic aid (loans and grants) and 1.3 billion dollars in military aid. 
Nevertheless, much of the assistance was channeled to government’s military
effort96
US military and economic aid became the primary level of US presence and 
influence in Greece. The dependency o f the Greek governments allowed the 
American interference in the domestic affairs which planted the seeds of anti- 
Americanism in the following years.
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The absence of strong and effective governments that would have vision, restraint 
and patriotism to form a political coalition which would include all the moderate 
Greek political forces deteriorated Greek politics even further^^. With the American 
tolerance and in the name of anti-communism the Greek authorities intensified police 
controls, trade unions remained under close government supervision and political
intrigues continued among the military.98
Nevertheless, the general view was that American involvement in Greece’s affairs 
brought welcome relief and the assurance that people would not share the fate of 
their communist-dominated Balkan neighbors. Hence, after the end of the civil war 
in 1949 closer relations with the US was the primary objective for Greece’s national 
interests. For Greece a major objective was the entrance to NATO as equal partner. 
Entry was expected to lead to a direct US commitment through NATO, thus 
achieving greater deterrent power. In an effort to build good credentials with NATO, 
Greece participated in the Korean War in June 1950. Finally, it entered NATO in 
1952 along with Turkey^^.
America’s institutional and structural presence in Greece strengthened in the early 
1950s with the signing of bilateral agreements regulating the status of US bases in
’’ The US would have played a different role in the political evolution of Greece than the one 
Washington chose in the late 1940s. The promotion of the democratic process and the liberalization of 
the country’s political system was primarily the responsibility of the Greek people and their leaders- 
and not the outsiders.
For the American role in the post-war Greece see T. Couloumbis, J.A Petropoulos, and H.J. 
Psomiades, 1976. Foreign Interference in Greek Politics (New York: Pella); Y. Roubatis, 1987. 
Dourios Ipos: I Amerikaniki Diisdisi stin Ellada 1947-1967 (Trojan Horse: The American 
Interference in Greece 1947-1967) (Athens: Odysseas Publications); D. Charalambis, 1985. Stratos 
kai Politiki Exousia: I Domi tis Exousias stin Metaemfiliaki Ellada (The Army and the Political 
Power: The Structure of Power in post civil war Greece) (Athens: Exantas Publications); I. Stefanidis, 
1999. Apo ton Emfilio ston Psixro Polemo: I Ellada kai o Simaxikos Paragontas (From the Civil 
War to Cold War: Greece and the Allied Role) (Athens: Proskinio Publications).
’’ T. Couloumbis,The United States, Greece and Turkey, pp. 17-20; E. Hatzivassiliou, 1995. 
“Security and the European Option: Greek Foreign Policy, 1952-1962” in Journal of Contemporary 
History. 30:1: DP. 187-202.
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the Greek territory. The bilateral agreements were signed in February 1953. These 
agreements provided for America’s right to establish bases; to man, equip, and 
resupply these bases; to overfly Greek territory; and to provide generally for the legal 
status and local accountability of US forces. These executive agreements were to be 
supplemented over the years by numerous ad hoc arrangements revising the legal 
status of US forces, adding new functions and provisions in specific installations and 
providing for coordination between sending and host state'®*^ .
2.3.2 Turkish Perception of the US Involvement
At the end of the war, Turkish government’s aim was to involve the US in defending 
Turkey against the Soviet Union. This was an urgent objective for Turkey after the 
Soviet revisionist demands. The US obliged, cautiously at first and enthusiastically 
later. The US was convinced that Turkey’s geographic location rendered it a key to 
the Middle East and began to be interested in the territorial integrity o f Turkey'°‘.
The Truman Doctrine signified the formal emergence of the US as Turkey’s 
principal supporter in the West. The need for declaring a doctrine of resolve the 
Soviet Union was dramatized by the Greek civil war, which was fast shifting in favor 
of the Communist guerrillas. Turkey, on the other hand, was not considered to be on 
the danger list. However, in the words of a US official, Turkey “ ...was slipped into 
the oven with Greece because that seemed the surest way to cook a tough bird” '° l
‘“ T Couloumbis The United States, Greece and Turkey, p. 16; I. Stefanidis, 2003. Asimetroi 
Etairoi Oi Inomemes Polities kai I Ellada ston Psixro Polemo 1953-1961 (Unequal Partners. The 
United States and Greece in the Cold War 1953-1961) (Athens: Patakis Publications).
G Harris ed. 1985. The Middle East in Turkish-Amencan Relations (The Heritage
“^ (3*^Hartri, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, p.26.
45
Internally, in contrast with Greece, the Turkish regime appeared not to be in any 
immediate danger. Political liberalization was continuing, the political contest 
seemed harmonious, problems still existed but they did not seriously threaten the 
Turkish political system’*^ .^
Through the Aid Agreement signed in June 1947 Turkey received 1.1 billion dollars 
in economic aid (loan and grants) and 1.9 billion dollars in military aid'°‘*. In 
contrast with Greece, Turkish government paid much more consideration in this 
agreement. The Turks being conscious through their history to the pain of offering 
special privileges to foreigners (the capitulations during the Ottoman Empire) 
insisted that US officials monitoring aid to projects would be limited in their 
movements by requirements of Turkey’s national security considerations'*^^
This financial help offered the opportunity to equip the Turkish military 
establishment in order to improve its mobility and power. Also the aid agreement 
provided for the modernization and maintenance of the Turkish armed forces. Much 
of the financial aid through Marshall Plan concentrated on developing agriculture
The basic need was not only to equip and strengthen the army, but to infuse new 
blood, new methods and new tools into the economy in order to bring about a
For the emergence of the DP and its rivalry with RPP in the years 1946-1950 see F. Ahmad, 1993. 
The Making of Modern Turkey , pp. 105-107.
T. Couloumbis,The United States, Greece and Turkey, p.l5; O. Sander, Tiirk-American 
İlişkileri 1947-1964, pp.46-52. See also G. Me Ghee, 1990. The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East 
Connection (New York: St. Martin Press), pp.35-50.
G. Harris, Troubled Alliance; Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, pp.54-
A. Kilic, 1959. Turkey and the World (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press), pp. 142-143.
61.
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development which would offset the load of national defense in the budget, and also 
support the defense efforts by a healthy economy. Nevertheless, the US support to a 
certain extent increased the level of the Turkish dependency on the US.
In the Turkish political scene, the American stance was accepted positively. There 
was a consensus -except the left wing socialist parties- to depart from the interwar 
neutralism towards a western orientation. Throughout the period between 1947 and 
1950 there was a consensus between the RPP government and the opposition party 
DP on pursing closer relations with the west and searching for a formal alliance with 
the US in order to strengthen its security posture against the Soviet Union'°^.
After the establishment of NATO in April 1949, Turkey was immediately interested 
in participating in the new military organization. Entry was expected to lead to a 
direct US commitment through NATO, thus achieving greater deterrent power. To 
increase its possibilities for entry Turkish government decided to send troops to 
Korea which actually was the third largest contingency after the Americans and 
Koreans'®**. The DP government which came in power in 1950 seemed to be more 
enthusiastic for the NATO membership'®®.
Turkish entry delayed because of western indecision as well as British-US 
conflicting interests with respect to organizing for western defense in the Middle 
Eastern area. In the late 1940s Britain was interested in establishing a regional 
Middle Eastern organization that would have been placed under its control and
E. Çayhan, and N. Güney, (eds.) 1996. Avrupa’da Yeni Güvenlik Arayışları: NATO-AB- 
TUrkiye (The Search for a New Security in Europe: NATO-EU-Turkey) (Istanbul: Afa Yayınları).
Ibid, pp. 151-152; G. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-Anierican Problems in Historical 
Perspective, pp.38-40.
O. Sander, Türk-Aınerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964, pp.46-52.
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would have included Turkey, as well as Greece. A number of Scandinavian states in 
NATO were also not so positive about the idea of expanding the NATO treaty to 
include such clearly non-Atlantic states as Turkey and Greece"®.
Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuat Köprülü, declared publicly on August 1, 1950, that 
NATO entry would be an “acid test of US interest in Turkey” '" .  The constant 
diplomatic requests reminders and complaints finally bore fruit. With the United 
States pressure a NATO foreign ministers meeting in Ottawa (September 1951) 
approved Greek and Turkish accession into NATO. British interests were secured 
later by including Turkey in the British-led Baghdad Pact (subsequently renamed 
CENTO), established in 1955, and thus rendering NATO and CENTO 
interdependent, as British and Turkish membership was common to both pacts''^.
The American presence in Turkey was further reinforced through bilateral 
agreements with the US signed in June 1954 which allowed the establishment of 
military and communications bases in Turkey to be used against the USSR. These 
agreements allowed the US to man, equip and supply these bases; to fly over Turkish 
soil; and established the legal status and local accountability of US forces in 
Turkey''^
E. Athanassopoulou, Turkey-Anglo- American Security Interests, pp. 236-242; 0. Sander, 
Tiirk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964 pp. 25-34; N. Eren, 1977, NATO and Europe: a 
Deteriorating Relationship? (Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs).
" ‘ M. Gönlübol, et. al. Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, pp. 223-227.
"■ S. Tashan, “Turkey’s Relations with the USA”, p. 15; 0. Sander, Türk-American İlişkileri 1947- 
1964 pp.79-84; H. Bağcı, 1998. “Demokrat Partinin Ortadoğu Politikası” (The Middle East Policy of 
the Democratic Party) in F. Sönmezoğlu, (ed.) Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (An Analysis of 
Turkish Foreign Policy) (Istanbul: Der Yayınları), pp. 101-133.
G. Flarris, Troubled Alliance Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, p.54-61; 
F. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus, pp. 116-125.
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Reasoning the triangular relationship between the United States and its two junior 
partners after the end of Second World War, we can reach the following conclusions:
• The beginning of the Cold War era was a period of rapid and unquestioned 
US global ascendancy concurrent with a rapid decline of the European power.
• Stalin’s attempts to establish a wide buffer zone in Eastern Europe were 
perceived as a revisionist objective in the Greek-Turkish area. Therefore, the 
governments of Greece and Turkey sought to secure commitments, peacetime 
entanglements, presence and guarantees from the west -  and especially from 
the United States. The various Greek cabinets did so with the utmost urgency 
and with no other options. The cabinets of Turkey, on the other hand, sought 
US aid after a careful weighing.
• The objectives of both Greece and Turkey were simple: contain Soviet 
penetration in their domestic affairs, simultaneously neutralizing left-wing 
(Socialist and Communist) opponents at home that were laying claims to 
power. Further, by maximum participation in organizations such as the 
Council of Europe and NATO, Greece and Turkey could “institutionalize” 
their relationship with other western states which in the past had manipulated 
them informally. Through formal participation on the basis of legal equality 
in these multilateral organizations, both Greece and Turkey were gradually 
developing legal, political and psychological filters muting direct intervention 
and maximizing perceptions of sovereignty and independence with 
predictable political benefits at home.
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• The US commitment towards Greece and Turkey was explained in the 
context of Washington’s Cold War political strategy as soon as the US 
became convinced of Stalin’s real intentions to “export communism”.
Considering that Greek-Turkish bilateral relations were on good-to-excellent terms 
throughout this postwar period, the diplomatic task for the United States was 
relatively trouble free. It was not until 1955 and the emergence of the “Cyprus 
question” that US policymakers began realizing that when its junior partners 
experience serious disputes, there occurs an automatic spill-over effect disturbing the 
smoothness of the southeastern flank of NATO, placing vital US and western 
interests in the Greek-Turkish strategic space in jeopardy.
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CHAPTER III
THE OUTBREAK OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT AND 
DETERIORATING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 
TWO NATO ALLIES
3.1 The First Phase to 1960
Greece and Turkey, together with the remaining Balkan states, had emerged from the 
ashes of the slowly disintegrating, multinational, and Turkish-administered Ottoman 
Empire in the aftermath of First World War. World War I and, to a lesser extent. 
World War II provided the guidelines for the disposition of territories among the 
various national states. Since World War II, the Balkans -once referred to as the 
“powder keg of Europe”- entered into a phase of regional stability.
One small, but strategically very important, area in the region that had escaped 
allocation after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was the island of Cyprus, which 
had been under British colonial control since 1878. With the decolonization 
pressures growing in the 1950s and 1960s, the problem of Cyprus emerged as a 
major bone of contention dividing the Greeks, the British, and the Turks. Each of the 
three NATO countries felt that its vital interests were at stake, and they soon entered 
into a dangerous collision course. The task for the United States - then the
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unquestioned leader of the Western Alliance- was to carve out policies that would 
lead to peaceful settlement that would not simultaneously rupture the cohesiveness o f 
the strategic southern flank of NATO.
Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea after Sicily and Sardinia 
It is located in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea 60 miles west of Syria, 40 
miles south of Turkey, and about 150 miles east of the Greek Dodecanese islands.
The cultural presence of Greeks on Cyprus can be traced back to the earliest times of 
recorded history, and it has been continuous ever since. Through the ages, however, 
Cyprus has been the prize of frequent and extractive invasions and has been 
administered by Phoenicians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, mainland Greeks, 
Romans, Byzantines, Venetians, Ottomans, and the British“ ''. The Turkish 
community’s presence on Cyprus goes back to 1571 with the conquest of Cyprus by 
the Ottomans Turks. The Ottomans ruled Cyprus directly until 1878, when, in 
exchange for British support against the Russians, they leased the island to the 
British“ .^ The British annexed Cyprus in 1914 after the Ottoman Empire joined 
forces with the Central Powers in World War I. In 1925, finally, the British 
converted Cyprus to the status of a Crown Colony'.116
For a detailed study of the history of Cypnis see F. Alasya, 1939. Kibris Tarihi (History of 
Cyprus) (Nicosia); D. Alastos, 1955. Cyprus in History (London: Zeno).
A. L. Macfie, 1996. The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (Revised Edition. Longman: London and 
New York), pp.35-45; J. McHenry, 1987. The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919-1939 (New 
York and London: Garland Publishing), pp. 1-32; Ş.S. Gürel, 1984. Kibris Tarihi (1878-1960) 
(History of Cyprus 1878-1960) (Ankara:Kaynak Yayınlan) vol. 1, pp. 17-33
R. McDonald, 1988. “Alliance problems in the eastern Mediterranean -  Greece, Turkey and 
Cyprus: Part II Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean,” Adelohi Papers 229, pp.7-8; Ş.S. Gürel, 
Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960), pp. 65-80.
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Throughout the centuries of the Ottoman and later the British administration, the 
Greek and the Turkish Cypriots maintained a remarkably conflict-free record. 
Although the two groups did not frequently intermarry, they lived and cooperated 
side by side throughout the island whether residing in small towns or mixed villages. 
The Turks generally concentrated their talents in administration, security (army, 
police), and agricultural sectors, whereas the Greeks gravitated toward commerce, 
small industry, and professions being involved in the island’s main activity of 
agriculture.
The first half of the twentieth century was an age of fierce nationalism and Cyprus 
was not left unaffected. Nationalism as a powerful mobilizing political and 
psychological force began spilling over from the Turkish and Greek mainland into 
the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. Among the majority community of 
Greek Cypriots, the dream was to attain enosis (union) of Cyprus with the 
motherland of Greece. Agitation for enosis was given added impetus and some hope 
once Cyprus was transferred to British administration. In 1915, Great Britain, 
seeking to enlist the Greeks into the entente ranks in World War I, offered Cypms to 
the then neutralist Greek government under the control of King Konstantine I. The 
offer was rejected by the German-leaned King, and a chance was missed to attain this 
important Greek objective''^. Subsequently, the slow ferment in favor of enosis 
continued, with an uprising by Greek Cypriots in 1931 and the British had to use 
force to quell it''*. During World War II, when Greece and Britain once again were
T Xristodoulides, 1991. Diplomatiki Istoria 1815-1919 (Diplomatic History 1815-1919) (Athens: 
Sideris Publications), pp. 555-557; J. McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919-1939, pp. 
32-33.
The riot was organized by the Greek Consul Alexis Kyrou. Venizelos who opposed the riot, 
recalled Kyrou immediately to Athens. As a result the British mled the island with harshness. Kyrou 
as a General Director of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the protagonist of the Greek
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fighting side by side against Germany and her allies, the Greek expectations for the 
postwar annexation for Cyprus were revived.
But once World War II ended and the Cold War gradually assumed its tension-filled 
course, the British appeared determined to maintain their control over strategically 
located Cyprus. Matters came to a head in the mid-1950s, following a number of 
undiplomatic rebuffs by British high officials to representations and inquiries by 
Greeks and Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots, enjoying the strong backing of the 
Papagos government in Athens, began setting the foundations of a struggle for the 
self-determination of Cyprus. Greek Cypriots expressed that their struggle would 
lead to enosis because of the structure and preferences of the great majority of the 
population” .^
The struggle for self-determination was designed to be two-pronged. On the military 
side, a small but extremely efficient, anti-British terrorist network was established. It 
was called EOKA (Ethniki Organosi Kiprion Agoniston - National Organization of 
Cypriot Fighters). Its leader was a Cypriot bom, right wing Greek Army officer, 
George Grivas; and its supply lines and logistical support could clearly be traced to 
Athens. The EOKA initiated acts of sabotage against British military targets and
appeal in the UN in 1954. V. Mathiopoulos, 1984. Tha xasoume ti Kipro? (Are we loosing Cyprus?) 
(Athens: Livani Nea Sinora), pp. 27-30; J. McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919- 
1939, pp.85-89; Ş. S. Gürel, Kıbrıs Tarihi, pp.134-141.
In 1950 a plebiscite organized by the Greek Orthodox church overwhelmingly was in favor of 
union with Greece. In this period, though the Greek government had significant concerns for raising 
the Cyprus issue in the international scene. It has raised their objections to Archbishop Makarios a 
number of times. But, by the fear of the domestic political cost and the rhetoric of Makarios they were 
urged to agree. See for details, M. Alexandrakis, V. Theodoropoulos, and E. Lagakos. 1987. To 
Kipriako 1950-1974 Mia Endoskopisi (Cyprus Problem 1950-1974 An Introspection) (Athens; 
Evroekdotiki), pp.21-22; A. Heraclidis, 2002. Kipriako: Sigrousi kai Epilisi (Cyprus Problem: 
Conflict and Resolution) (Athens: Sideris Publications), pp. 40-42; C. M. Woodhouse, 1982. 
Karamanlis The Restorer of Greek Democracy (Oxford University Press: New York), p. 63; Ş. S. 
Gürel, Kıbrıs Tarihi vol.2, pp.65-69.
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against Cypriots showing a soft attitude toward the British colonial authorities. These 
acts were designed to draw world attention to the Cypriot problem. Simultaneously, 
on the political front, the Greek Cypriots, led by young Archbishop Makarios, were 
hoping to secure a settlement of the issue in the United Nations with the Greek 
government’s support and resting their case on the principle of national self-
determination 120
The British argued that Cyprus was their “domestic affair, not subject to U.N 
jurisdiction. The Turks of Cyprus first allied themselves with Britain and opposed 
the idea of Enosis. Later, during the mid-1950s the Turkish Cypriots argued that if 
Britain wanted to forgo its sovereignty over Cyprus, then Turkey should reclaim the 
island. When the Greek Cypriots with the support of Greece formed EOKA, the 
Turks also formed their own paramilitary organization, the TMT (Türk Mukavemet 
Teşkilatı - Turkish Resistance Organization). Towards the end of 1950s, the TMT 
adopted partition of the island between Greece and Turkey as its major goal‘s‘.
Turkey followed a similar course. Turkish governments until the 1950s considered 
events in Cyprus as a British internal affair. İnönü, who had represented Turkey at 
the Lausanne peace negotiations in 1923, did not bring up the Cyprus issue for fear
T.W. Adams and A. Cottrell, 1968. Cyprus Between East and West (BaltimoreThe Johns 
Hopkins Press), pp. 8-10.
D. Bitsios, 1975. Cyprus The Vulnerable Republic (Thessaloniki: Institute of Balkan Studies), 
pp. 22-46; S. Bilge, 1975. “The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey” in Karpat, Kemal, (ed.) Turkey’s 
Foreign Policy in Transition 1959-1974 (Laiden: E.j. Brill), pp.138-139; S. Ismail, 1997. Kıbrıs 
Sorununun Kökleri : Ingiliz Yönetiminde Türk-Rum İlişkileri ve ilk Türk-Rum Kavgaları (The 
Roots of the Cyprus Problem. Turkish-Greek Relations During the British Administration and the 
First Turkish-Greek Dispute) (Nicosia: Kıbrıs Türk Mücahitler Derneği), pp. 354-364; X. loanides, 
1991. Neo-Otliomanikos Imperialismos 1955-1995 (Neo-Ottoman Imperialism 1955-1991) (Athens: 
Troxalia Publications), pp.61-95.
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that Britain would become more intransigent over the capitulations'^^. Actually 
j after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Ankara encouraged the migration to 
Turkey of a significant number of Turkish Cypriots.
During the late 1930s and in the 1940s Ankara was satisfied with the British 
presence on the island, believing that this would serve as a deterrent against Soviet as 
well as German expansionism in the area. Hence, it is not surprising that on 30 
October 1948 the foreign minister of the ruling People’s Republican Party (PRP), 
headed by İnönü, told the National Assembly that for Turkey “there is not a Cyprus
123problem as such” .
Turkey’s interest in Cypriot affairs increased in 1954 when Greece brought up the 
question of Cypriot self-determination at the UN General A s s e m b l y ' B r i t a i n  
opposed the Greek attempt, and AnJcara supported Britain, arguing that Cyprus was 
British internal affair. The decision of Greece to internationalize the issue in 1954 as 
well as the starting of the EOKA’s activities in 1955 led Britain to organize the 
London tripartite Conference with the participation of Turkey (August 29-September 
7, 1955).
S. Bölükbasi, 1993. “The Johnson Letter Revised,” Middle Eastern Studies 29:3, p.507; Ş. S. 
Gürel, Kıbrıs Tarihi vol. 1, pp.109-114.
‘^ S^. Bölükbasi, “The Johnson Letter Revised”, p.508.
It is uunclear as to whether the Papagos government chose to ignore the Turkish factor in its 
decision toward the 1954 U.N. appeal, or simply miscalculated the degree of the Turkish interests in 
Cyprus. The latter seems more valid for the following reasons: First, it was still the euphoric phase in 
the post-war Greek-Turkish relations; second, the low response at the Turkish official level towards 
the growing demands on Cyprus for enosis. Thus tlie Greek government underestimated the negative 
messages coming from the Turkish press and public opinion indicators as not representing the views 
of the Turkish government; Third, Greek policymakers assiuned that the Menderes government, then 
in power in Turkey, like its predecessors would abide by articles 16 and 20 of the 1923 Laussane 
Treaty and fifth, Greece and Turkey participated in NATO, in bilateral defense arrangements with the 
US, and in the tripartite Balkan Pact. As a result, the Greek government did not anticipate Turkish 
fears of encirclement by Greece in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean if Cyprus also came 
under Greek sovereignty; See also Ş. S. Gürel, Kıbrıs Tarihi vol. 2, pp.78-82.
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The Conference led nowhere as Greece insisted that self-government should not 
exclude enosis in the long run, however, for the first time Turkish stance became 
clear on the issue: Turkey preferred the continuation of the British rule on Cypms, 
but if any change was to come in the island’s status, Cyprus ought to revert to Turkey 
because of prior possession, geographic contiguity, and the presence of the 18 
percent Turkish Cypriot minority. Thus the only compromise Turkey appeared to be 
willing to make was based on the policy of taksirn, the Greek-Turkish partition of 
Cyprus'“^ .
The consequences of these miscalculations were damaging the Greek interests as 
well as Greek-Turkish relations. Shortly thereafter, on September 6-7, 1955, unruly 
Turkish citizen groups, with the backing of the Menderes government in Ankara 
(which proved later in the Menderes trial in 1961) attacked the property and persons 
o f the Greek minority in Istanbul. The damage was considerable in blood and 
treasure'^*^. As a result of the 1955 events, a serious number of the prosperous Greek
127minority left for Greece .
The Papagos government in Athens was incensed and ordered back all the Greek 
officers who were serving in the mixed NATO regional command operating in Izmir. 
The Greek side expected a strong official US reaction. Instead, the American 
reaction was mild as the US was not prepared to go as far as the Greeks would have
F Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus, p. 237.
A Alexandris, 1983. The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974
(Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies).
In 1952 in a meeting between Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Evagelos Averof and Makarios, the 
first referred that a possible rising of the Cyprus Issue would have a negative impact on the Greek 
minority of Istanbul. Makarios agreed to that possibility and added that despite that Hellenism of 
Istanbul is important, it is convicted to disappear in the long-term. E. Averof-Tositsa, 1982. Istoria 
xamenon efkerion;IGpriako 1950-1963 (History of Lost Opportunities :Cyprus Problem 1950-1963) 
(Athens: Estia Publications), vol A p.35.
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wanted to go. Secretary Dulles sent two identical letters to the Prime Ministers of 
Greece and Turkey, deploring antagonism between the two countries and calling for 
restraint . The message the US was sending to all parties concerned was to be 
repeated many more times during the coming years: that the Cyprus problem, as well 
as bilateral problems between the countries involved, were relatively unimportant 
and had to subordinated the real danger, which continued to be communist 
infiltration and exploitation of the weakness in the southeastern European region. US 
ambassador Steams wrote :
It was inconceivable to the US government that two states which felt 
themselves directly threatened by the Soviet Union, which had insistently 
sought the protection of NATO membership, and which were receiving large 
amounts of military and economic aid from the United States would permit 
bilateral problems to get out of hand'
Steams carried on criticizing his government,
...we have consistently behaved as though Greece and Turkey erased a 
millennium of their history when they signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 
February 1952, abandoning forever those national interests and objectives that 
were incompatible with US efforts to maintain a balance of power with the
_ . no
Soviet Union
The equal distance stance between the two countries that Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles took with his letter on the IS"’ of September disappointed Greeks. In a 
moderate message King Paul made Dulles know that the “feelings of indignation of 
the Greek people with respect to the Turkish atrocities and feeling of abandonment 
by our friends run far higher than you may realize” '^'.
T. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey, p. 29; for a thorough analysis and harsh 
criticism of the two letters to Papagos and Menderes see; M. Steams, 1992. Entangled Allies US 
Policy Toward Greece and Turkey, and Cyprus (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press), 
pp. 29-34.
Ibid, p.9.
Ibid, p.6.
C. Nicolet, 2001. United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek- 
Turkish Bone of Contention (Bibliopolis Mannheim und Möhnesee), p.65.
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Concerning the developments in Cyprus, US policy in the 1950s was one of seeking 
damage control within the NATO alliance. In a conflict pitting Greece on one side 
against Britain (and subsequently Turkey) on the other, the United States reluctantly 
tilted on the side of Britain and Turkey. During the 1950s, US votes in the UN were 
considerably closer to the British and Turkish preferences; this, quite naturally, 
created resentment and disappointment in Greece.
The US position was opposed to the internalization of the Cyprus question in the UN, 
and instead favoring a quiet settlement of the problem within the “NATO family”. 
The US was concerned about the involvement of the Cypriot Communist party
132AKEL in the nationalist movement .
The inability of Greece to find enough support at the U N '”  as well as its reluctance 
to deepen the dispute with Ankara led it to consider independence an acceptable first- 
stage solution of the Cyprus crisis. For the Turks an independent Cyprus was also 
more acceptable than a Cyprus unified with Greece. So, when Greece opted for 
negotiations after the November 1958 UN debate, Ankara agreed. Unexpectedly, 
negotiations led to a rapid agreement between the Turkish and Greek Prime 
Ministers, Menderes and Karamanlis, and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots had to 
follow suit' '^*. The London summit o f four parties in February 1959 led to a 
settlement which provided an establishment of an independent Cyprus*.135
*^  ^ “Documents: Cyprus, 1950-1954; The Prelude to the Crisis, Part II: The View of the United 
States, 1988. .Toumal of the Hellenic Diaspora, XV: 1-2, pp. 72-73; C. Nicolet, United States Policy 
Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention, pp. 32-42.
*^  ^ S. Xydis, 1968. “The UN Assembly as an Instrument of Greek Policy: Cyprus,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 12:2, pp. 141-158.
'^ “US Department of State, Vol X, 18,
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On August 16, 1960, Cyprus emerged as an independent state. The outcome was a 
product of an asymmetrical compromise. The Cyprus constitution, accordingly, 
sought to protect the major interests and expectations of each of the contending 
parties. Cyprus was named an independent republic, but Britain was allowed to 
maintain sovereign rights over two good-sized base areas in the southern and eastern 
regions of the island. Greece and Turkey, together with Britain, were named 
guarantor powers with the right of e le c tiv e  or individual intervention to restore the 
constitutional status quo of the young republic. Greece and Turkey, in addition, were 
permitted to maintain small military units on the island and to act as suppliers and 
overseers of their respective ethnic communities. Union (enosis) with another state 
and partition {taksim) were expressly forbidden. This was accepted with serious 
reservations by the Greek Cypriot leader. Archbishop Makarios. The Turkish Cypriot 
leader. Dr. Fazil Küçük, on the contrary, initiated the new arrangement quite readily.
The bicommunal form of government established in 1960 contributed to the 
separation rather than the integration of the ethnic groups. The two communities 
were set constitutionally to be educationally, culturally, and religiously apart. The 
legal system provided that the Greek Cypriots should be judged by Greek Cypriot 
judges, Turkish Cypriots by Turkish Cypriot judges, and cases involving litigants 
from both communities by special mixed two-judge courts. The President of the 
Republic was always to be a Greek, elected separately by the Greek community, and 
the vice president, always a Turk, was to be elected separately by the Turkish
Ş S Gürel Kıbrıs Tarihi vol 2, pp. 152-154; A. Vlachos, 1982. Deka Xronia Kipriako (Ten Years 
Cyprus Problem) (Athens: Estia Publications).
S. Bölükbaşı, 1993. “The Johnson Letter Revised,” pp. 510-511; M. Sanca, E. Teziç, and O. 
Eskiyurt, 1975. Kıbrıs Sorunu (The Cyprus Problem) (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları), 
p.l2.
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community. Each of these executives was granted an irreversible veto over foreign 
affairs, defense and internal security. Simultaneously, a system of ethnic quotas was 
set up for both executive and legislative branches. The Turkish Cypriots (whose 
population was about 18 percent of the total) were designated to have 30 percent of 
the portfolios in the cabinet and 30 percent of the seats in the House of 
Representatives (where the representatives were to be elected separately by each 
community). The Turkish Cypriots were also assured 30 percent of the posts in the 
civil service and police forces and a 40 percent quota in the army. Important 
legislation (on matters of taxation and the economy in general) needed separate 
majorities of both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot caucuses in the House of 
Representatives, and constitutional amendments were rendered virtually impossible 
because they required the consent of separate two-thirds majorities of both ethnic
caucuses’^^ .
This complicated political/legal arrangement broke down three years after the 
establishment of the Cyprus republic. The Greek Cypriots had been complaining that 
the Turkish minority had been given disproportionate rights and that the business of 
governing the island could hardly proceed under legalized deadlock circumstances. 
The Turkish Cypriots, for their part, saw in potential Greek constitutional revisionist 
tendencies an attempt to erode their hard-earned rights and to move gradually toward 
the isolation and the political and even cultural elimination of the Turkish Cypriot 
presence from the island. However, the Greek Cypriot administration which had the 
upper hand in ruling the island never had endeavored sincere efforts to apply the 
provisions of the Treaties that established the Cypriot state.
A Heraclidis, Kipriako: Sigrousi kai Epilisi, pp. 68-72; S. Bilge, “The Cyprus Conflict and 
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In retrospect, the Cyprus crisis during the 1950s and the early 1960s at first, pitted a 
strong NATO member, Britain, against a relatively weak one, Greece. The stronger 
party sought to have the matter resolved and possibly quietly forgotten through direct 
bilateral negotiations. The weaker party, Greece employed the classic levers of 
weakness: adopting harassing terrorist activity in Cyprus and resorting to the public 
multilateral forums hoping to embarrass Britain in open debate. The British, seeking 
to weaken the Greek hand in Cypms, encouraged Turkish Cypriot and Turkish 
ainland involvement in the disposition of the case. The Turks, considering their 
security concerns and interests, became a part of the problem. So what began in 
1954 as a British-Greek dispute over Cypriot self-determination had been 
transformed by 1959 into a dangerous Greek-Turkish bilateral dispute over the future 
of Cyprus with the British now playing the role of the “honest broker”.
m
own
American efforts, throughout, were designed to prevent Cyprus from disrupting the 
smooth functioning of the southeastern flank of NATO. The US adopted a passive 
role toward Cyprus during the 1950s because it considered Cyprus within Britain’s 
sphere of influence. The US was mainly concerned that the Cyprus crisis would 
cause a deterioration of relations between three of its allies and weaken NATO. It 
did not object to enosis or taksim, provided that these solutions would come as a 
result o f trilateral negotiations. Hence, the US opposed Greece’s recourse to the UN 
and called for negotiations among interested parties.
The Zurich-London settlement and the declaration of Cyprus’ independence was thus 
a welcome development for the US. It was pleased with the compromise 
agreements, which seemed to eliminate a serious friction point in the relations of
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three of its allies. For the moment the stability and viability of the western alliance 
seemed assured.
3.2 The Second Phase, 1963 to 1974
Having settled the Cyprus issue at Zurich, both Greek and Turkish governments 
turned their attention to other areas of concern. The acceptance of the agreements 
posed greater difficulties and risks for the Greek than the Turkish government. After 
all, the Greeks in Greece and Cyprus had to come to terms with abandoning the old 
national dream of enosis. The Zurich Accords may have settled the Cyprus dispute, 
but the desire for enosis did not wane in Cyprus or Greece. Thus, in due course, 
Makarios, Grivas and some Greek politicians in Athens were able to exploit 
widespread national disenchantment in their renewed bid to pursue union.
Forsaking enosis was not easy even for Karamanlis who well understood the 
limitations of Greece’s power. According to C.M. Woodhouse, Karamanlis’ 
biographer, the Greek Premier believed in the historical inevitability of enosis. But 
he also believed in the need for avoiding a confrontation with Turkey. As 
Woodhouse stated: his advice had been that Makarios should seek to assuage the 
suspicions o f the Turks, to co-ordinate his policy with the Greek government, and to 
join NATO as an independent state. Thus the Greek nation would have two voices in 
all international bodies. Karamanlis later argued that if Makarios had followed his 
advice, we should arrive one day at enosis .
137 C. M. Woodhouse, Karamanlis The Restorer of Greek Democracy,p. 87.
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In Turkey, the Menderes government, which negotiated the Cyprus agreements, was 
overthrown in a military coup in May 1960, before the Cyprus Republic was 
proclaimed. However, one day after their takeover on May 27, 1960, the military 
rulers “went on record in support of the Zurich and London agreements”’ *^. The new 
military leaders channeled their energies into introducing a new Constitution and 
civil administration. After the elections of October 1961, a civilian government took 
office from the military.
In Cyprus, in the presidential elections of December 1959, Archbishop Makarios was 
challenged over his abandonment of enosis. Among the critics of the settlement was 
EOKA leader G. Grivas, who returned to Greece to a hero’s welcome. Nevertheless, 
Makarios defeated John derides, the rival candidate for the presidency, winning 
two-thirds of the votes. He proceeded to win every subsequent Greek-Cypriot 
election with huge mandates. The Archbishop’s political acumen and charismatic 
personality enabled him to exercise enormous authority in the Greek-Cypriot 
community.
On the Turkish Cypriot side. Dr. Fazil Küçük was acclaimed as Vice-President. 
Another Turkish Cypriot leader of considerable stature was Rauf Denktaş, a brilliant 
lawyer, who became President of the Turkish Communal Chamber and who 
exercised an influential role in his community’s politics.
Cypriot leaders saw themselves as guardians of their respective communities’ 
interests. This approach, as well as the absence of a consensus on how to cope with
T. Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, p.52.
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the major aspects of government, led to constitutional disputes within less than a 
year'^^. One of the contested provisions stated that civil service jobs were to be 
allocated between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the ratio of 70:30. Since the 
Turkish share of the population was 20 percent, Greek Cypriots argued that this was 
discriminatory to them. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, whose job prospects in 
the private sector were less favorable than Greek Cypriots, were eager to have their 
allocation of public service jobs without delay.
Another controversial issue that seriously damaged intercommunal relations 
concerned the division of municipalities in the five major towns. The Constitution 
provided for the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish municipalities. 
However, after independence Greek Cypriots leaders wanted to defer separation, 
claiming it could be used as a basis for partition in the future. On the other hand, 
Turkish Cypriots pressed for implementation because they feared that Turkish 
neighborhoods would be poorly served by unified municipal authorities controlled by 
the Greek majority. The issue was referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court of 
the Republic, which ruled in favor of separate municipalities in April 1963.
Yet another disagreement arose over the organization of the Cyprus army. The 
Constitution provided for an army of 2000 men, to be recruited after independence: 
its composition was to be 60 percent Greek Cypriot and 40 percent Turkish Cypriot. 
The Constitution did not specify whether Cyprus army contingents were to be 
integrated or formed as separate units. Both Vice-President Küçük and Defense 
Minister Örek favored separate units, pointing out that integrated contingents would
139 Z. Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict National Identity and Statehood, p.52.
65
face great difficulties due to linguistic and religious differences of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots soldiers. Makarios opposed separate units. Consequently, the Greek 
Cypriot majority in the council of ministers decided on unified contingents. Upon 
Küçük’s use of veto, Makarios decided not to have an army at all. These and other 
lesser issues caused deadlock and immobilized the partnership government
On November 30, 1963 President Makarios, acting of the advice of the British High 
Commissioner on Cyprus''” released a document proposing 13 substantive 
amendments to the 1960 constitution. Makarios’s amendments sought to eliminate 
the veto rights of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and the Turkish Cypriot caucus 
in the House of Representatives and to seriously reform the quota system as it had
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been applied to governmental practices
Both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots rejected Makarios’ proposals out of hand on 16 
December 1963; and the level of tension increased. Soon the threshold of physical 
violence was crossed leading to intercommunal bloodshed. Turkey and Greece 
moved to protect the interests of their surrogate communities in Cyprus, and the 
United States and NATO were, once again, faced with a situation where two 
important junior partners were at the gates of warfare'143
The Greek Cypriot decision to remove the Zurich-London Accords was a calculated 
risk given the anticipated reaction of the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. Makarios and
S. Sonyel, 1997. Cyprus, The Destruction of a Republic, British Documents 1960-65 (The 
Eothen Press), pp. 13-29; D. Bitsios, Cyprus The Vulnerable Republic, pp. 115-124; P.N. Vanezis, 
1974. Makarios Pragmatism v. Idealism (London; Abelard-Schuman), pp. 115-121.
Officially British side denied any involvement. See for details, M. Alexandrakis, To Kipriako 
1950-1974 Mia Endoskopisi, pp.32-34.
S. Mayes, 1981. Makarios A Biography (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd), p.l61.
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his associates had to take into consideration the ability of Turkey to respond 
militarily.
On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots had the advantage of considerable local 
military superiority. Former EOKA directing Greek Cypriot armed forces felt 
confident of their ability to crush Turkish Cypriot resistance before Turkey had a 
chance to intervene. In addition, Makarios expected the new Greek Prime Minister 
George Papandreou who came to power in November 1963, would help to deter a 
Turkish intervention by threatening Greek retaliation. Papandreou had disapproved 
the Cyprus settlement and promised further support for a policy of enosis '^ '^ .^ This 
had encouraged Makarios to set his amendments proposals, something would have 
never attempted if Karamanlis were in power.
The United States under President Lyndon Johnson, fearing a war between Greece 
and Turkey, took its first step in crisis management on 23 December when Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk asked US ambassadors to tell Ankara and Athens to “urge 
maximum restraint on three governments and on both communities in Cyprus’"*^.
The intercommunal violence continued''*® which had resulted in the Turkish air 
bombing of Nicosia on 25th of December; and this brought the establishment of a
Papandreou when came to power had two main options; either to continue with Karamanlis’s 
NATO-oriented policy patterns in Cyprus or to seek a more politically advantageous (popular) road of 
pursuing a Cyprus settlement through the United Nations. Papandreou chose the second road
S. Bölilkbaşı, 1988. The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and 
Cyprus (Lanham: University Press of America), pp. 59-60.
A. Çay, 1989. Kıbrıs’ta Kanlı Noel-1963 (Bloody Christmas in Cyprus-1963) (Ankara; Türk 
Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınlan); R. Denktaş, 2000. Kıbrıs: Elli Yılın Hikayesi (Cyprus: 
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“joint” peace force mainly by British that seemed to please all the parties''*^. 
Makarios was pleased because Turkish military intervention was avoided. The 
Turkish government also seemed pleased because the introduction of the British 
troops was to keep order and prevent the outbreak of new hostilities.
Despite the establishment of the “joint” peacekeeping force, violence did not end in 
Cyprus. Meanwhile, the breakdown of the constitutional order had convinced the 
Turkish Cypriots that the 1960 constitution needed change so as to grant them 
additional guarantees against violence. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, 
renewed their calls for a unitary state without the “fetters” of the 1960 constitution. 
Since all parties desired a change in the constitution of Cyprus, they readily accepted
148a British proposal to convene a conference in London
Greece and Turkey sent to London their foreign ministers, Costopoulos and Erkin, 
whereas Britain was represented by Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs 
Duncan Sandys. On 16 January, the representatives of the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot communities, derides and Denkta§, joined the conference. During the first 
phase of talks they discussed the political status of the island. Three different plans 
were proposed by Greeks and Turkish Cypriots and Britain.
Greek Cypriots demanded the establishment of a unitary state and the elimination of 
special rights granted to Turkish Cypriots by the 1959 Treaties. Denkta§, too, called 
for a revision of the 1959 Treaties so that a bizonal or cantonal federation could be 
established. His plan envisaged the establishment of one or two Turkish cantons and
B. O’Malley, and I. Craig. 1999. The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish 
Invasion (London: I.B.Tauris Publishers), pp.92-93.
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the transfer of the Turkish population to these areas. Denkta§ added that if federation 
were not accepted, partition would be the only alternative left''*^.
As expected, the Greeks and the Turks rejected each other’s proposals. In order to 
save the conference, Duncan Sandys offered a compromise solution on 20 January 
1964. The British plan contained several aspects which could be considered pro- 
Greek or pro-Turkish, such as the adoption of a parliamentary system without 
communal quotas or local autonomy. The British plan satisfied neither the Turkish 
nor the Greek side. After its rejection on 21 January, the conference was suspended 
for two days. The same day. Secretary of State Rusk asked US ambassador Hare to 
assure the Turkish government that if the London Conference failed, the NATO 
Council could take up the issue. He added that Turkey should be reminded that it 
was an integral part of the NATO family and that the US would do its best to 
accommodate Turkey’s interests'^®.
Rusk realized that the situation was getting out of hand, and that if the US wanted to 
prevent a debacle in NATO’s southeastern flank, it had to act. The US proposed in 
February 1964 a NATO force sent to Cyprus which was accepted by Greece and 
Turkey but was rejected by Makarios'^'. Upon Makarios’s rejection of the NATO 
force on 4 February 1964, the US Administration decided to send Undersecretary of 
State, George Ball, to the area to convince Makarios that some kind of a
'^ ’ Ibid.
S. Rizas, 2000. Enosi, Dixotomisi, Anexartisia: Oi Inotnenes Polities kai i Bretania stin 
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peacekeeping force was necessary in Cyprus to prevent Turkey’s intervention'^^. 
Ball went also to Turkey to convince İnönü that the US was doing its best to end the
cnsis.
İnönü accepted Ball’s proposal of a peacekeeping force without US participation on 
10 February 1964. Ball’s negotiations with Makarios were not so successful. Two 
days later, Makarios told Ball that he could accept a UN peacekeeping force 
composed of troops from Commonwealth countries. Makarios added, however, that a 
UN Security Council resolution “guaranteeing the political independence and 
territorial integrity of Cyprus should precede the establishment of such a force”
In other words, Makarios wanted the UN to annul the Treaty_of Guarantee and 
support the “unfettered” independence of Cyprus. As Ball put it, Makarios’ central |
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interest was to block off Turkish intervention
Ball then turned to Ankara and tried to reassure İnönü that the US would support 
Turkey and would not ignore Turkey’s rights in Cyprus. In the meantime, 
intercommunal violence continued and the arrival of the UN forces (March 1964) 
was not enough to end violence. The Turkish government publicly protested these 
actions in Cyprus and the National Security Council in June 1964 decided to 
intervene in the island to establish “a political and military beachhead”. It was hoped
US Department of State : Vol XVI: 3, 
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that the intervention would enable Turkey to negotiate a satisfactory settlement 
within a short time'^^.
On 4 June 1964, İnönü called US ambassador Raymond Hare to inform him of the 
government’s decision to intervene in Cyprus. İnönü said that despite all American 
assurances, attacks against Turkish Cypriots did not stop and that the situation was 
becoming worse every minute. The Turkish fears further increased, because Greek - 
government was increasing its military presence in the island
President Johnson, in order to avoid a Turkish landing in Cyprus, which would have 
resulted in a Greek-Turkish war, replied with a letter delivered to Turkish Prime 
Minister İnönü on June 5, 1964. The letter, written in a rather undiplomatic style, 
categorically rejected İnönü’s suggestion that all peaceful means had been exhausted 
and stated that Turkey’s “right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable”. In 
İnönü’s words, this letter made use of all the means that could be assembled. Johnson 
stated that Turkey’s intervention would lead to a war between Greece and Turkey'^^. 
By pointing to the possibility of a Greek-Turkish war, Johnson was in fact stating 
that the US would not prevent Greece from attacking Turkey. Furthermore, Johnson 
maintained that “a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct 
involvement by the Soviet Union”. Johnson added: “I hope you will understand that 
your NATO allies have not a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to 
protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in
S Bölükbasi, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations, p.74.
The first months of 1964, Papandreou government secretly sent Greek troops in Cypms which 
reached the number of 10,000 (well above the limits set by the Zurich and London agreements). 
Greeks aim was to provide a credible deterrent against a possible Turkish invasion which would create 
a fait accompli of partition of Cypms.
'^ “^Document President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu,” Middle East Journal. X X , p.386.
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Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO
allies” '^ l
Johnson also stated that he had “no doubt that the general membership of the United 
Nations would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey...”, and 
added that “the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied 
military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present 
circumstances”. Johnson concluded with the assurance that the US would remain 
“deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of Turkish Cypriots” and invited 
İnönü to Washington to discuss the cnsis .
İnönü received the letter with serious consideration. Johnson dwelt on the dangers 
İnönü feared most. He stressed that a Greek-Turkish war would be likely and failed 
to indicate what the US would do to avert it. More significantly, Johnson insinuated 
that if Turkey’s intervention led to a Soviet attack on Turkey, the US might refrain 
from coming to its aid. The possibility of its contingency was bound to affect 
İnönü’s decision to intervene, given the fact that only one month earlier Khrushchev 
had once more opposed Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus'®®. Johnson also intimated 
that the US might join other members of the UN in condemning Turkey and even 
imposing sanctions on it. Finally, Johnson reminded İnönü that he could not use 
American supplied military equipment. İnönü knew only too well that non- 
compliance could mean an American embargo'®'.
Ibid.
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Johnson had left İnönü a way out by proposing consultations in Washington. İnönü 
cancelled the intervention and accepted the offer of discussions by writing to 
Johnson that . .a settlement is likely to be reached if you lend your support and give 
effect with your supreme authority to the sense of justice inherent in the character of 
the American nation” '*"^ . İnönü informed the public that Johnson had asked for the 
postponement of the intervention and had invited him to Washington to review the 
situation. He did not reveal, however, the full content of the Johnson letter. İnönü 
probably feared that a full disclosure would create an instant public uproar and 
backlash which could harm Turkey’s alliance relationship with the US.
However, Johnson’s words created doubts among the Turks about the credibility of 
the NATO umbrella in case of a Soviet attack on Turkey. Furthermore, it became 
apparent to many Turks that the alliance with the US entailed a number of limitations 
to their freedom of action in vital matters of foreign policy'^^.
After forestalling Turkey’s intervention, Johnson knew that he had to make an 
equally forceful presentation to Papandreou in order to induce him to be as 
forthcoming as İnönü. The President made several attempts to influence Greek 
officials. In one of them, Johnson told the ambassador of Greece, Alexander Matsas, 
that “Greece must avoid at all costs humiliating its ally Turkey” and should negotiate 
with her to reach a settlement. Johnson hinted that the next time he might not be as
“Document President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu,” p.387.
C. Nicolet, United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974, pp. 244-245.
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influential with İnönü by saying that negotiating with the Turks was difficult, but it
would be more difficult to talk after an invasion 164
I
During June 1964 the Greek Premier, George Papandreou, and Turkish Premier 
İnönü visited Washington. İnönü accepted bilateral n e g o t i a t i o n s i n  contrast to 
Papandreou. The later was “tough” in his meeting with Johnson and rejected any 
attempts for Greek-Turkish talks’'^ ''. Papandreou estimated that time was in Greek 
side’s favor, and it was a matter of time to achieve enosis'^^. Eventually, Greek 
Prime Minister only agreed to separate talks of Greek and Turkish representatives 
with an American emissary, if UN mediator Tuomioja specifically asked for 
American assistance.
The American mission finally started on July 5 in Geneva with former Secretary of 
State, Dean Acheson as mediator. On 14 July 1964 Acheson submitted his proposals 
to the delegations headed Nihat Erim, and Dimitris Nicolareizis. His plan provided 
for a union with Greece. Greece in return would make certain concessions to Turkey. 
A portion of the island should be ceded to Turkey in full sovereignty which should 
be used as a military base'®^ Then special arrangements for the protection and the 
welfare of those Turkish Cypriots not included within the Turkish sovereign base'*^ .^
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The Turkish side accepted the plan as a basis for negotiations, however, Greek side 
rejected it, as it was disapproved from President Makarios'^°. v,
A modified version of the first Acheson plan then proposed a leasing of the base to 
Turkey for 50 years instead of ceding it. Moreover, the special provisions and 
guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots envisioned as the first plan. This time both sides 
rejected it'^'.
Though Acheson mission did fail, the United States could have contained the 
conflict, prevented a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey and 
advanced a settlement that would have safeguarded western interests in the 
Mediterranean region. In practical terms, the Acheson’s plans for the Cyprus solution 
would have provided for the dissolution of the state of Cyprus on the basis of a 
Greek-Turkish agreement, offering the armexation option to Greece while allowing, 
in compensation, a smaller, but sizeable, portion of Cyprus, to be administered by 
mainland Turkey.
All the versions of the American plan could have been sold to the Greeks as enosis 
and to the Turks as taksim. The plan in the American eyes would have solved the 
problem of Cyprus permanently and to the west alliance’s advantage. The island 
would have been retrieved from the status of a non-aligned state and placed in the 
NATO sphere, apportioned among the three NATO allies (as the British presence 
would have been continued in the sovereign base areas).
' ’’TrS Department of State ; Vol XVI; 94,
http: //www..state.gov/r/na/ho/frus/iohnsonlb/xvi/4765.htm.
D. Brinkley, 1998. “The Cyprus Question: Dean Acheson as Mediator,” Journal of the Hellenic 
Diaspora 24:1, p. 13.
75
In order to reach to such solution Greece and Turkey should have agreed on the 
proposed terms (portion of the territory) and should have convinced their respective 
peoples in Cyprus. On the first issue Greece could not even accept the idea of 
making territorial concession even if it was only a military base of the size of the 
current British base. Turkey, on the other side, was trying to get a larger portion of 
the island for their military base, including space for as many Turkish Cypriot 
civilians as possible.
On the second issue, the Turkish government did not face any problem as Turkish 
Cypriot community fully approved Turkish actions all along. In contrast, the Greek 
government had to cooperate and convince the hard-to-control President Makarios 
who was in favor of enosis but at the same time had formulated his own non-aligned 
policy.
Papandreou himself faced an enormous problem, as he could not control Makarios, 
and to commit him with the Greek policy, and simultaneously persuade Americans to 
achieve the best agreement he could make with the Turks’’^ So he was entrapped 
between Makarios policy (whose policy totally disapproved) and his own vague 
populist policy toward enosis.
Papandreou after the rejection of the first Acheson plan, discussed with the American side the 
possibility to “overthrow” Makarios and declare “instant e n o s is” by a joint action of the Greek 
Cypriot and Greek parliaments, while the three guarantor powers and the US could reach agreement to 
provide for a Bill of Rights for the Turkish community and a NATO base with a Turkish commander. 
C. Nicolet, United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974, p. 107. These conspiracy plans never 
implemented because US feared the Soviet involvement and there was also sufficient support from 
Grivas in Cyprus. Additionally, Americans were convinced that Papandreou was weak and had no real 
power to impose such risky plans.
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After the failure of the American mediation, it was clear that the Greek Cypriots had 
no intention of going back to the pre-December 1963 order in Cyprus. Makarios 
strengthened his power and made clear that he was one o f the main players of the 
game that no one could ignore. In the military level, the gradual infiltration of 10,000 
Greek troops in the island preserved the status quo and in the political level he 
continued verbally to purse enosis. He wa.s saying: “I aspire to unite the entirety of 
Cyprus with Greece, not part of her. To succeed in doing so, I shall remain firm and 
unbent, prepared to sacrifice myself and die” '^ .^
On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots quickly established their own administration 
which resembled a small state but controlled only 5 percent of the island. The 
Turkish administration possessed all the political, military, administrative, judicial 
and social institutions. It should be added that Turkey subsidized most o f the 
functions o f this administration by an annual grant o f 10 million British pounds.
Two and a half years later, Athens’ newly established military regime'^"', in a Greek- 
Turkish meeting in September 1967, proposed to the Turkish side the union of 
Cyprus with Greece due to the communist danger, and in exchange Turkey would 
acquire a military base under the status of leasing or sovereignty. Turkish Prime 
Minister Siileyman Demirel rejected the offer and proposed partition o f the island .
A. Papaxelas, O Viasmos tis Elinikis Dimokratias, p. 129.
During the mid-1960s, the political situation in Greece was dangerously destabilized. The 
government of George Papandreou fell under pressure from the palace in July 1965 over the 
disagreement between Papandreou and the young king Konstantino for the control of the army. The 
problematic democratic process interrupted after the military coup under the leadership of Colonel 
George Papadopoulos on 21 April 1967. D. Kitsikis, Istoria tou elinotourkikou xorou apo ton 
Venizelo eos ton Papadopoulo, pp.275-285.
M. Fırat, 1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu, p. 212; S. Bölükbaşı, The 
Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations, p.l29; M. Sarıca, Kıbrıs 
Sounu, pp. 136-143; D. Kitsikis, Istoria tou Elinotourkikou Xorou apo ton Venizelo eos ton 
Papadopoulo, p. 304.
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For one more time, it was proved that Greece and Turkey could not agree on a 
political solution for Cyprus on the basis of enosis. Two months later, in November 
1967 a third crisis burst, provoked by the unwarranted attack against two small 
Turkish villages led by Grivas and elements of the Greek national guard’^ *^.
The Turkish government threatened to retaliate with military intervention unless 
Grivas was removed from the island together with the 10,000 Greeks’ mainland 
troops that had been infiltrated into Cyprus in 1964. The American diplomacy 
activated again between Athens, Ankara and Nicosia and Cyrus Vance, then 
President Johnson’s special representative, convinced Papadopoulos -one of the 
leaders of the Junta regime established in Athens in April 1967- to remove Grivas 
and the Greek army division from Cyprus, development that satisfied the Turks’’ .^
With the removal of the Greek troops -Makarios did not oppose it- Greece lost a 
credible deterrent against Turkish use of force in the island and seriously damaged its 
prestige. Greece also showed that she desired enosis, however, she was not 
determined to make a war for it. Additionally, the military regime’s stance showed 
that it could make easy concessions in order not to dissatisfy the US. During the 
1967 Cyprus crisis, the Americans did get involved mainly to settle the crisis, and as 
this was achieved, they did not pay further attention to the problem.
A. G. Xydis, 1976. “I Exoteriki Politiki tou Stratiotikou Kathestotos (The Foreign Policy of the 
Military Regime) in G. Gianoulopoulos, and R. Clogg, (eds.) I Ellada kato apo Stratiotiko Zigo 
(Greece under the Military Yoke) (Athens: Papazisis Publications).
US Department of State : Vol XVI: 340, 
httn: /www.state.gOv/r/Da/ho/frus/iohnsonlb/xvi/4761.htm.
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3.3 The Third Phase, 1974 and After
After the crisis of winter 1967, to be followed by the removal from Cyprus of the 
10,000 supernumerary Greek troops and the departure of activist General George 
Grivas, the ethnic troubles on the island seemed to settle down to a state of relative 
stability. But as negotiations between the two ethnic communities strung out over 
the years, the political center stage moved into a new phase involving an intra-Greek 
Cypriot political conflict aggravated by the interventionist policies of the military 
junta that was ruling Greece.
The pressure from the Greek military regime against a progressively independent 
Makarios gathered momentum in the early 1970s. Makarios’s “greatest sin” 
according to the Athens colonels was that he was involved in aiding anti-junta 
elements'^®. Furthermore, the Athens junta accused Makarios that he “had betrayed 
enosis'\ Hence they encouraged the reactivation of EOKA, which became known in 
its reorganized version as EOKA-B. The EOKA-B attacked Makarios’s self-serving 
and autonomist policies as the first steps toward the dehellenization of Cyprus.
During this phase EOKA-B was once more under the leadership of the aging, but 
popular, George Grivas, who reentered Cyprus secretly in September 1972 and 
mounted a campaign of intimidation against Makarios and his supporters.
Concerning the future Cyprus settlement, the policies between Makarios and the 
Greek government diverged completely. The colonels’ objective appeared to be
178 T. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey, p.77.
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moving in the direction of securing a generous version of Acheson Plan as they did 
in September 1967. If carried through, such a plan would have eliminated the 
Makarios government and led to the annexation of the bulk of Cyprus to Greece 
allowing in the form of “adjustments” for some territorial presence of mainland 
Turkey to Cyprus. These adjustments, the junta felt, were necessary in order to allay 
the Turkish fears regarding the threat of Greek encirclement. Greek diplomats 
accordingly met secretly with their Turkish counterparts in Lisbon and Paris in 
connection with NATO meetings that were held in these capitals. Without reaching 
formal agreements, Greek and Turkish interlocutors moved closer to consensus based 
on some form of “double enosis'" (or partition). Athens at that time showed clearly 
that she was seeing the Cyprus issue as a Greek-Turkish problem which should be 
settled between the two countries, ignoring the Cypriot govemment'’ .^
Makarios completely disagreed with these initiatives and he refused to cooperate 
with Athens regime. In January 1968 before the presidential elections he declared 
that '‘■enosis is the long-term aim, however, at the time being it is not feasible” '*®. 
Makarios rejected enosis indirectly. Having the full control of the government, he 
was believing that time was in favor of the Greek Cypriots, and that he was delaying 
the progress in the inter-communal talks
181
Situation seriously deteriorated when Papadopoulos was replaced (November 1973) 
by his trusted security chief. Colonel Dimitrios loannides. loannides established a 
civilian front-type government. He reserved for himself the exercise of real power.
Y Kranidiotis, 1984. Diethnopiisi kai Apodiethnopiisi tou kipriakou Provlimatos 
(Internalization and De-intemalization of the Cyprus Problem) (Ph.D. Thesis. Athens: Panteion 
University), pp. 196-197.
Ibid, p.l79.
'«'Ibid, p.241.
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but he operated from the sidelines. The new dictator remained for years in virtual 
anonymity. He formed a reputation of bein^ fanatically anti-Communist and 
uncontrollably anti-Makarios. He was a deep believer in enosis. His hatred toward 
Nlakarios verged on the pathological and dated back to the time loannides had served 
in Cyprus in the early 1960s. Unlike Papadopoulos, who was prepared to see 
Makarios fall through the use of political pressure, manipulation, and even 
assassination techniques'^^ loannides had no inhibition against using large-scale 
military force in order to remove his bitter rival from the political scene.
The death of General Grivas in January 1974 was the second event that exacerbated 
the Cypriot situation. Despite Grivas’s personal anti-Makarios feelings, Grivas had 
acted throughout as a relatively restraining influence on EOKA-B terrorist activities. 
Grivas was opposed to assassination attempts against Makarios, and even more 
opposed to taking the type of action such as a military coup that would provoke
Turkey’*^
On July 15 1974» finally, the Athens junta attempted a coup against Makarios . 
The Cypriot National Guard, aided by units of EOKA-B was ordered to grab power 
in a blunt and bloody coup. Archbishop Makarios, whose Presidential Palace was 
reduced to rubble by National Guard artillery fire, escaped from death and fled over
A ecret plan, code-name “Hermes”, was used by mainland Greeks and Greek Cypriot operatives, 
March 1970 managed to shoot down the Archbishop’s helicopter. The helicopter crash-landed, 
b t t^he Archbishop and hTs pilot escaped death, T. Couloumbis, 1996. Kipriako: Lathi, Didagmata 
k^i Proo tikes (Cyprus Problem: Mistakes, Lessons and Prospects) (Athens: Sideris Publications),
L  T C ouloum bis, The United States, Greece and Turkey, pp.78-80.
'*■* For the inaction o f  the US to stop the Greek Junta see 1. Slengesol, 2001. “A Bad Show? The 
n  'ted States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis”, Mediterranean Quarterly 1:2, pp.96-129; C. Nicolet, 
u" 'ted  States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974, pp. 414-429; S. Rizas, 2002. Oi Inomenes 
p " r f  I Diktatoria ton Sintamatarxon kai to Kipriako Zitima 1967-1974 (The United States, 
t L* ufctatorship o f  the Colonels and the Cyprus Problem 1967-1974) (Athens: Pataki Publications),
pp. 175-192.
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the mountains to a British base. From there he was flown with the British aid to 
safety through Malta to London. Nikos Sampson, a right-wing, pro-EOKA-B 
operative was installed by the Greek junta as president. The “new regime” pledged 
to continue a nonaligned foreign policy, to hold free elections within a year, to 
continue intercommunal talks with the Turkish Cypriots, and to address immediate 
problems of the Cypriot people that had been allegedly threatened by a communist-
inspired conspiracy'
In the meantime, the view from Turkey was one of grave concern for the fate of the 
Turkish Cypriot c o m m u n i t y ' T h e  Turks were clearly prepared and determined this 
time to take advantage of the opportunity for intervention provided by the Athens 
regime’s brutal action.
Shortly after the anti-Makarios coup, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit issued a 
statement which tersely asserted that Turkey would “ ...never accept any fait 
accompli of this kind. We will not permit anyone to intervene in the rights of the 
Cypriot Turks”'*’ . Following emergency meetings of the Turkish National Security 
Council, Ecevit made it clear that the coup in Cyprus was considered by Turkey as a 
mainland Greek intervention and could not go unanswered. Simultaneously, General 
Semih Sancar, the chief of Turkey’s General Staff, announced that Turkey’s armed 
forces had been placed in a state of readiness.
R. Denktaş, Kıbrıs: Elli Yılın Hikayesi, p.379.
M Şahinler, 1979. Türkiye’ nin 1974 Kıbrıs Siyaseti (Turkey’s Policy towards Cyprus in 1974). 
(Istanbul).
T. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey, p.91; M. Sanca, Kıbrıs Sorunu, p.l82.
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Athens response to Turkey’s complaints was that the recent events in Cyprus were an 
internal affair of an independent state and member of the United Nations. But this 
denial did not pacify Turkey or any other opponents of the Athens junta. The day 
after the coup, July 16, shortly the announcement of the formation of a government 
in Cyprus under Nikos Sampson’**, the Turkish government delivered a note to Great 
Britain seeking arrangements for joint action in Cyprus in accordance with Article 4 
of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, which granted Britain, Greece and Turkey the 
right to intervene in Cyprus for the purpose of restoring the status quo of the Zurich 
and London treaties.
Prime Minister Ecevit flew to London on July 17 determined to secure a prompt 
British answer (the Turkish note of July 16 had requested a British response within 
24 hours) to Turkey’s proposition regarding joint action in Cyprus. Ecevit, in 
statements released in Ankara and London, made it clear that Turkey would not 
recognize the regime established in Cyprus’*^ .
The US response to the management of the crisis, unlike the 1964 and 1967 crises, 
was little and late. On the night of July 17, US Undersecretary of State, Joseph 
Sisco, was sent by Henri Kissinger to the trouble zone. Sisco must have known that 
the Turks at this stage were virtually unstoppable, and that the time to have applied 
US pressure on anybody should have been prior to the Athens junta’s decision to 
unseat Makarios in a bloody coup. Nothing would have proven more sobering, for
Nikos Sampson was a newspaper publisher Machi, of extreme right-wing political orientation 
whose declared objective had been enosis at all costs. During the EOKA struggle in the 1950s, he had 
developed the reputation of being an arch-terrorist who enjoyed killing British soldiers and was said to 
have a deep hatred against the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots. See T. Couloumbis, The United 
States, Greece and Turkey, p.lOl.
H. Cem, 1974. Ecevit’in Savunması (The Defense of Ecevit) (Istanbul: Aktüel Yayınları), pp. 17-
18.
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example, to the Athens colonels than to have been told in unequivocal terms that the 
United States would not be responsible for the likely Turkish military reaction to an 
Athens-sponsored coup in Cyprus. But apparently no such warning was ever issued
to the loannides regime 190
Ecevit held an inconclusive meeting with Sisco in London on July 18, and shortly 
thereafter he stated that “the situation is very grave. Time has become a very 
important factor, because Greek military presence in Cyprus increases by the hour. 
The illegal administration is taking root”' ‘^ '. Back in Ankara the next day. Prime 
Minister Ecevit held another emergency meeting with the Turkish military high 
command. Throughout this time a tremendous amount of military activity was 
taking place, such as large-scale movements of Turkish troops in the ports of Mersin 
and İskenderun opposite the northern coast of Cyprus. The Turkish media reported 
information was indeed pointing to the direction of an imminent Turkish military 
operation in Cyprus.
In New York the UN Security Council, with US concurrence, agreed to hear 
Archbishop Makarios in his capacity as the head of the Cypriot state. But, 
simultaneously. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Ambassador Anderson 
announced in Washington that the new, Sampson-appointed Cypriot foreign minister, 
Dimis Dimitriou, had received US Ambassador Rodger Davis in Nicosia. Anderson, 
however, hastened to add that the Cypriot “political situation remains unclear and 
.. .the question of recognizing does not arise now”'^^
B. Ozke9eci-Taner, 2002. “1974 Cyprus Conflict in Perspective: Theory and Practice”, Foreign 
Policy (Ankara): XXVII: 1-2, pp. 42-44.
H. Cem, Ecevit’in Savunması, pp.18-19. 
■” To Vima. 17/07/1974.
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Joseph Sisco arrived in Athens early on July 19. From the start, Sisco had great 
difficulty locating members of the Greek government. Late in the day he managed to 
have a meeting with loannides, his civilian Prime Minister Androutsopoulos and his 
chief of staff Bonanos. Sisco’s message -  transmitting gently Turkey’s minimum 
expectations -  including the following points:
• Removal of Nikos Sampson
• Safe return of Makarios in Nicosia
• A timetable for the withdrawal of Greek officers with meaningful provisions 
for inspection and reinforcement of his condition
• Replacement of Greek officers by neutral personnel under UN auspices
• Guarantees of the Turkish Cypriot community, with a land corridor under 
Turkish Cypriot military control to link the Turkish Cypriot enclave in
193Nicosia with the coast .
loannides’ response to these terms was negative. Had his regime acceded to the 
removal of Greek officers in Cyprus, this act probably would have been equated with 
capitulation under pressure and could have triggered loannides’s political coup de 
grace. Athens, in an apparently inadequate response for the purposes of placing 
Turkey, offered only to replace, rather than remove, the Greek officers from Cyprus.
Sisco then went to Ankara to tell Ecevit about the Greek “concession”. Ecevit 
insisted on his demands. Sisco once more flew to Athens but came back empty- 
handed. In the meantime Kissinger had conducted eleven phone conversations with 
Ecevit who “advised Kissinger against the kind of pressure Lyndon Johnson had
193 S. BSliikba?!, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations, p.l92.
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exerted in 1964 and warned him that such a tactic would mean the permanent “loss” 
of Turkey to the Western Alliance”. Kissinger continued to oppose the intervention, 
but as Evecit acknowledged, he never tried to intimidate Ecevit. Moreover, Kissinger 
created the impression that he believed Turkey’s grievances concerning Cyprus were 
justified’ '^*.
At 3:00 a.m. on 20 July 1974, only two and a half hours before the Turkish operation 
started, Sisco returned from Athens and asked Ecevit for another forty-eight hour 
delay in the Turkish intervention. Ecevit replied that “ten years ago both Turkey and 
the US made mistakes. The US prevented Turkey’s military action, and Turkey 
acquiesced”. Ecevit added that as a result of the 1964 Johnson letter, Turkey-US 
relations were harmed and that Greek-Turkish relations further deteriorated. He 
concluded that “this time Turkey will not repeat its mistake. I hope that you would
not either’,195
The factors that affected Ecevit’s decision should be examined: Ecevit believed that 
the Cyprus question, like other Greek-Turkish problems, could be solved in Turkey’s 
favor if  Turkey acted assertively. Ecevit also thought that US omnipotence belonged 
to an earlier era, and smaller allies of the US could therefore ignore American 
preferences, creating fait accompli with reasonable prospects for a favorable 
outcome.
Ecevit also found encouragement in the fact that as a result of the Sampson coup, the 
unpopular Greek junta was further isolated internationally. Ecevit calculated that
H. Cem, 1974. Ecevit’in Savunması, p.23.
S. Bölükbaşı, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations, p.l92.
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world public opinion could not be any more favorable for a Turkish intervention, and 
that if executed carefully, Turkey’s landing could be projected as a rescue operation 
of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Ecevit realized, however, that any change in 
conditions might remove the cover of legitimacy from the Turkish intervention and 
that the West might fall back on its traditional identification of Turks as barbaric 
invaders. In fact, some high-ranking military leaders believed from the outset that 
the world would have hated us even if we had fired roses instead of bullets''^'’.
Ecevit’s pro-invasion stance seemed to be further justified when Greece continued to 
send reinforcements even after the coup of 15 July 1974. The Greeks undertook their 
build-up in daylight and Turkish reconnaissance planes discovered dozens o f Greek 
transport aircraft and ferryboats carrying troops to Cyprus. The Greek build-up lent 
an additional urgency to the situation, causing Ecevit, who was not known for his 
patience, to become increasingly restless.
A major factor that contributed to Ecevit’s assertiveness was the Soviet acquiescence 
in, if not support, of a military intervention. The Soviet leaders knew that the 
Sampson coup not only would eliminate the Cyprus nonalignment, but that enosis, 
which they believed would follow shortly, would bring Cyprus under the firm control 
of Greece and thus NATO. Ecevit carefully exploited the Soviet opposition to 
enosis. Both he and his foreign minister Güneş told Soviet Ambassador Grubyakov 
that Turkey “did not intend to annex or partition Cyprus and ... will respect not only 
the independence of the island, but also its nonalignment” Throughout the week
S. Bölükbaşı.The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations, p. 196; İ. 
Sabahattin, 1988. Kıbrıs Barış Harekati’ nin Nedenleri-Gelişimi-Sonuçları (The Cyprus Peace 
Operation: Reasons, Developments, Consequences) (Akdeniz Haber Ajansı Yayınları).
’’^S. Bölükbaşı, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations, p. 195.
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following the 15 July 1974 coup, Turkish-Soviet dialogue continued. The Soviets 
consistently indicated that they were ready to accept a limited Turkish action, 
provided that Cyprus’ international status was preserved.
On July 20 at 5: 30 a.m., the Turkish landing began attacking Cyprus. According to 
the general staffs plans, Turkey would conduct the operation in two stages. During 
the first stage, which was to last for two days, Turkish forces would capture a 
bridgehead in northern Cyprus. After the completion of the first stage, officials 
would begin negotiations to conclude a new settlement in Cyprus. If the Greeks 
refused a new constitutional order, the Turks would launch the second operation and 
achieve their goals forcefully .
Ecevit went on the radio at 6:30 a.m. and announced his government’s decision to 
the Turkish people as follows:
The Turkish Armed Forces have started landing in Cyprus from the air and sea. 
Let this operation be auspicious to our nation and to all Cypriots. We believe 
that by acting in this manner we shall be rendering a great service to all 
mankind and to peace. I hope that our forces meet no resistance and that a 
bloody clash is avoided. We in fact are going to carry peace and not war to the 
island, and not only to the Turks but also to the Greeks. We have to make this 
decision after we have exhausted all diplomatic and political methods. 
Meanwhile, I wish to express my gratitude to friends and allies, particularly the 
United States and Britain, which have displayed well-meaning efforts to have 
the dispute settled through diplomatic methods. If their efforts were abortive 
those responsible for this operation are not those who displayed these good
intentions 199
The Turkish forces, meeting sporadic resistance by the feuding and disorganized 
Greek Cypriot side, established an area of control in the Nicosia-Kyrenia corridor.
Ibid, p. 195; H. Cem, Ecevit’in Savunması, pp.38-40.
’’’ T. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey, p.93.
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The invasion had stunned the Greek and the Greek Cypriot military regimes and their 
dwindling supporters.
While the Greek Cypriots were still under the impact of the fratricidal anti-Makarios 
coup, loannides in Athens was being informed of the Turkish military landings. He 
was reported to have become furious at what he considered outright Turkish 
treachery and deceit. After, exclaiming, “We have been betrayed”, he gave his 
military staff an order for general mobilization intent upon retaliating against Turkey 
in Cyprus and perhaps elsewhere. With loannides’s apparent determination to widen 
the war against Turkey, Washington’s crisis management team finally moved into 
high gear. The key aim of the US effort was to avoid an all-out war between the two 
NATO allies.
Sisco was ordered, therefore, to continue the shuttle process between Athens and 
Ankara and his task was to secure a quick cease-fire on the ground in Cyprus and to 
begin a process of negotiation and, hopefully, gradual troop disengagement. In the 
meantime the Athens junta entered into a rapid process of disintegration. loannides’s 
order for mobilization resulted in near chaos. It became obvious that there was 
considerable confusion and unpreparedness in the Greek war plans. Senior generals, 
such as Gregorios Bonanos, Andreas Galatsanos, Alexandros Papanicolaou, and 
Petros Arapakis balked at the prospect of fighting an unlimited all-fronts war with 
Turkey over Cyprus. They concluded that Greece was badly prepared and such a 
war would have resulted in the loss of exposed and undefended Greek islands of the 
Aegean that were close to the coast of Turkey^ *^ ®. Furthermore, the bulk of the Greek
200 S. Psycharis, 1976. Oi 70 krisimes meres (The 70 Critical Days) (Athens: Papazisis), pp. 15-38.
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forces stationed in northern Greece under the command of General loannis Davos 
indicated clearly that they were prepared, if necessary, to match toward Athens 
(rather than Istanbul) in an attempt to remove the adventurous junta from power and 
to replace it with a responsible government of national unity.
Joseph Sisco, in the meantime, was confronted with the virtual disappearance of the 
members of the Athens junta, including loannides. All of them seemed to have 
vanished from the face of the earth. Sisco managed to locate only Admiral Arapakis 
in the early morning hours of July 22. Arapakis took it upon himself to agree to a 
cease-fire with Turkey in the name of the Athens regime. He assured Sisco that he 
had cleared this decision with loannides .
On the morning of July 23, the Greek high command held a final meeting with the 
shadowy dictator, whose rank of brigadier general rendered him formally subordinate 
to them. In effect, they informed him of their decision to invite the up-to-that time 
banned political leadership to form an emergency government of national unity, 
loaimides stormed out of the conference room furiously asserting that Greece ( i.e. 
loannides) had been betrayed both in Cyprus and now in the mainland. A number of 
important Greek politicians were then summoned by the military command and 
began conferring at the old parliament building. After some hesitation they agreed to 
invite Konstantinos Karamanlis from his Paris exile to form a government of national 
unity that would begin the process of democratic restoration while facing the critical 
problems in the Greek-Turkish crisis.
Ibid, pp. 15-38; T. Couloumbis, Kipriako: Lathi, Didagmata kai Prooptikes, pp. 52-53; M.A. 
Birand, 1985. 30 Hot Days (London: Rustem and Brother), pp. 25-28.
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The signing of the Cyprus cease-fire on July 22 and the collapse of the Athens junta 
on July 23 led to the collapse of the Sampson regime in Cyprus, too. Glavkos 
derides, the president of the Cypriot House of Representatives, assumed 
temporarily, but constitutionally, the duties of acting president. Makarios, the formal 
president of Cyprus, remained near the UN scene in New York city.
The action now moved to Geneva, where two rounds of vigorous negotiations 
started. These were five-party negotiations by representatives of the three guarantor 
states -  Greece, Turkey and Britain -  as well as Glavkos derides and Rauf Denktaş, 
acting as the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. 
The conference was chaired by Britain’s foreign minister, James Callahan. While 
these negotiations proceeded, the Turks steadily reinforced their Nicosia-Kyrenia 
beachhead and inched forward continually enlarging the pocket of land under 
Turkish military control .
The military landing of Turkish troops on Cyprus altered radically Turkey’s stated 
diplomatic objectives. The Turks argued now that the Zurich and London 
agreements, which had been violated by the Greek Cypriots since 1963, no longer 
provided a margin of safety for the Turkish Cypriot community. Instead, Turkey 
presented the Greek and Greek Cypriots sides with two alternative plans calling 
either for a loose bi-zonal federation or a loose multicantonal federation. The latter 
was referred as “Güneş Plan” from Ecevit’s foreign minister. Turan Güneş. Both 
Turkish plans, in the eyes of the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots, called for masked
202 Ibid, pp. 59-62.
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forms of partition of Cyprus, a condition that they had rejected systematically from
the very outset of the Cyprus dispute203
Washington, with the Athens junta gone from the scene and replaced by a 
considerably less manipulable democratic government, began to shift away from 
Greece and closer to Turkey. The revised judgment of Washington was that a 
Turkish presence in Cyprus was now a fait accompli and that no future settlement 
could be arrived at without some separation of the ethnic populations and the 
attainment of considerable autonomous rights for the Turkish Cypriots in territorially 
distinct regions of Cyprus. The Güneş Plan, which had been developed with heavy 
inputs from Henry Kissinger, was unveiled in the Geneva talks on Saturday, August 
13, 1974, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Simultaneously, Washington offered 
encouragement to Ankara in a formal statement that had been reviewed carefully by 
both Kissinger and Sisco :
The United States position is as follows: we recognize the position of the 
Turkish community in Cyprus requires considerable improvement and 
protection. We have supported a greater degree of autonomy for them. The 
parties are negotiating on one or more Turkish autonomous areas. The avenues 
of diplomacy have not been exhausted and therefore the United States would 
consider a resort to military action unjustified. We have made this clear to all
, ·  204parties .
Greek foreign minister, George Mavros and Greek Cypriot Acting President, 
Glavkos Clerides^'^^ upon receipt of the Güneş Plan, asked for 36 hours so that they 
could consult with their governments. Foreign minister Güneş, citing that time had
203 G Camp 1980. Conflict over Cyprus.” Political Science Quarterly 95:1. pp.58-
60.
T Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey, p.97; I. Slengesol, “A Bad Show? The 
United States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis , pp.96-129.
derides believed that the Greek Cypriot side should accept a bizonal federation. But he was 
powerless to commit given the opposition of Makarios and the Greek government. See G. derides, 
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run out and pointing out that further delay would create security problems for the 
exposed Turkish troops in Cyprus, demanded as immediate yes-or-no answer. The
206negotiations thus broke down .
The next morning the reorganized and heavily reinforced Turkish troops on Cyprus 
were ordered to launch a second and major phase of the invasion. It resulted in the 
occupation of about 37 per cent of the territory of Cyprus, creating a large refugee 
problem of over 180,000 Greek Cypriots who fled to points in southern Cyprus to 
avoid contact with the advancing Turkish troops. Subsequently, most of the Turkish 
Cypriots living in southern enclaves also left their homes and sought refugee in the
207Turkish-occupied northern zone
In Athens, the new Karamanlis government was facing a major dilemma. Greece was 
a guarantor state of Cyprus and, according to constitutional procedures, had a right to 
take appropriate action to redress the impact of the Turkish invasion. Greek 
governments in the past had indicated clearly that a Turkish invasion in Cyprus 
would have resulted in a full-scale Greek-Turkish war. Karamanlis’s initial 
predilection, therefore, was to declare war on Turkey and confront the Turkish forces 
in Cyprus and in other fronts if that became necessary^®*. But the Greek Army chiefs 
at the war council in Athens informed Karamanlis that the state of readiness of the 
Greek armed forces was inadequate to pursue the war in relatively distant Cyprus and 
simultaneously defend the exposed eastern Aegean islands. The Prime Minister 
angrily acquiesced to the military status quo in Cyprus. It was a major diplomatic
M A Birand, 30 Hot Days, 97-113; S. Rizas, Oi Inomenes Polities, I Diktatoria ton 
Sintamatarxon kai to Kipriako Zitima, pp. 229-234.
T Couloumbis, Kipriako: Lathi, Didagmata kai Prooptikes, pp. 64-68; S. Rizas, Oi Inomenes 
Polities, I Diktatoria ton Sintamatarxon kai to Kipriako Zitima, pp.224-240.
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and psychological humiliation for Greece. So, Karamanlis, seeking to defuse the 
explosive state of public emotions, made the drastic decision to withdraw Greece 
from the military arm of NATO. This dramatic step was taken in order to express 
feelings of anger and bitterness against NATO’s apparent inability or unwillingness
to react to the Turkish use of force in Cyprus '^^ .^
Moreover, there was a strong Greek-American lobby in the US Congress and it was 
felt this could be used to exert pressure on Turkey. In February 1975 Congress 
imposed an embargo on arms shipments to Turkey, on the grounds that American 
equipment had been misused in the Cyprus landing. The embargo stopped the 
delivery of arms already purchased by Turkey, and the disbursement of 200 million 
dollars in grants. The action was vigorously opposed by the US administration, 
particularly by Secretary of State, Kissinger, who argued that it would seriously 
weaken Turkey’s defensive capability and thus damage the Alliance^
Turkey’s reaction to the US-imposed arms embargo came almost five months later. 
On 26 July 1975, Turkey suspended US operations at all military installations within 
Turkey. Eventually, the US arms embargo was lifted three years later in 1978^".
The 1974 Cyprus crisis altered the substance, nature, and structure of the whole 
dispute. Throughout the 1955-1974 period, the Cyprus question had been described 
from two distinct perspectives. One perspective (probably the dominant one)
209 Y YajinaiQs  ^ 1989. Isagogi stin Eliniki Exoteriki Politiki 1949-1988 (Introduction to Greek 
Foreign Policy 1949-1988) (Thessaloniki, Paratiritis Publications).
■'“R. McDonald, “Alliance problems in the eastern Mediterranean”, p.61.
B. Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West Since World War 11”, pp.57-58.
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considered Cyprus a leftover province of the Ottoman Empire that was up for 
disposition between rival claimants. According to this approach, the Cyprus 
settlement had been delayed because the island had been a British colony at the end 
of the First World War. From this viewpoint, Cyprus could have been unified with 
Greece (given its over 80 percent Greek Cypriot majority and the preference of its 
inhabitants) or assigned to Turkey (on the grounds of geopolitics) or divided between 
the two countries as an act of political compromise splitting, the difference of 
opposing Greek-Turkish mainland interests. One could argue that the policies of 
Greece (pursuit of enosis-nmon with Greece) and Turkey (toA;s/m-partition between 
Greece and Turkey) and the United States (the Acheson Plan-a form of partition 
referred to as “double enosis") were all attuned to this first perspective. In short, the 
Cyprus problem was to be treated as an irritant affecting NATO’s southeastern flank. 
As such, the problem was to be solved by Athens and Ankara with the concurrence 
o f London and Washington. The solution, once arrived at, should just be announced 
to the inhabitants of Cyprus, who were not seen as Cypriots, but as either Greeks or 
Turks.
The second perspective, alternatively, focused on Cyprus as a distinct political entity 
-  a new state with a bi-ethnic composition whose goal, as was the case with most 
newly emerging ex-colonial states, would be to develop effective constitutional 
structures that would accommodate its culturally and politically diverse elements. It 
appears that this perspective was adopted in substance (but not always in terms of 
rhetoric) by the Cypriot government. Its basic premise was that, given the 
incompatible security objectives of Greece and Turkey (enosis versus taksim), the 
only viable alternative for Cyprus would be the development of an independent.
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neutralist, and bi-ethnic Cyprus that could maintain its diverse cultural identity, but 
which would remain politically intact. As an independent, neutralist or neutralized 
entity, Cyprus expected to reduce anxieties in Turkey that some day it would be 
annexed by Greece, adding to the “encirclement” of Turkey by Greek controlled 
islands.
The second perspective suited the political needs of the Cypriots (the Greeks maybe 
more than the Turks), for their status and identity would be more significant as long 
as Cyprus remained as independent state, member of the Commonwealth of Nations, 
the Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations, rather than becoming just a 
province appended to either Greece or Turkey or split somehow between them.
After the adventure of July-August 1974, the second perspective may be in the 
upswing. Greek Cypriots have realized that, in their moment of greatest crisis (the 
Turkish military intervention of 1974), the Greek motherland was both ill-equipped 
militarily and too far (in terms of physical, if not also psychological, distance) to 
come to their decisive aid. Greece realized that the dream of enosis was no longer 
feasible. The Athens junta-supported coup against President Makarios-following 
years o f friction between the Athens and Nicosia governments served to indicate on 
both sides of the relationship that the interests of Greeks and Greek Cypriots were
not in all cases identical.
Since 1974 the negotiating positions of Greek and Turkish Cypriots have taken a 
very distinct form. Despite protracted rounds of bi-communal talks between 
representatives of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities under UN
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auspices, no breakthroughs have been announced and the two sides seem to be far 
apart in their demands and expectations. The position of the Turkish Cypriots -  
backed and heavily influenced by mainland Turkey-has hardened considerably 
compared to the pre-1974 period. Arguing that the Zurich and London Agreements 
had proven unworkable (which was a Greek Cypriot position before 1974), the 
Turkish side proposes the creation of a bi-zonal federation to be established roughly 
along the administrative occupation lines created after the 1974 crisis. They 
envisioned a relatively weak federal government in which both communities would 
be represented on the basis of political equality. The federal government would be 
complemented by strong state governments under the exclusive control of Turkish 
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots respectively.
The central premise of the Turkish Cypriots is that, once the proposed federal state is 
mutually agreed upon, provisions will be made for the Turkish community to remain 
the majority element in the northern region in Cyprus to avoid being culturally, 
politically, and economically overwhelmed by the majority of Greek Cypriots. The 
Turkish Cypriots also envision a system of guarantees (including some type of 
symbolic presence of mainland Turkish troops on Cyprus) for the long range 
viability of the new federal Cypriot state. However, Turkish Cypriots (and Turkey) 
give assurances that the bulk of the Turkish forces stationed in northern Cyprus 
would be withdrawn once a mutually acceptable settlement is reached by the two
communities.
In the interim period the Turkish Cypriots have unilaterally declared the creation of a 
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC), which, they hope, will serve as the
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Turkish Cypriot component of a proposed bi-communal and bi-zonal federation 
They have organized this entity as a federated parliamentary republic with an elected 
president, a legislative assembly, and a prime minister, with a ten member cabinet 
appointed by the president. The Turkish Cypriot community leader, Rauf Denkta§, 
served as president of the TFSC since its formal proclamation on June 8, 1975 until 
1983. For some administrative functions the TFSC had been appended to the 
Turkish mainland system. This gradual integration includes the adoption of Turkish 
import, export, and customs rules; the use of the Turkish lira as the operative 
currency in northern Cyprus; and the assignment of the whole Turkish controlled 
zone to the mainland Mersin Postal District for coordination of international mail^'^.
Initially, the Turkish federated “state” did not seek separate international recognition. 
Turkey, however, maintained its embassy in the Turkish sector of Nicosia, the capital 
of Cyprus, and refused to recognize the Cyprus government in any capacity other 
than a Greek Cypriot community administration. Turkish Cypriot community with 
the Turkish support finally attempted to declare their independence unilaterally in 
November 1983 but could not gain international recognition.
The Greek Cypriot negotiating position (backed by mainland Greece) has been 
considerably different from that of the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots view 
the Turkish proposal for a bi-zonal federation as constituting a demand for de facto 
partition o f the country through a loose confederative scheme. The Greek Cypriots 
are willing, unlike the pre-1974 period, to proceed with a bi-communal and 
territorially organized federation; but they argue that the size of the territory of each
212 M. Sanca, Kıbrıs Sorunu, pp. 232-242.
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federal component should be analogous to the percentage of each community’s 
population (agreed by both sides to be 18 percent for the Turkish Cypriots and 80 
percent for Greek Cypriots). In addition, the Greek Cypriots argue that the future 
federal government should have substantive (rather than only marginal and 
ceremonial) functions and should be organized to reflect the demographic character 
(that is, the 80; 20 population ratio) of the island. Also they believe that a future 
federal Cyprus should permit all its inhabitants to enjoy the standard freedoms of 
movement and economic activity in the entire territory of the country^'I
The Greek Cypriots maintain that the Turkish Cypriots, being under the virtual 
occupation of mainland Turkey, are not allowed to express freely the wishes of the 
Turkish Cypriot community. They assert that negotiations that have taken place 
“under the gun” of partial Turkish occupation of Cyprus cannot lead to a genuine and 
mutually acceptable settlement, and they demand that Turkey must heed the relevant 
UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of its occupation force from Cyprus"^
Reacting to the often repeated argument advanced by Turkey and the Turkish 
Cypriots regarding the need to provide for a sense of security to the Turkish Cypriot 
community and to Turkey proper, the Greek Cypriots have officially offered to 
accept a regime of total demilitarization in Cyprus (hoping to remedy any Turkish 
mainland security anxieties) and the installation of a multinational (UN supervised) 
police force to provide, for a long period of time, the function of internal security and 
to accommodate for the fears of the Turkish Cypriot minority community.
f a k' 1989 “I Diethis Diastasi tou Kipriakou: 1960-1987” (The International 
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Ultimately, the Greek Cypriot position rests on the principle of maintaining the unity 
of the state of Cyprus and opposing alternatives -  such as union with Greece, 
partition between Greece and Turkey, or just plain partition into two economically 
nonviable ministates that will continue on a course of mutually erosive conflict -  a 
conflict that may spill over into a generalized confrontation between the motherlands 
of Greece and Turkey.
Despite the mconclusiveness of many rounds of intercommunal negotiations over the 
years, the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable compromise is still strong -  
especially if  the political decision is made in both Greece and Turkey proper to 
permit the two communities to move toward a logical modus vivendi -  in short, to 
stop viewing Cyprus as a disputed province and to accept it as a small and 
independent state of bi-ethnic makeup that should be encouraged to find workable 
constitutional arrangements.
In November 1978 and shortly after the embargo on Turkey was lifted, the Carter 
administration, seeking to demonstrate that easing the pressure on Turkey would 
facilitate a settlement, proposed a 12-point plan which enjoyed strong Canadian and 
British backing. Although the plan, known after its primary drafter as the Matthew 
Nimetz Plan, was quickly rejected by the Greek Cypriots and, eventually, by the 
Turkish Cypriots, some of its useful principles could have been used for a mutually
acceptable compromise package.
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The main provisions of the Nimetz plan envisioned the creation of a bi-regional 
independent, federal republic, forbidding simultaneously the unification of part of the 
whole of the state of Cyprus with any other state. The country would be divided into 
two constituent regions. The federal government’s functions would include foreign 
affairs, defense, currency and central banking, interregional trade, foreign trade, 
communications, federal finance, customs, immigration, and civil aviation.
215
ofFinally, the Nimetz Plan made provisions for delineating territorial jurisdictions
the two constituent states based on criteria of economic productivity and viability,
security, population distribution, and historical factors. It was clearly suggested that
the lines ultimately agreed upon would result in significant territorial changes to the
post-1974 occupation lines in favor of the Greek Cypriot side. The plan called for
qI* refugees who could not, or chose not to, return to their homes, the
withdrawal of all foreign armed forces except for small contingents remaining by
mutual agreement; and the institutionalization o f a demilitarized republic possessing
only small regional police forces. Of special interest to the Greek Cypriots, the plan
provided for the priority resettlement by Greek Cypriot refugees of the Varosha
region in Famagusta under the interim administration of the UN Peacekeeping Force
in Cyprus. Future economic development projects for the proposed Cypriot Federal
Republic would be financed by a general fund of the federal government
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administered by the two regions .
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Since 1979 the negotiations scene has shifted once again to interconununal talks 
carried out in Nicosia by the representatives of the two communities under the 
auspices of the United Nations. The negotiators have been polite and patient, but no 
visible signs of progress seem to have taken place to date.
3.4 The US Stance towards the Greek-Turkish Dispute over Cyprus
Before the Cyprus problem was internationalized with the first Greek appeal to the 
UN in 1954, the US avoided the growing conflict between the Greek Cypriots and 
the British, holding an ambivalent opinion over the issue. In answer to the Greek 
defeat at the UN in 1954 the Greek Cypriot EOKA started its violent enosis struggle 
in the spring 1955· The US feared a deterioration of NATO cohesion in its 
southeastern flank, and it supported an “inside” solution among the involved parties 
(British, Greeks and Turks). But, it did not take a position regarding the substance of
the issue.
This attitude disappointed especially the Greek side as when riots broke out in 
Istanbul against the Greek minority after the breakdown of the 1955 London 
Conference Secretary of State, Dulles wrote identical letters to the Greek and 
Turkish Governments, calling for subordination of their bilateral problems to the real 
danger o f East-West antagonism. The Greeks, who were the principal victims of the 
Turkish riots, were deeply hurt about being put in the same position with the
. .. 217perpetrators .
E. Averof-Tositsa, Istoria xamenon efkerion:Kipriako 1950-1963, pp. 77-82.
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After the establishment of the Republic o f Cyprus and the events of 1963, American 
policy toward Cyprus was primarily motivated by the following considerations:
• the need to contain the conflict on the island and thus the risk of a Greek- 
Turkish war.
• to restore the cohesion of NATO’s southeastern flank.
• to avoid Soviet involvement in this inter-allied dispute.
• concern over Makarios’ non aligned policy, as well as over the support he 
received from communist and leftist Cypriot parties, such as AKEL and 
EDEK, and his reliance on the United Nations to promote Greek Cypriot 
interests.
• the increasing recognition of the strategic importance o f Cyprus for the 
defense o f American economic, political, and military interests in the Middle 
East.
• the “sensitivity” shown towards Turkey, based on the American appraisal of 
Turkey’s strategic importance in the region and,
• “sensitivity” shown towards Greece to fulfill enosis. Thus, the United States 
sought to resolve the problem based on the above considerations.
During the first serious crisis in 1964, the US administration involved actively to 
contain the conflict and the risk o f a Greek-Turkish and mediating towards a new 
settlement in Cyprus between the two allies. The United States being convinced that 
the “independence” solution did not work out, they came up with the conclusion that 
union with Greece would have been the best outcome. However, this was only to be 
achieved in return for Greece’s territorial concessions to Turkey, whom the US was 
determined not to humiliate.
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Nevertheless, a gradual alienation of Turkey by the US took place, in the beginning 
of June 1964, when the Johnson administration threatened it in order to keep it from 
military intervention in Cyprus. Every Turkish threat of intervention involved the 
US more deeply in the search of a solution^'*.
The US handling of the Cyprus problem in 1964 was not so successful for three 
reasons; First, the US kept the problem within the NATO family, perceived Greece 
and Turkey as being the countries which would be able to decide on the fate of the 
island, and thus underestimated the power of the C3q3riot government which refused 
to let those countries determine its future. Second, the US fought the symptoms 
rather the roots of the problem, as they continued to see the Cyprus problem as a 
Greek-Turkish thorn in the south-eastern flank of NATO. Third, they did not 
anticipate that both Greek and Turkish side considered Cyprus more important in 
their foreign policy priorities than NATO solidarity.
Having the unpleasant experience of the Geneva negotiations, in 1967 crisis the 
Americans only cared to settle the crisis. The US diplomacy mobilized its efforts 
immediately and proved again that only the most powerful western nation was able 
to pull the two NATO allies back from the brink of war. In the aftermath of the 
crisis, the US became convinced that no solution could be found without the 
involvement of the Cypriot communities and “recognized” the authority of the 
President Makarios and the need consult him .
C. Nikolet, United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974, 236-247.
Ibid, 305-324; S. Bolukba?!, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American
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Once the split between Athens and Nicosia came to a head, with the coup d’etat by 
the Greek colonels on Cyprus in the summer of 1974 the US diplomacy became 
active again. Its aim was to keep Greece and Turkey from clashing over Cyprus and 
harming the NATO flank. This time, the United States could not stop Turkey from 
intervening in the island but as a general war was avoided, the US and particularly 
then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was not really concerned about the eventual 
outcome of the crisis. However, if the US had acted more actively like in the 1963- 
64 and 1967 crises, it is not clear whether it would have been able to prevent the 
outcome that we know today, taking into account the nature of the Cyprus conflict in
19 74 22 0
Nevertheless, despite the Turkish military intervention and the clashes erupted in the 
island, a general Greek-Turkish war was avoided. State Department after the events 
of 1974 believed that the damage caused to NATO’s southeastern flank by the 
limited Greek withdrawal from that organization and the closing of American bases 
in Turkey in response to the arms embargo could be repaired, given the presence of a 
cooperative conservative Greek government. Additionally, they expected that the 
change of balance of power among the involved parties in Cyprus would provide a 
quick resolution of the problem.
S. Rizas, Oi Inomenes Polities, I Diktatoria ton Sintamatarxon kai to Kipriako Zitima, pp. 
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3.5 The Greek and Turkish Perceptions of the US involvement in the Cyprus 
Crises
Both Greece and Turkey throughout this period were worried about and suspicious of 
the American involvement and each side had its own concerns. As communal 
dispute broke out almost two years after the independence of Cyprus, Greece and 
Turkey accepted the US mediation. Both sides preferred to be faced with a solution 
package from outside, rather than to have to formulate painful concessions 
themselves. However, Greece and Turkey could not agree to a solution based on 
enosis with concessions.
All governments that ruled Greece from 1964 to 1974 were confronted with 
American pressures designed not only to minimize the possibility of a Greek-Turkish 
conflict over Cyprus, but also to seek a solution of the problem through direct 
negotiations. This was perceived positive from the Greek side as all Greeks agreed 
that a new Cyprus settlement was needed; however, the real obstacle was that there 
was no cooperation and co-ordination with the Cypriot government .
The elected government of George Papandreou in 1963 was reluctant to undertake 
such dialogue but finally he did it with no results. It seemed that Papandreou desired 
to have a solution imposed from the US in order to be able to excuse it in the face of 
domestic criticism as a result of massive pressure.
221 S. Rizas, Enosi Dixotomisi Anexartisia, pp. 127-129.
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His handling of the Cyprus problem contributed to the destabilization of his 
government and his resignation from office in July 1965. The conservative minority 
governments that succeeded him and the military junta that governed Greece from 
1967-1974 did undertake such negotiations with Turkey, behind the back of the 
Cyprus government
The military coup in Athens in April 1967 was regarded as enhancing the chances for 
a quick solution to the Cyprus problem. The military government believed that it 
was able to impose a solution on Cyprus by making concessions to Turkey without 
serious domestic reactions. Greek government seriously misjudged the Turkish 
attitude, as it expected that Turkey would still endorse a deal based on enosis with 
concessions. Athens junta failed, and to a certain extent, the Americans realized that 
Ankara’s attitude had toughened in the face of growing Soviet support for its 
position, and that it was after all the Turkish Cypriot community that was suppressed 
under Makarios’ policy.
The Greek military regime orchestrated plans behind the scene against Makarios in 
an effort to achieve the long-standing desire of Greece, enosis. No elected Greek 
government dared to attempt such a brutal action, despite the fact that during the 
decade of 1960s there were such plans. Athens junta was convinced that the United 
States would not allow Turkey to get involved in the island. This action caused the 
Turkish military intervention as Turkey was determined this time to protect its vital
223interests in the island .
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After the collapse of the military regime the new civil government under Karamanlis 
could not really act effectively neither diplomatically nor militarily. In the 
diplomatic level, during the Geneva conference the decision should be approved 
from Makarios who at that time chose for himself the role of the victim from both 
sides (Greek and Turkish) and even in front of the military defeat could not accept a 
compromise and the Cyprus problem perpetuated until today.
In the military level, Karamanlis did not undertake the high risk to declare war 
against Turkey without being aware of the real capabilities of the Greek forces. And 
at that particular time it was impossible to trust the military high officials. So as a 
protest for the US ineffectiveness to stop Turkey, he withdrew from the military 
wing of NATO. Greek side considered the US as responsible for the outcome of the 
crisis-maybe even more than the Turks. It is noteworthy that Greek political and 
military elite have not made yet their self-criticism for this “black page” of the Greek 
modem history.
The Turkish side was pressurized by the Americans as well. The first attempt was 
successful as the Turks did not intervene in 1964. Turkey became basic player in a 
possible new settlement and Turkish policymakers began a thorough examination of 
the overall Turkish foreign policy in order to find the reasons for Turkey’s failure to 
intervene. The consensus reached by most political parties and the public in general 
was that Turkey’s political dependency on the US and its isolation in the
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international community were the causes of the Cyprus debacle, and that Turkey 
needed to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the Third World^^‘‘.
Turkey, recognizing the political and diplomatic weakness of the Greek governments 
especially after 1967 proposed solutions that amounted to a partition of Cyprus and 
attempted to safeguard the Turkish Cypriot community.
In July 1974 Turkey landed its forces in the island. Despite the concern of the 
Turkish policy makers due to the US opposition, the Turkish government was 
determined this time, as strongly believed that unless Turkey intervened, Cyprus 
would be unified with Greece. This would be a serious compromising for the 
Turkish national interests. The failure of the negotiations towards a political solution 
in Geneva resulted in the de facto partition of the island.
The US arms embargo in the aftermath of the 1974 crisis led Turkey to retaliate by 
closing all the American military installations in Turkey and thus imperiling US 
security interests. MoreAver, the Turkish perception of the US importance to Turkish 
National security reconsidered. As a result, Turkish foreign policy targeted its
efforts to lessen its reliance on the US225
The American role in the Cyprus conflict during the decade 1964-1974 significantly 
altered the Greek and Turkish perception of US in Greek and Turkish national 
security. Both realized that NATO membership was not a panacea for all security 
contingencies. As a result, both countries strove to decrease their dependency on the
Boliikba?!, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations, pp. BO-
MO.'
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US. Greece shifted its foreign policy to western Europe and Turkey improved its 
relations with the Soviet Union and other regional states.
no
CHAPTER IV
EMERGENCE OF THE AEGEAN DISPUTE AND THE US
4.1 Emergence of the Aegean Dispute since 1974
The primary cause of Greek-Turkish disputes during the 1950s and 1960s was the 
Cyprus question. In the late 1973, following the discovery of oil deposits off the 
southern shore of the island of Thasos in the northeastern part of the Aegean Sea, a 
number of jurisdictional issues were added to the already emotionally heavy Greek- 
Turkish agenda.
The Aegean Dispute is a composite term covering three separate but related issues 
between Greece and Turkey:
1. The dispute about sovereign rights over the Aegean continental shelf.
2. The question of the territorial sea limits claimed by each country.
3. A dispute over military and civil air traffic control zones in the Aegean area.
Three other questions are intimately involved and must be considered in connection 
with the Aegean dispute; the remilitarization of the Greek islands of the eastern 
Aegean, whose demilitarization was ordered by the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and 
Paris (1947); the problem of minorities (the Greek orthodox minority of Istanbul and
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on the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos), and the Muslim 
(mainly Turkish origin) minority in Western Thrace.
The friction emerged in the Aegean deteriorated the already tensed relations of the 
two allies because of the Cyprus problem. As a result, both Greece and Turkey 
changed their perceptions towards the US and NATO. After 1974, Greece came to 
regard its NATO membership as a buffer, not primarily against the Warsaw Pact and 
the Soviet Union but against Turkey, and as a reinforcement of its ties not to the 
United States but to Europe.
In the light of the Cypriot experience the Athens government was afraid that Ankara 
might be tempted to employ military force in this area as well. In order to avoid this, 
Greek diplomacy sought political and military assistance from the United States. 
The aim of the Greek strategy was designed to firstly get the US to guarantee the 
territorial status quo in the Aegean, and secondly to allocate its military aid to Greece 
and Turkey in a manner that would not disrupt the regional balance of power.
As to the US guarantees for the territorial status quo, that is the present borders of the 
Aegean, Greek diplomatic efforts have not been quite so effective. Nevertheless, in 
1976 the Karamanlis government obtained an official commitment from the then US 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, “that the United States would actively and 
unequivocally oppose either side seeking a military solution and will make major 
efforts to prevent such a course of action” . This was the closest the Greeks ever
226 D. Bitsios, 1983. Fera apo ta Sinora (Beyond the Borders) (Athens: Estia Publications), p.254.
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got to an official guarantee for their borders with Turkey. In 1981^^’ the new Prime 
Minister Andreas Papandreou went further by asking from NATO to guarantee 
Greece’s eastern borders^^*. The Greek demand for border guarantees was repeated 
for some years, but then shelved, as neither Washington nor NATO (let alone 
Turkey) were inclined to accept this kind of an arrangement.
On the other hand, Ankara begun to consider NATO, to some extent, as a buffer 
against over-reliance on the United States. Turkey was suspicious with the US, 
whose security policies, in Turkish eyes, were unduly influenced by Greece or the 
Greek-American lobby. During the period of the United States-Turkish arms 
embargo between 1975-1978, Ankara relied heavily on the continuing flow of 
military assistance from another NATO member, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
to compensate for the interruption of supplies from America.
Turkey, too, tried to forward its position in the bilateral dispute via NATO. Turkish 
side was constantly blocking the Greek re-entry to NATO until 1980 and 
internationalized the “Lemnos problem”^^ .^ Athens maintains that this strategically 
important island close to Dardanelles may be militarized, thus stationing air force 
and army units on the island. Turkey quotes the Treaty of Lausaime (1923) and
In October 1981, PASOK under Andreas Papandreou came to power after having warned the 
Greek electorate in numerous speeches of what he called the “Turkish threat”. The search for allies 
against “Turkish expansionism” became the prime goal of Greek foreign policy. In December 1981- 
only a few weeks after his triumphant election victory -  Papandreou attended a NATO defense 
ministers’ meeting, where he stubbornly insisted on a guarantee by the alliance to shield to Greece 
from aggression by Turkey. As the NATO members were not willing to agree to this demand, the 
entire meeting ended in failure. For the first time in NATO’s thirty-year history no joint communiqué 
was issued. This was the most spectacular example of Papandreou’s internalization strategy in 
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argues that this island must be demilitarized. The Lemnos problem is a part of the 
overall Greek-Turkish dispute pertaining to the military status of the Greek islands of 
the eastern Aegean^^®. Ankara has successfully internationalized and NATOised this 
bilateral problem by preventing -  to the dislike of the Greeks- an inclusion of 
Lemnos in all NATO exercises.
Both protagonists believed in particular that the United States tilted in favor of the 
other. The Greeks were convinced that strategic considerations -  the notorious 
realpolitic- invariably gave Turkey more weight because of its larger population, 
troop’s strength and border with the Soviet Union. The Turks, on the other hand, 
believed that the weight of their membership was limited by its purely strategic 
character, and that NATO tended to side with Greece for historic, cultural, and 
religious reasons.
4.2 The Aegean Issues
4.2.1 The Aegean Continental Shelf
Greece and Turkey make rival claims over certain portions of the Aegean continental 
Shelf^^'. The Greek position is founded on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
J. Brown, Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey, pp. 13-14; A. Gündüz, 1985. Limni 
Adasının Hukuki Statüsü Üzerinde Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı (İstanbul: Bayrak Yayımcılık); S. 
Ligeros, 1989. “I Natoiki Ptixi tis Elinotourkikis Dienexis” (The NATO Dimension of the Greek- 
Turkish Dispute) Tetradia: 25, pp.53-62.
C. Rozakis, 1988. “To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou kai I Elinotourkiki Krisi” (The 
International Legal Status of the Aegean and the Greek-Turkish Crisis) in Alexandris, A. (ed) Oi 
Elinotourkikes Sxesis 1923-1987 (Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1987) (Athens: Gnosi
Publications), pp. 272-492; G. Papadimitriou, 1975. I Diafora gia tin Ifalokripida tou Aigaiou kai 
to Kipriako Provlima (The Dispute over the Aegean Continental Shelf and the Cyprus Problem) 
(Athens: Papazisis Publications); F. Sönmezoğlu, 2000. Türkiye ve Yunanistan ilişkileri & Büyük 
Güçler (Turkish-Greek Relations and the Great Powers) (Istanbul: Der Publications) pp. 180-190.
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Continental Shelf, which was signed and ratified by Greece and many other 
countries, but not by Turkey. The Convention provided, inter alia, that the 
“continental shelf refers to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to 
the coast but outside the area of the continental sea to a depth of 200 meters or, 
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the 
exploitation of natural resources of the said seas”^^ .^ Further, the convention 
provides that populated islands are entitled to continental shelves. Because the 
Aegean Sea is dotted with over 2000 islands that are part of Greece’s sovereign 
territory, and given that well over 200 of these islands are significant in terms of size 
and population, a delimitation of continental shelf rights in accordance with the 1958 
treaty would result in about two-thirds of the Aegean continental shelf being awarded 
to Greece.
Turkey’s position on the continental shelf emphasizes what the Turks consider 
political, rather than legal, considerations. Turkey argues that the Aegean should be 
viewed as a special sea with unique characteristics, and that “equity” rather than 
strict interpretation of traditional international law should become the operative 
criterion for a settlement. The Turks point out that an arrangement acceptable to 
them would delimit the Aegean continental shelf on the basis of a median line east, 
o f which Turkey would have primary jurisdiction for purposes of exploration and 
exploitation of seabed and subsoil resources. As a minimum, the Turks are willing to 
consider plans for joint exploitation in continental shelf areas that are subject to 
dispute^ ^^ .
C. Rozakis, “To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou kai I Elinotourkiki Krisi”, p.277.
T. Bahçeli. Greek-Turldsh Relations since 1955, pp.129-141; Ş.S. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut içinde 
Türk Yunan İlişkileri, pp.71-72.
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The Greek response to the Turkish position is that the median line proposed by 
Turkey would, in effect, enclave Greece’s eastern islands in a Turkish jurisdictional 
zone. Given, further, Turkey’s behavior in Cyprus in 1974 as well as a number of 
Turkish leaders’ statements suggesting dissatisfaction with the territorial status quo 
in the Aegean^^"* any such “solution” would just open up the road toward more 
Turkish territorial revisionism and adventurism in the area.
In terms of dispute settlement, the Greek position is that the matter, as has been the 
case with similar disputes involving other states, should be submitted for 
adjudication to the International Court o f Justice . The Turkish view, on the 
contrary, prefers the road of bilateral negotiations between Turkish and Greek 
diplomatic experts, and Turkey is not willing, at least in the short run, to submit the
236issue for international adjudication to ICJ .
The danger of military conflagration is continuous while the dispute remains 
unsolved. Every time Greece or Turkey carries out scientific experiments and sends 
exploration ships to perform seismic work over disputed areas o f the continental 
shelf, the chances of armed conflict increase. Such incidents in the summer of 1976 
and the spring of 1987 came very close to breaking out into a Greek-Turkish war.
X Sazanidis, 1979. Oi elinotourkikes Sxeseis stin Pentaetia 1973-1978 (Greek-Turkish Relations 
in thé Five Years 1973-1978) (Thessaloniki), pp. 122-123.
X. Dipla, 1992. I Elino-Tourkiki Diafora gia tin Ifalokripida ton Aigaiou (The Greek-Turkish 
Dispute over the Continental Shelf of the Aegean) (Athens: ELIAMEP).
S. Bôlükbaji, 1992. “The Turco-Greek Dispute: Issues, Policies and Prospects” in C. Dodd, (ed.) 
Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects (London: The Eothen Press), pp.33-34.
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4.2.2 Territorial Waters and their Limits
Another potential point of friction between Greece and Turkey relates to the width of 
territorial waters. For the time being, both countries observe in the Aegean area a 
six-mile territorial waters limit. Turkey, however, maintains a 12-mile limit on the 
Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts. Under present arrangements, and given the 
plethora of Greece’s Aegean islands, about 35 percent of the Aegean is designated as 
Greek territorial sea and about 9 percent as Turkish territorial sea^^ .^
The Greek government has indicated repeatedly that it reserves the right to extend its 
territorial waters to 12 miles, but has not done so to date despite the fact that Greece 
has signed the 1982 Sea of the Law Treaty and it was ratified by the Greek 
Parliament in May 1995. In response to the Greek Parliament’s action, on June 8, 
1995 the Turkish Parliament gave its government authority to take all necessary 
measures, including military ones, if Greece exercised the right to 12 miles and
238increased its territorial waters .
The Turks frequently declare that the adoption of the 12-mile limit by Greece would 
convert the Aegean into a “Greek lake”. It would be, consequently, totally 
unacceptable to Turkey and would be treated as a casus An arrangement -
employing the 12-mile limit- would result in a disposition where Greece’s share of
A. Wilson, 1979/1980. “The Aegean Dispute,” Adelphi Papers. 155. p.36; Van Dyke, Jon. “The 
Role of the Islands in Delimiting Maritime Zones: The Boundary Between Greece and Turkey”, 
Foreign Policy (Ankara) IXIV: pp.3-4; Türk-Yunan İlişkileri ve Mégalo Idea (Turkish-Greek 
Relations and the Great Idea) 1985. (Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı), pp. 53- 
56.
P. Robins, 2003. Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press), p. 115.
T. Bahçeli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, pp. 141-142.
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total Aegean Sea space would increase to 64 percent; Turkey’s would remain at less 
than 9 percent, with the remaining area being designated as international waters^ "*®. 
The application of the 12-mile limit by Greece, assuming it was done peacefully, 
would remove the continental shelf issue from the Greek-Turkish dispute agenda, 
because most of the currently disputed continental shelf area would fall under Greek 
territorial waters.
In the territorial waters issue, as was the case with the continental shelf, Greece 
emphasizes its rights and responsibilities under international law. Greece responds 
to Turkey’s objections about “closing of the Aegean” by emphasizing that all states 
in the area - and especially Turkey -  will continue enjoying the rights of freedom of 
navigation and iimocent passage as provided by customary international law and in 
particular the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty.
4.2.3 Air Space, Command and Control Issues
A matter of some importance in the triad of jurisdictional issues that divides Greece 
and Turkey is the air space control question. Greece, by an executive declaration 
back in 1931, established a 10 nautical mile territorial air limit extending out from 
the coasts of its mainland and its islands^'". This arrangement placed close to 55 
percent of the Aegean’s territorial air under Greek territorial air control. In addition, 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), without Turkish objections,' 
assigned to Greece in 1952 the air traffic control responsibility in the Aegean Flight
A. Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute,” p.37; Ş. S. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan 
İlişkileri, pp. 72-79.
A Giokaris, A. Dimitrakopoulos and X. Dipla. 1994. Simla Trivis stis Elinotourkikes Sxeseis 
(Points of Friction in Greek-Turkish Relations) (Athens: Sideris Publications), pp. 2-50; Türk-Yunan 
İlişkileri ve Mégalo idea, pp.56-58.
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Information Region (FIR). This region covers the entire Aegean area up to the 
median line separating mainland Turkey from Greece’s eastern Aegean islands such 
as Samothrace, Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and the Dodecanese. Prior to 1974 
Cyprus crisis and while Greece and Turkey were fully functional members of NATO, 
command and control responsibilities for air and sea operations over the entire 
Aegean region had been assigned by NATO internal agreements to the Greek
military command242
Since the mid-July 1974 crisis, Turkey has raised serious objections to all these 
arrangements. In the electrified atmosphere that followed the Cyprus 1974 events, 
Turkey issued NOT AM 714 (a notice to air users through ICAO) declaring a mid- 
Aegean line running north to south and requiring all approaching aircraft flying fi-om 
west to east to report their positions and flights plans to Turkish air controllers. 
Greece rejected this instruction and issued its own NOTAM 1157 declaring the 
Aegean air routes to Turkey unsafe because of the threat of conflicting control orders 
and jurisdictions. The Aegean as a result, became virtually closed to international air 
traffic until the middle of 1980s when, in an attempt to improve the climate of 
bilateral relations, Greece and Turkey removed their respective notices, restoring
243commercial traffic over the Aegean .
Turkey has insisted, however, that the median line -  dividing the Aegean into 
approximately equally sized sectors of responsibility -  must become the guiding 
principle for any lasting and mutually acceptable settlement. The median line, 
Turkey has argued -  especially after Greece’s withdrawal (1974-1980) from the
C.  Rozakis, “To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou kai I Elinotourkiki Krisi”, pp. 355-358.
T. Bahçeli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, pp. 149-152; Ş.S Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut içinde 
Türk Yunan İlişkileri, p.82.
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military structures of NATO -  should extend over assigned command and control 
responsibilities within NATO. Further, Turkey, in terms of the modus operandi of its 
own military aircraft, has been acting as if it does not recognize a 10-mile air 
territorial zone for Greece’s mainland and islands, but rather a 6-mile zone 
coterminous with Greece’s territorial waters^ "^ "*.
Greece has asserted persistently that it considers any unauthorized foreign flight 
within its ten-mile territorial zone as a violation of its air space and has been 
registering its complaints systemically with Turkish authorities while seeking to 
escort the violators out of the disputed air space. Needless to say, this situation -  
especially during periods of national or NATO coordinated military exercises raises 
the possibility of incidents that may escalate into violent hostilities between the two 
NATO allies.
Attempts at settlement of the command and control issue have followed the route of 
bilateral negotiations and NATO technical discussions. Greece has objected 
systematically to any arrangement that would enclave its eastern Aegean islands into 
a Turkish “security envelope”. This, in the view of Greece, would weaken the 
sovereign status of Greek territory in the Aegean.
4.2.4 Militarization of the Eastern Aegean islands
This issue is often raised in informal statements made by politicians and strategic 
analysts that appear in the Greek and Turkish press. But the “dispute” as such has
United States recognizes Greek airspace as only six miles as well. See C. Migdalovitz, 1997 
“Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues -  Background and Recent Developments”, CRS Issue Brief, p. 1.
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not been included formally in the published agenda of bilateral talks nor has there 
been any suggestion of submitting the dispute as a case for third-party arbitration or 
adjudication.
Turkey’s position is that since 1974 Greece has violated the provisions of the Treaty 
of Lausanne (1923) and the Treaty of Paris (1947). These treaties provide for the 
demilitarization of the eastern Aegean islands and the Dodecanese islands, 
respectively. The Turkish view is that the fortification of these islands, which are 
very close to the coast of Turkey, poses security problems and points to revisionist
tendencies in Greece245
The Greek response is that, with respect to the Greek islands of Lemnos and 
Samothrace, the Lausaime treaty provisions are no longer applicable, having been 
superseded by the Treaty of M ontrei^ (1936), of which Greece is a signatory. The 
Montreux treaty, which regulates the regime of the straits has, in effect, permitted the 
remilitarization of the whole area including the two Greek islands. The treaty gives 
Greece the same rights of remilitarization of its territories as it does for Turkey. 
With respect to other major Aegean islands (such as Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and 
Dcaria), Greece argues that the treaty of Lausanne does not prohibit local self-defense 
arrangements, and that Greek military facilities fall into that category '^*®.
Turning to the Dodecanese islands and their “disarmed status”, Greece argues that 
Turkey has no legal interest in the case -  not being a party to the Treaty of Paris -
T. Bahçeli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, pp. 146-147; H. Pazarcı, 1992. Doğu Ege 
Adalarının Askerden Arındırılmış statüsü (Ankara; Adalet Matbaacılık).
D. Dontas, 1987. Greece and Turkey: The Regime of the Straits, Lemnos and Samothrace
(Athens : Eleftheroudakis) (distribution), pp. 91-102.
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and furthermore, that the Paris treaty provides for the maintenance of “internal 
security forces” '^^ .^ Finally, the Greek position justifies the need for limited security 
arrangements on the islands as required by a number of threatening revisionist claims 
on the Aegean islands advanced by Turkish officials '^^*. Additionally, the 
establishment in 1975 of the “ominous” Turkish Fourth Army (known in Turkey as 
the Army of the Aegean) is viewed by Greece as posing a clear and present danger to 
the peace and security of the Aegean islands '^^^. Ultimately, the Greek position is 
founded on the UN Charter -  that supersedes all other treaty obligations -  which 
provides that every state has an inherent right to take steps to guarantee the self- 
defense of its territories^^'^.
In an attempt to diffuse mutual suspicions, each side has made a number of offers 
designed to placate the fears of the other. From the Greek side there are statements 
reiterating constantly that Greece has no claims whatsoever on Turkish territory. 
Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis in 1976 suggested, in this vein, that Greece 
and Turkey should enter into a mutual nonaggression pact. The Turkish side 
responded, however, that such a pact would be superfluous and embarrassing, given 
that both sides were signatories of the NATO alliance. From the Turkish side one 
also hears frequent official pronouncements that Turkey has no territorial designs on 
Greece’s Aegean islands, and that the issues dividing the two countries deal only 
with jurisdictional matters regarding the disposition of Aegean continental shelf, air 
space, and territorial sea.
C. Rozakis, “To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou kai I Elinotourkiki Krisi”, pp. 432-433.
-■** A. Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute”, p.40.
T. Couloumbis, 1983. The United States, Greece and Turkey, p.l22.
K. Ikonomidis, 1989. To Nomiko Kathestos ton Elinikon Nision tou Aigaiou (The Legal Status 
of the Greek Aegean Islands) (Athens: Gnosi Publications).
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4.3 Other Frictional Issues - The Question of Minorities
Another frictional issue, but which has not been raised officially in bilateral 
negotiations is the mutual treatment of minorities. It is a question that strikes 
sensitive chords in both countries and that appears frequently in the columns of the 
Greek and Turkish popular press.
Turkey’s concerns focus on the status, rights, and privileges of the Muslim Turks and 
Pomaks (numbering about 120,000) who are located primarily in the region of 
Western Thrace not far from the Greek-Turkish border, which is formed by the river 
Evros^^'. Turkish media frequently complain that Greek legislation discriminates 
against Turkish-speaking landowners, making it very difficult for them to acquire 
and hold on property while providing extremely favorable incentives to their Greek­
speaking and Greek Orthodox counterparts^^^.
Greece denies these charges, indicating that Greek Muslims elect at least two 
members in Greece’s House of Representatives, and that, since the treaty of 
Lausanne was signed in 1923 (which provided for the balanced protection of 
minorities in both countries), the size of the Turkish-speaking community increased 
from 100,000 to 120,000^^^. In contrast, Greece points out that the Greek Orthodox
Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece (A Helsinki Watch Report, August 1990); A 
detailed analysis of the problems of the minority in B. Oran, 1991. Tiirk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı 
Trakya Sorunu (The Western Thrace Problem in Turco-Greek Relations) (Istanbul: Bilgi).
B. Oran, 1996. “The Sleeping Volcano in Turco-Greek Relations: The Western Thrace Minority” 
in K. Karpat, Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments (Wisconsin: Madison), pp.l 19-128; T. 
Bahçeli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, pp. 169-188.
A. Alexandris, and A. Paresoglou. 1994. “Mousoulmanoi tis Ditikis Thrakis (The Muslims of 
Western Thrace) in T. Veremis, (ed.) Valkania: Apo ton Dipolismo stin Nea Epochi (Balkans: 
From Bipolism to the New Era) (Athens: Gnosi Publications), pp. 816-820.
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minority of over 100,000 in Istanbul has been reduced to the current low level of less 
6,000 as a result of systematic measures of economic discrimination, threats, and 
generally ill treatment by the Turkish authorities. Also, the Greek side protests 
against the near total elimination of the Greek populations on the islands of Imbvos 
and Tenedos as a result of years of oppressive Turkish administration^^'*.
4.4 The US Attitude towards the Greek-Turkish Dispute over Aegean Issues 
until the End of the Cold War
As a result of the 1974 crisis, US relations with each country suffered, and a period 
of US retrenchment from the region set in. Policy-makers were reluctant to pursue 
activist or high-profile initiatives both because of continued hostility to the United 
States in each country.
Ford Administration tried to restore relations with the new civilian government in 
Athens. One contributing factor to this repairing of relations was the public debate in 
the US Congress over the shortcomings of US policy toward the junta, viewed as a 
kind of a semi-official mea-culpa, led in large measure by liberal democrats^^^. In 
addition, the legislative branch insistence on punishing Turkey for its actions on
254' B. Theodoropoulos, 1988. Oi Tourkoi kai emis (The Turks and Us) (Athens: Fitraki Publications), 
pp. 301-313; A. Alexandris, 1983. The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 
1918-1974 (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies); Denying Human Rights & Ethnic Identity: 
The Greeks of Turkey (Helsinki Watch, March 1992).
One exception was the US involvement in humanitarian and refugee relief in Cyprus, including a 
major US role in financing the resettlement of the refugees. US aid in support of refugee resettlement 
and relief was over 50 million dollars in the period 1974-76. See E. Laipson, 1991. “US Policy 
towards Greece and Turkey since 1974” in D. Konstas, (ed.) The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 
1990s Domestic and External Influences (London: Macmillan), p. 166.
P. Watanabe, 1984. Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy: The Politics of 
the Turkish Arms Embargo (Connecticut: Greenwood Press).
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Cyprus by means of the arms embargo tried to divert the anti-American feelings of 
the Greeks^^^.
US relations with Turkey in the 1974-1977 period went in the opposite direction: 
initially satisfied with the administration’s hands-off reaction to events in Cyprus, the 
Turks were shocked by the imposition of the embargo, which, in their view, gravely 
undermined the alliance relationship and set back Turkey’s ability to fulfill its 
military obligations to NATO. The embargo had also a different political impact on 
informed Turks: it exposed the weakness or inability of the US administration to 
conduct its own foreign policy. For Turkey, the embargo was a rude awakening that 
the shook the premises of the 1950s commitment to partnership with the United 
States^ l^
The Ford administration saw the need to return US relations with the eastern 
Mediterranean states on a surer footing, but its policy efforts fluctuated between 
exasperated expressions of harm to US and NATO interests and quiet acceptance of 
the need to pull back from status quo ante relations with the two principal parties. 
Renewal of agreements governing the use of military facilities in both countries 
proved politically impossible, particularly in light of Greece’s withdrawal from the 
military command of NATO to protest at what it viewed as the alliance’s failure in 
Cyprus, and in light of Turkey’s downgrading of bilateral cooperation after the 
embargo. The bases continued to operate on an ad hoc basis, but the arrangement 
was less than satisfactory from the US point of view.
R. Hackett, 1980. “The role of the Congress and Greek-American relations” in T. Couloumbis, and 
J. latrides, (eds). 1980, Greek-Atnerican Relations. A Critical Review (New York: Pella), pp. 131- 
148.
P. Henze, 1993. Turkish Democracy and the American Alliance (Santa Monica: RAND), pp. 
28-30; M. Gönlülbol, et. al. Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, p.605.
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During the Carter administration the arms embargo was lifted and a linkage of 
military aid to the two countries was (7: 10 ratio) established^^^. In Athens the 
Karamanlis and Rallis governments were firmly committed to restoring Greece’s 
credibility in the Western camp, including becoming a full member of the European 
Community, and returning to the military command of NATO. In effect, this pro- 
Western policy gave the Greek government considerable leverage in its relations 
with Washington, and there were pressures on US policy to facilitate Greek re-entry 
in order to complete a new base agreement. Thus the US and NATO commanders, 
US generals Alexander Haig and Bernard Rogers, became involved in trying to 
mediate Greco-Turkish problems, resolution of which had become a Greek condition 
for re-entry into NATO^^* .^
Turkey initially sought to use its power of veto in the NATO military committee to 
block a return to the pre-1974 arrangements which had placed the Aegean under the 
responsibility of the Greek command. Turkish representatives argued that in the 
post-1974 circumstances, new arrangements should be made and proposed the use of 
the Aegean median line to divide responsibilities^^'. Greece rejected this proposal 
which would have placed its Aegean islands within a proposed security zone 
controlled by Turkey. Greece threatened to close the remaining American bases in 
Greece unless offered satisfactory terms for re-entry. Subsequently, following 
prolonged negotiations. General Bernard Rogers, NATO Supreme Commander, 
persuaded Turkey’s General Evren (the head of the military government then in
Since 1978 it became an accepted practice for the US Congress to allocate military aid for Greece 
and Turkey in the ratio 7: 10. In other words, the US was given to the Greeks 70 per cent of the 
military assistance attributed to the considerably larger Turkish armed forces, in spite of Turkish 
protests and the occasional unwillingness of the US administration. See C. Migdalovitz, 1995. 
“Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues” CRS Issue Brief, p.2.
E. Laipson, “US Policy towards Greece and Turkey since 1974”, p.l66.
Ş. S. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri, pp.90-91.
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power) to drop Turkish objections, and Greece returned to NATO in October 1980. 
Greece and Turkey agreed to postpone negotiations on command and control 
arrangements after Greece’s re-entry^^^, but base talks with the United States were 
not completed until governments changed in both Athens and Washington.
In Ankara, the lifting of the embargo allowed base talks to proceed. In March 1980, 
the two governments signed a Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, 
which included US government “best efforts” pledges to help finance a multi-year 
weapons modernization program. For Turkey this may have been as an effort to 
compensate for the defense deterioration of the embargo years, although in the US 
community, there continued to be disagreement about the extent to which the 
embargo could be blamed for the sorry state of Turkish military equipment^^^ In the 
US defense establishment, there was widespread relief at the restoration of defense 
relations, colored dramatically by the fall o f the Shah of Iran, and its related loss of 
US access and influence in Turkey’s eastern neighbor
In the decade of 1980, the Reagan administration did not show much concern for the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the Greek-Turkish dispute. During the Reagan era, the 
policy towards the two countries had essentially two discrete and separate 
components. This was mainly because of the cordial ties developed between 
Washington and Ankara, as the military government that ruled Turkey from 
September 1980 until elections in 1983 won favour in Regan’s camp, because of its
T Bahçeli Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, p. 149; R. McDonald, 1988. “Alliance problems 
in the eastenl Mediterranean -  Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part II Prospects for security in the 
MgrjjtPi-ran^ an ” AHffIphi Papers_229, pp 75-78.
E. Laipson, “US Policy towards Greece and Turkey since 1974”, p.l67; O. Sander, Türkiye’nin 
Dış Politikası, pp. 97-100.
““  P. Robins, Suits and Uniforms Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, p.l33.
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anti-Soviet stance. The 1983 election of Turgut Ozal to the premiership further 
strengthened the bonds, based on shared strategic and economic philosophies.
Across the Aegean, an opposite set of dynamics was in place, and this led to friction 
with Washington. The election of PASOK leader Andreas Papandreou in 1981 did 
not make for harmonious relations with the new American president. Papandreou’s 
official positions on NATO, US bases and East-West relations in general, even if 
best understood as rhetoric or hyperbolic abstractions, harmed the relations of the 
two allies '^"^.
During this period US activism was directed at conflicts with a clear East-West 
dimension, which did not pertain to Greek-Turkish disputes or Cyprus. Additionally, 
in late years of 1980s, it seemed that the US had become accommodated to the 
chronic friction between Greece and Turkey.
While encouraging any bilateral moves between Ankara and Athens to discuss their 
differences, the United States never attempted to take a more active role as a 
mediator, nor did it take public positions on the various bilateral disputes . This 
was the case in the short-lived Davos process, a series of meetings between the 
premiers Papandreou and Ozal in 1988. The rapprochement encouraged but with 
little apparent US involvement, stalled in autumn 1988 due to Papandreou’s illness 
and political difficulties at home.
265 M. Spourdalakis, 1988. PASOK: Domi, Esokommatikes Kriseis kai Sigentrosi Exousias 
(PASOK: Structure, Inter-party Crises and the Concentration of Power) (Athens: Exantas 
Publications), pp. 297-306.
E. Laipson, 1988. Greek-Turkish relations: Beginning of a new era?. Congressional Research 
Library ICRS'), p.59.
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In the end of Reagan presidency with remarkable warming in US-Soviet relations, 
and the extraordinary collapse of communist regimes in eastern Europe, the US 
interests shifted even more from the eastern Mediterranean. Relations with Greece 
and Turkey were moving in a new concept of power sharing in the post-Cold War 
world.
To sum up, in the immediate aftermath of 1974, the United States was not a credible 
outside mediator, because of suspicions on the Greek side, in particular, that 
Washington had encouraged or acquiesced to Turkey’s actions in Cyprus. On the 
other hand, Turkey was worried about American intentions after the imposition of 
the arms embargo. After 1978, the United States became indirectly involved in the 
NATO-sponsored efforts to solve the Aegean command issue. Concerning the other 
Aegean issues, it showed no preferences for direct initiatives. Since the US 
recovered the loss of influence lost in the 1970s, it seemed to have accustomed to the 
Greek-Turkish quarrel in the eastern Mediterranean^®^
4.5 The 1976 Crisis between Greece and Turkey and the US
On 1 November 1973, Turkish government granted the Turkish State Petroleum 
Company (TPAO) exploration permits to search for petroleum in the Aegean seabed. 
Greece had granted similar permits for similar activities in the same area since 
1961^ ®*. After an American company struck significant deposits of oil off the Greek 
island of Thasos, the matter gained enough importance to trigger a protracted quarrel.
®^’ J. Brown, 1991. Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey, p.5. 
Bahçeli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, p. 130.
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Greece protested against granting of such permits by Turkey for the first time on 
February 7, 1974 partly to preclude a finding of acquiescence in international law.
The first Turkish response, on 28 February 1974, was to propose negotiations. 
Greece accepted this on 25 of May “in accordance with the international law as 
codified in the Geneva Convention” - a step described by the Turkish Prime 
Minister, Bülent Ecevit “as positive development” .
Three days later, however, Turkey announced that a survey ship the Qandarli was to 
make magnetometric studies in the Aegean in preparation for oil-drilling. The area 
o f the survey, according to the Minister for Power and National Resources, Mr. Cahit 
Kayra, was to be “in the Turkish continental shelf’. The Qandarli entered the 
Aegean on 29 May and, accompanied by 32 warships of the Turkish navy, spent six 
days exploring and sailing along the western limit of the areas in which Turkey had 
granted mineral exploration concessions. In the ensuing tense situation Greece sent a
new protest, which Turkey rejected270
At this point (in mid-July) the continental shelf dispute was overtaken by a sequence 
of outside events: the Samson coup and the Turkish landing in Cyprus on 20 July 
1974, and more particularly the second landing, on 14 August, gave the whole 
Aegean dispute a very much more serious aspect.
Throughout the winter of 1974-75 Turkish leaders made serious statements that 
caused Greece to fear an attack. This could have come either in Thrace (where
Rozakis, “To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou”, pp. 280-282. 
Ş. S. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri, pp. 86-87.
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heavy security measures were imposed) or against the islands, which Turkey 
appeared to see as the bases for Greek raids against Anatolia^^'. In Greece, too, there 
were belligerent statements -  particularly by Andreas Papandreou, leader of the Pan- 
Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) which, if heeded nationally, could have 
increased the danger of war"^ .^ But the Greek government itself adopted a restrained 
policy.
It was in this spirit that Greece proposed on 27 January 1975 that the two countries 
should jointly take the continental shelf issue to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). The Turkish Prime Minister welcomed the idea, and was attacked for doing so 
by the then Opposition Leader, Bülent Ecevit. Turkey accepted the proposal on 6 
February. But almost at once there was a change in policy following the replacement 
of Prof. Irmak by the Justice Party leader Süleyman Demirel. On 6 April, Demirel 
declared that the boundaries of the continental shelf would have to be established 
“through a negotiated settlement”. And on 16 April the Foreign Minister, Ihsan 
Sabri Çaglayangil, spelled out the principle that has dominated Turkey’s approach 
ever since: Let us talk first- we may reach an agreement -  and not go to the Hague^^^
In spite of Turkey’s preference for a political rather than a legal settlement, 
Çaglayangil met his Greek counterpart Dimitrios Bitsios, in Rome on 19 May 1975 
for preliminary discussions on a compromis for a joint submission of the Aegean 
question to the International Court. Twelve days later Karamanlis met Demirel at a 
NATO summit in Brussels and they agreed to speed up the work of legal experts 
preparing it. This meeting later acquired legal significance when Greece cited the
A. Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute”, p. 7.
V. Coufoudakis, “PASOK and Greek-Turkish relations”, p.l69. 
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joint communiqué as evidence to the International Court that Turkey had agreed to 
submit to the latter’s adjudication^^“*. The communiqué said that the two Prime 
Ministers had decided that their problems should be resolved peacefully by means of 
negotiations and, as regards the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea, by the 
International Court at the Hauge. It also said that they had defined the general lines 
on which the forthcoming meetings of the representatives of the two governments 
would take place^^^.
From now on, the two sides’ legal experts met at more or less regular intervals. But 
progress remained slow. In June, there was tension when a Canadian hydrographic 
vessel, Goel I, arrived at Izmir to prospect near Greek territorial waters on behalf of 
an American company, the Dorchester Gas Corporation, with Turkish experts 
aboard. More tension occurred in July when Turkey set up a new military command, 
the Fourth Army, with headquarters at Izmir. Dubbed the “Army of the Aegean” by 
the Turkish Press, it was given the task of defending the Anatolian coast, and 
pointedly excluded from Turkey’s commitment to NATO.
In September of 1975 the Demirel government, under attack from the opposition 
(and particularly Ecevit) for agreeing to go to the International Court at Greek 
insistence instead of first “creating Turkey’s legitimate rights to the Aegean seabed”, 
announced that it was postponing a further meeting of legal experts about to be held 
in Paris. It gave as a reason that Greece wanted the immediate drafting of a 
compromis, whereas Turkey sought the examination of “every method” for a solution
D. Bitsios, Pera apo ta Sinora, pp.70-75; Ş. S. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan 
İlişkileri, pp.87-88.
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of the problem. It was, of course, perfectly true that the Greek government attached 
primary importance to the signing of the compromis. Its reasons were twofold. First, 
it believed that the two sides would never be able to resolve all their differences by 
themselves. Second, a handed-down legal decision would encounter less opposition 
from Greek public opinion than a negotiated one.
Hard-line pressure by the Turkish opposition continued, with dramatic results the 
following year. In February 1976 Ecevit accused Demirel of allowing “the balance 
of power in the Aegean to change against us” . Next day the government announced 
that a hydrographic research ship, the Hora, later re-named Sismik I, was being fitted 
out to prospect for oil near the Greek island of Thasos, the area of Greek discoveries 
three years previously. That the main purpose of the Sismik I  was to assert Turkey’s 
claim to the seabed seemed to be confirmed by Power and National Resources 
Minister Selahattin Kılıç, when he said that the issue of exploration licenses for 8 
million hectares covered all Turkish claims to the continental shelf
While the preparation of the Sismik I  went ahead, Greece made a proposal for a non- 
recourse-to-force pact. This was initially welcomed by Turkey but rejected when 
Opposition leaders described it as a Greek maneuver in preparation for extending
territorial waters from six to twelve miles276
On five occasions between March and August, Greece expressed anxiety to Turkey 
about Sismik Fs intended operations. Greece also announced that if the vessel 
entered the area of the Greek claim it would create a dangerous situation. Turkey
276 D. Bitsios, Fera apo ta Sinora, p.77.
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replied that if Greece interfered with the vessel, she would be forced to retaliate. The 
Sismik I  sailed from (Janakale and entered the disputed area on 6 August 1976 
accompanied by a Turkish minesweeper and naval cooperation aircraft. For three 
days it prospected on the Greek-claimed continental shelf west of Lesbos. Although 
Sismik I  was closely observed and its movements plotted by the Greek navy, there 
were no attempt to interfere .
Although Greek sources affirm that there was a danger of war between Greece and 
Turkey on this occasion (and clearly the possibility of an accident existed) the 
episode appears in retrospect as evidence of both sides’ determination to stop in the 
eleventh hour. At the same time the Sismik I  short voyage abruptly raised the level 
o f the Aegean dispute and accelerated legal and political developments^^®.
On 10 August 1976, within hours of the Sismik Fs return to (^anakale, Greece asked 
for an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council, on the ground that 
“repeated violation by Turkey” of Greek sovereign rights in the Aegean continental 
shelf had created a dangerous threat to peace and security. She also started 
proceedings against Turkey in the International Court and filed a request for interim 
measures of protection. The appeal to the Security Council cited article 35 of the 
United Nations Charter and was accompanied by an Explanatory Memorandum 
referring to the “already very serious” Greek-Turkish dispute, Turkish naval and air
Ş. Kut, “Türk Dış Politikasında Ege Sorunu” (The Aegean Problem in Turkish Foreign Policy) in
F. Sönmezoğlu, (ed.) Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (An Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy) 
(Istanbul: Der Yayınları), pp. 264-266.
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maneuvers of the Sismik I, and Turkey’s insistence on continuing exploration of the 
seabed^^ .^
In the Council the Greek representative asked members to instruct Turkey to suspend 
her “provocative acts” and to prevent in the Aegean the kind of tragedy it had been 
too late to stop in Cyprus. He delivered a statement, made a few days earlier by 
Konstantinos Karamanlis reiterating Greece’s interpretation of the Geneva 
Convention as binding countries, such as Turkey, that had not signed it. The 
statement recalled Turkey’s February 1975 acceptance of the Greek proposal to refer 
the continental shelf question jointly to the International Court and accused Turkey 
o f adopting inflexible positions in negotiations on a compromis for joint 
submission^*®.
Turkey responded to the Greek request for a Security Council meeting by restating 
her position on the continental shelf question that, in the absence of an agreed 
delimitation, the Greek claim that she had violated Greek sovereign rights was 
unfounded. Turkey said that the Sismik I  was conducting research outside Greek 
territorial waters, where the continental shelf had yet to be delimited, and that, while 
engaged in this lawful pursuit, the vessel had been harassed by the Greek navy and 
air force. Ankara complained that Greece had violated the treaties of Lausanne and 
Paris by militarizing the East Aegean islands^*'.
In the Council the Turkish representative repeated Turkey’s claim to sovereign rights 
where the continental shelf was a prolongation of the Anatolian land, adding that a
C. Rozakis, “To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou”, pp. 290.
Ibid, p. 291.
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Greek vessel, the Nautilus, was “at this very moment” conducting research similar to 
those of the Sismik /  in a neighboring region. Turkey hoped that the Council would 
invite Greece to enter into “meaningful negotiations” and that it would also examine 
Greek violations of treaty obligations regarding demilitarization of the islands. Other 
points were that:
• Turkey did not exclude recourse to the International Court to settle certain 
relevant aspects of the problem, but the dispute must first be negotiated 
between the parties. Only then should aspects that could not be resolved be 
submitted to the Court “or any other legal or judicial instance”.
• The Geneva Convention was not applicable to the Aegean, whose shape 
made it a special case; and in any case legal doctrines on the continental shelf 
were in a state of flux, particularly in the light of UNCLOS EQ, which had 
been discussing the subject since December 1973.
• The task of Sismik I  was to collect scientific data necessary for conducting 
negotiations with Greece, whose government had been kept fully informed 
about the preparations for the ship’s voyage^® .^
The Security Council did not apportion the blame for the Aegean situation 
attributable to either party or attempt to deal with the substance of the dispute. 
Instead, it adopted Resolution 395, offering a procedural framework for seeking a 
settlement . After referring to vanous provisions for the peaceful resolution of 
disputes in Chapter VI of the UN Chapter, it appealed to the two parties to '‘do
282
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everything in their power to reduce present tension in the area so that the negotiating 
process may be facilitated” *^'*.
The operative paragraphs of the resolution were Nos. 3 and 4 Paragraph 3 called on 
the governments of Greece and Turkey to resume direct negotiations over their 
differences and appealed to them to do everything in their power to ensure that these 
resulted in mutually acceptable solutions. Paragraph 4 invited them in this respect to 
continue to take into account the contribution that appropriate judicial means, in 
particular the International Court of Justice, were qualified to make to the settlement 
of any remaining legal differences which they might identify in connection with their 
present dispute^*^.
The wording of Paragraph 4 was, of course, extremely ambiguous. Some authorities 
considered that it conformed to the Turkish position in envisaging that the two 
parties should decide through negotiations what issues should be submitted to the 
Court. Others argued that it endorsed Greece’s unilateral application by inviting the 
parties to “continue to take into account” the potential contribution of the court^*^. 
From any point of view the Security Council resolution must be considered indefinite 
and unsatisfactory. It did, however, manage to take some steam out of the dispute.
Simultaneously, Greece unilaterally petitioned to the International Court in two 
separate actions. The first instituted proceedings against Turkey over delimitation of 
the continental shelf and the rights of each country to explore and exploit. The
284 Security Council Resolution 395, 31 UN SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions of the UN Security 
Council 15, UN Doc. S/INF/32 (1976).
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second, a request for interim measures of protection, asked the Court to direct both 
countries to “refrain from all exploration activity or any scientific research, with 
respect to the continental shelf area in which Turkey has granted such licenses” and 
also form any further military measures or actions which might endanger the two 
countries’ peaceful relations^^^.
Greece based her request for interim protection on two grounds: first, the grant of 
licenses to the Turkish State Petroleum Company and the activities of Sismik I 
constituted an “irreparable prejudice” to Greece’s right of exclusivity of knowledge 
about her continental shelf and to the Court’s future judgment on the merits of the 
case. And second, that any continuation o f the grant o f licenses and of exploration 
would undermine friendly relations between the two countries. Turkey opposed this 
on the grounds, inter alia, that her exploration activities did not prejudice any of 
Greece’s rights in the disputed areas, and that even if they did, compensation would 
be given and the Court would not be prejudiced .
The Court refused the Greek request for interim protection because it could not find 
enough risk of “irreparable prejudice” to justify exercising its power to grant an 
interim injunction. However, the request gave rise to an interesting argument as to 
the Court’s jurisdiction in the case. In contentious cases the jurisdiction of the 
International Court is dependent, under its Statute, on the consent of the parties. In 
this particular case Greece alleged two independent expressions of Turkish consent. 
The first was the General Act on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes o f 1928. This, 
Greece argued, gave the Court jurisdiction, since under Article 37 of its Statute it had
ibid.
' “ Ibid.
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inherited the function of the former Permanent Court of International Justice, to 
which the General Act refers. The second was the joint communiqué issued after the 
Brussels meeting of the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers on 31 May 1975.
Article 17 of the General Act (to whom both Greece and Turkey acceded) says that 
all disputes over which the parties are in conflict shall be submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, unless the parties agree to arbitration. Turkey 
raised two objections to its application to the present case. The first was that the Act 
might no longer be in force, the second that its application was in any case precluded 
by the Greek reservation. A similar argument about the desuetude of the General Act 
had been made by France in the Nuclear Tests case (in which Australia sought relief 
from French nuclear tests in the Pacific), but had been rejected by four judges upon 
whose opinion Greece relied heavily. She also adduced evidence of the General 
Act’s continuing vitality, based on the fact that the UN Secretary-General, having for 
several years dropped the Act from his list o f multilateral treaties, reinstated it in
1974289
The Greek reservation on which Turkey based her second objection had been made 
at the time of Greece’s accession to the treaty. It withheld from the Court disputes 
“relating to the territorial status of Greece, including disputes relating to its rights of 
sovereignty over its ports and lines of communications’’^ *^^ . Greece argued that this 
use of the phrase “territorial status” covered only land territory (the reservation was 
directed at a dispute with Bulgaria) and that “sovereignty” was quite separate from 
the sovereign rights claimed in the seabed. Turkey contended that there could be no
Rozakis, “To Diethes Notniko Kathestos tou Ageou”, p 291. 
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such distinction, citing ruling in the North Sea Continental Shelf case in support of 
its case.
The Brussels communiqué offered a fail-back position for Greece. The communiqué 
said that at their meeting the Prime Ministers had agreed that Greco-Turkish 
problems “should be solved peacefully by means of negotiations and as regards the 
continental shelf of the Aegean Sea by the International Court at the Hague”. Greece 
contended that this amounted to a “joint and several” acceptance of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, and that the communiqué, being a juxtaposition of two binding unilateral 
statements, was sufficient to endow the Court with responsibility to adjudicate under 
Article 31 o f its status. Turkey contended that, since the two countries had never 
been able to define the scope of their dispute over the Aegean, they could not have 
reached an agreement to submit it to the Court at the Brussels meeting, and that, by 
agreeing to speed up a proposed meeting of experts on the question of the continental 
shelf, the Prime Ministers had given priority to political negotiations.
The effect of Security Council Resolution 395, followed on 11 September by the 
International Court’s rejection of the Greek request for a temporary injunction, was 
to throw the parties back on their own resources. In November experts from both 
sides met in Berne and, after 10 days of talks, signed a declaration establishing a 
code of behavior to govern future negotiations on the continental shelf^^'.
The most important points of the declaration were that such negotiations should be 
sincere, detailed and confidential with a view to reaching a settlement based on
A. Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute”, p. 10.
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mutual consent: both parties should abstain from anything that might prejudice the 
negotiations; and both agreed to study state practice and international rules “with a 
view to implement certain principles and practical criteria that could be of use in the 
delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries” . For further talks 
a method of work was accepted by the two Secretaries-General of Foreign Ministries. 
The declaration was released in Athens and Ankara on 20 November. Despite some 
lapses in respect of the paragraphs on prejudicial initiatives, it remains the 
recognized framework for bilateral discussions.
■v^
For five years following the Berne Agreement, Turkey and Greece from time to time, 
showed some willingness to negotiate the issue. The most notable effort, in this 
respect, was the 1978 Montreux meeting of Prime Ministers. Upon the invitation of 
the new Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit and his Greek coimterpart Karamanlis met in 
Montreux on May 10-11, 1978. The two leaders confirmed that the issue must 
continue to be discussed in bilateral meetings. The Montreux meeting was followed 
by various meetings of foreign ministry under-secretaries and of technical
293committees .
In January 1978 the Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction in the Aegean Sea  ^
Continental Shelf case^ '^*. This foreclosed one of the three avenues open for the 
peaceful solution of the dispute. The others were political negotiation (which shows 
signs o f being insufficient), or some form of non-judicial arbitration, which has yet to 
be explored. However, Greece and Turkey were not able to reach an agreement on
§. Kut, “The Aegean Continental Shelf Dispute between Turkey and Greece”, p.l93.
K. Svolopoulos, 1987.1 Eliniki Exoteriki Politiki sta Valkania 1974-1981 (Greek Foreign Policy 
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the delimitation of the continental shelf because of the general tension in their 
relations as a whole. Finally, all these half-hearted efforts, meetings and negotiations 
came to an end in 1981 with Andreas Papandreou’s coming to pov/er in Greece.
During the 1976 crisis both parties did not attempt to involve the US. After the 
ending of the crisis, the Greek government launched two separate appeals one in the 
Security CounciP^^ and the other to the International Court of Justice in an effort to 
internationalize the issue as much as possible and to involve as many international 
players as possible.
On the other hand, the failure of the US crisis mediation in Cyprus either to prevent 
the Turkish military action or to bring about its quick withdrawal of the Turkish 
troops after a civilian government was restored in Nicosia is deeply imprinted in 
Greek and Greek-Cypriot political consciousness as evidence of US approval of 
Turkey’s actions. Due to these developments in Cyprus, the US was very careful to 
get involved in the 1976 Aegean crisis.
4.6 The 1987 Crisis between Greece and Turkey and the US
Like the previous crisis of 1976, this hinged on proposed oil explorations in disputed 
waters and likewise involved the survey ship Sismik I. The Turkish government 
granted exploration and exploitation licenses to the state-owned Turkish Petroleum 
Corporation in international waters near the Greek island of Samothrace. At the 
same time, Turkey accused Greece of having violated the Beme Protocol of
Greek Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs asked from the American Ambassodor in Greece Jack 
Kioubitz, his government to play “fair play” and do not act behind the scenes in favor of Turkey 
during the discussions of the Security Council in the UN. D. Bitsios, Pera apo ta Sinora, p. 82.
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November 1976, whereby both sides undertook to avoid provocative actions, by 
proposals to nationalize the foreign -owned consortium that had been given the 
concession to exploit the existing Thasos (Prinos) oilfield^^^.
Beyond the causes of the crisis and who started it, the crisis escalated. On 28 March, 
the Turkish survey ship Sismik I , under naval escort, set sail for the Aegean, Greek 
and Turkish forces were placed on alert and Papandreou declared that all necessary 
measures would be taken to safeguard Greece’s sovereign rights^^^. Holding 
NATO , and, in particular, the United States, to be responsible for the crisis, 
Papandreou ordered the suspension of communications facilities at the American 
base in Nea Makri and promptly dispatched his foreign minister, Karolos Papoulias, 
to Sofia to brief the Bulgarian leader, Theodor Zivkof. In a calculated snub, the
296 According to the Greek sources, the crisis begun with the Turkey’s National Security Council 
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Prime Minister Papandreou declared in an emergency television broadcast that, “the maps 
published by Turkey show clearly that the planned route of the S ism ik  I  lies 95 per cent within the area 
under which the Greek continental shelf extends...It is our decision not to allow the Sismik to go on 
with its seismic research in the Aegean. It is our duty to defend both our borders and our sovereign 
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ambassadors o f Warsaw Pact countries in Athens were briefed on the crisis in
advance of their NATO counterparts^^^.
The threat of outright hostilities was averted only when Turkish Prime Minister 
Turgut Ozal made a statement in London^ *^ *^  saying that it was Greece and not Turkey 
who was violating the Bern Agreement by drilling on the continental shelf So if 
Greece had no such plans Turkey would call back its ships because Turkey never had 
the intention to drill on the continental shelf anyway. Mr. Ozal added that Turkey 
always wanted to establish friendly relations with Greece and that this last incident 
showed the imperative of starting a dialogue^®'.
The Greek government announced that no drilling would take place in disputed 
waters and bilateral negotiations should begin only to explore possibilities of signing 
a “compromise” for submitting the case to the International Court of Justice; and 
during the period of negotiations a de facto moratorium would prevail^® .^
The March 1987 crisis, like the confrontation in the Aegean eleven years earlier, 
demonstrated the potential dangers of an outbreak of violence in the Aegean. Just 
like the 1976 confrontation was instrumental in helping reach an understanding for 
stability in the Aegean for just over a decade, the 1987 crisis became a catalyst for 
improved Greek-Turkish relations. Greek and Turkish premiers exchanged
R. Clogg, 1991.“Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-1974 Period” in D. Konstas, (ed.) The 
Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s Domestic and External Influences, pp. 12-26; Ptisi ('Flight’). 
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correspondence and proposals which led to their first high-level meeting at Davos, 
Switzerland in January 1988.
On 31 January, Papandreou and Ozal issued a joint statement which emphasized the 
need to avoid the kind of confrontation that, in March 1987, had brought the two 
countries to the verge of war. The Davos agreement was subsequently referred to by 
the PASOK government as the ''symphonia mi-polemou: the “no-war agreemenf’^ ®^. 
With a view to creating a much-improved climate in bilateral relations the two 
leaders agreed to establish a “hot line” between Athens and Ankara, undertook to 
meet at least once a year and to visit each other’s countries. They called for an 
intensification of contacts at all levels, with particular emphasis on the 
encouragement of tourism and cultural exchanges. To this end, two joint committees 
were established to discuss the development of closer political and economic 
relations. These political and economic committees met twice in 1988 and their sub­
committees more frequently^ *^ "*.
In an early gesture of good will, the Turkish government rescinded the 1964 decree 
restricting the property rights of Greek nationals in Turkey. In return, Greece lifted 
her objections to the reactivation of 1964 Association Agreement between Turkey 
and European Community, which had been “frozen” since the 1980 Turkish military 
coup. Reciprocal visits by, among others, the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers 
were followed by an official visit, the first such visit by a Turkish Prime Minister for
K. Botsiou, 2001. “Oi Elinotourkikes Sxeseis 1974-2000(Greek-Turkish Relations 1974-2000)” in 
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thirty-six years, by Ozal to Athens^® .^ Papandreou had not reciprocated Ozal’s visit 
by the time of his defeat in the elections of June 1989.
The defeat of PASOK and the beginning of an unstable situation in Greek domestic 
politics (1989-1991) terminated the efforts for further improvement in Greek-Turkish 
relations and further effort to deepen in the Greek-Turkish Aegean problems. The 
global and the regional changes brought new challenges, priorities and problems in 
the two allies and the US as well, so the overall Greek-Turkish dispute was left aside 
in the foreign policy agenda of all parties concerned.
To summarize the third chapter, the Aegean dispute which broke out in early 1970s, 
soon developed into a major bones of contention between Greece and Turkey. It is 
true that the poisonous political climate in Cyprus exacerbated initial disagreements 
over the delimitation of Aegean continental shelf and over the extension of the 
territorial waters in the Aegean.
Since the mid-1970s, the Aegean dispute has become the primary source of tension 
between the two allies. Each side has well developed and structured its arguments 
over the Aegean issues with no real intention or will to move even slightly towards a 
peaceful solution. The US did not endeavour real effort to bring the two parties 
closer to a solve the Aegean dispute as both Greece and Turkey for different reasons 
perceived American involvement with suspicions. And the Americans themselves 
gradually got used with this friction since it was under control.
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Enformasıon Genel Müdürlüğü. Ankara, pp.96-99, 137-138; S. Bölükbaşı, “Türkiye’nin Yakındaki 
Avrupa ile İlişkileri: Türk-Yunan Sorunları”, pp.267-268.
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With the end of 1976 crisis Greece attempted to internationalize the Aegean problem 
in the UN and the International Court of Justice with no real results. For the next six 
years, the Aegean continental shelf dispute remained a categorical problem in 
Turkish-Greek relations: no real crisis, but no effort to solve the problem, either. 
Then in 1987, the issue of the Aegean continental shelf erupted again and brought 
Turkey and Greece once again to the brink of war. This time Greece tried to 
mobilize NATO in an effort to resolve the crisis without asking the direct 
involvement of the United States. Papandreou went further by holding the US 
responsible for the crisis. Eventually with the mediation efforts of NATO Secretary 
General the tension subsided.
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CHAPTER V
GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
5.1 Greece’s Relations with the US in the 1990s.
Since the 1974 Cyprus crisis the Greek-American relationship became strained as the 
wide-held view in the Greek public and the Greek political elite was that the 
American foreign policy was greatly responsible for the success and preservation of 
the Colonel’s regime (1967-1974), and in Cyprus it seemed to have consistently 
favored Turkish policies.
' f
The 1974-1981 New Democracy governments, by setting as the primary goal the 
accession of the country to the European Community, took a strategic decision which 
had the most positive impact on the consolidation of Greece’s democratic institutions 
and on its formulation of long-term political economic and security policies^® .^ 
Greek foreign policy makers believed that apart from the fact that European 
Community’s membership would serve Greece both as a diplomatic lever and as a 
restraining mechanism, it also would operate as a means to change the nature of 
Greek-US relations from a highly hierarchical to a more balanced one. Nevertheless,
P. Kazakos, and P. loakimidis, 1994. (eds.) Greece and EC Membership Evaluated (London: 
Pinter Publishers).
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New Democracy governments had remained steadfast in its conviction that the
ТП7United States was Greece’s natural partner .
With the rise of PASOK in power in 1981, the confrontational tactics and the anti- 
American dogma of Papandreou’s government added considerable irritation to 
already strained US-Greek relations^^^. The PASOK government found it politically 
expedient to condemn the foreign policy of the Reagan administration at every 
opportunity^^^, while at the same time expecting American officials to accommodate 
Greece in its feuds with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean.
For its part, Washington paid no particular attention to Greece but continued to base 
its policy toward its small ally on narrowly-defined collective defense considerations 
dictated by the logic of the Cold War^^^. In the issue of the military assistance, it 
expected the PASOK government to live up to its NATO obligations and permit the 
existing American bases to remain on Greek soil. PASOK once in power dropped its 
vocal opposition to the presence of the US bases in Greece. Instead, it started 
bilateral negotiations with the US which led to the signing of a five-year base
J. latrides, 1983. “Greece and the United States: The Stained Partnership” in Clogg, Richard (ed.) 
Greece in the 1980s (London: Macmillan Press), pp. 168-169; C. Rozakis, 1986. Eliniki Exoteriki 
Politiki (Greek Foreign Policy) (Athens: Maliaris-Paidia).
A. Borowiec, 1983, The Mediterranean Feud (New York: Praeger Press), pp.84-86. 
^^^Papandreou’s government differentiated itself from the American or the European Communities 
policies in order to demonstrate the “independence” of Greek foreign policy and strengthened the 
PASOK leaders’ sense of self-importance. Such incidents were the refusal to condemn the 
Jaruzelski’s crackdown of the Solidarity Movement in Poland in 1982; PASOK government’s 
decision to veto a European Council statement condemning the Soviets for shooting down a Korean 
civilian airplane in 1983 and the harsh condemnation of the Reagun administration over the bombing 
of Libya in 1986. See with details, J. latrides, 1993.“Beneath the Sound and the Fury: US relations 
with the PASOK Government” in R. Clogg, (ed.) Greece, 1981-89. The Populist Decade (New 
York: St. Martin Press), pp. 161-16; A. Kalaitzidis, and N. Zahariadis, 1997. “Papandreou’s NATO 
Policy: Continuity or Change” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora. 23: 1, pp. 105-116..
E. Laipson, 1983. U.S Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean: Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, 
Congressional Research Library iCRSL pp. 34-35.
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agreement in the summer of 1983^” . The presence of the US bases, from the 
PASOK perspective, was to be made conditional on the preservation of the Greek- 
Turkish military balance in the Aegean -  understood in terms of the 7:10 ratio in US 
military aid and sales to Greece and Turkey respectively^*^.
PASOK’s impact on Greek-US relations was negative. But both parties came to a 
realization that there was a divergence of their respective interests and that they 
could not count on the other’s support except in limited areas. For the Greeks, it was 
clear that in facing their principal adversary, Turkey, they could not have substantive 
American support. On the other hand, for the Americans it became clear that 
Greece’s cooperation in critical matters for the American foreign policy was 
questionable .
The electoral defeat of PASOK in 1989 paved the way to an improvement and a 
more ffiction-ffee relationship between Greece and the United States. One of the 
immediate aims of the new conservative government of Konstantinos Mitsotakis was 
to improve the climate of Greek-US relations. Mitsotakis visited Washington soon
C. Migdalovitz, 1995. “Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues”, CRS Issue Brief, pp.2-3. 
^'^PASOK declared that the expiration of this agreement, late in 1988, would signal the final removal 
of these bases from the Greek soil. This, apparently, was a tactic designed to soften the impact of the 
public from PASOK’s pre-election promises. For as early as the autumn of 1985 the Papandreou 
government had opened the door for the continuation of the US bases in Greece by indicating its 
readiness to begin a new round of negotiations for a new base agreement which -  it was argued -  once 
concluded with mutual satisfaction, would be submitted through a referendum to the fmal arbiter -  the 
Greek people. Base negotiations begun early in 1988 and were suspended after many sessions (in 
May of 1989) in view of the June elections. It fell to the New Democracy government to complete the 
task by concluding an eight-year agreement shortly after assuming to power in April 1990. The new 
government argued that 80 per cent of the new defense and cooperation agreement had been worked 
out by the previous PASOK government. See with details, T. Couloumbis, 1993. “PASOK’s Foreign 
Policies, 1981-89” in R. Clogg, (ed.) Greece, 1981-8. The Populist Decade, pp.l 19-120.
For the Americans was much irritating the refusal of the Greek authorities to cooperate closely 
with the United States and the other western governments in countering international terrorism. 
American officials were especially perturbed by the PASOK government’s handing of several 
extradition cases of suspected terrorists. J. latrides, “Beneath the Sound and the Fury: US relations 
with the PASOK Government” p.l64.
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after he came to power and concluded a number o f economic agreements. Moreover, 
Greek careful participation in the Gulf war displayed the strategic significance and 
the logistical value of Greece and its “loyalty” to the alliance. Nearly 90 percent of 
the logistical support for all allied operations in the Persian Gulf moved through the 
Mediterranean, and a significant part involved Greek and Cypriot facilities^
Despite the better understanding between the Mitsotakis and the Bush 
administrations, the State Department’s report on human rights which in 1991 
referred to a “Slavo-Macedonian” minority in northern Greece, largely irritated the
Greek government and the public^
Simultaneously, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the 
Communist bloc and the end of the Cold War signified the most radical changes in 
Europe since 1945. With the end of the bipolar structure of the East-West 
competition Europe’s morphology was transformed and posed new challenges for 
G reece^an d  the United States.
The collapse of communism in southeastern Europe brought an end to the Cold War 
security system and its familiar arrangements. The potential consequences of 
possible conflicts are now less all-encompassing than any direct East-West
One of the main arguments of New Democracy government in order to convince the Greek public 
opinion in favor of the Greek participation in the Gulf war was that later, in the end of the war Greece 
would have the chance to improve and strengthen its position in the Cypras issue. However, the Bush 
administration only expressed its appreciation, agreed in principle to sell to Greece Partiot missiles 
and repeated the familiar assurances concerning country’s security. The Southeastern Yearbook 1991. 
ELIAMEP, pp. 262-263.
J. latrides, 2003. “The United States and Greece in the Twentieth Century” in T. Couloumbis, T. 
Kariotis, and F. Bellou. Greece in the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass Publishers), p. 102.
V. Theodoropoulos, et al. 1995. Skespeis kai Provlimatismoi gia tin Exoteriki mas Politiki 
(Thoughts and Concerns for our Foreign Policy) (Athens: Sideris Publications).
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confrontation, but the likelihood of smaller, more complex conflicts was greater^ 
While for Greece, the Balkan problem was rightly perceived as affecting vital 
national interests, for the US it merely represented the first serious challenge to the 
American attempt to come to terms with post-Cold War security threats and a 
complication in the process of identifying its security interests in Europe^’*.
/
At the initial stage of the Yugoslav crisis, there was coincidence of Greek and 
American policy for different reasons. The United States did not want to get 
involved in a European crisis which was under the European Union’s sphere of 
influence and in addition was still preoccupied with the developments in the Gulf 
However, the United States immediately chose to support the Tirana and the Skopje 
regimes (the ministates of the region) in order not to expand the crisis^
Greece on the other hand, during 1990-91 sought to perpetuate the regional stability 
o f the Cold War era through the continuation of the “traditional” Greek-Yugoslav 
relationship that had developed after 1949. In the same period, Greece had been 
concerned about the fate of the Greek minority in Albania, an issue that affected the 
relations between the two countries. Furthermore, Greece focused on the task of 
preventing the international recognition o f Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) under her old name^^°. This proved to be an uphill struggle, since the
’^’K. Ifandis, 1996. “Greece and the US after the Cold War”, p.l55.
D. Keridis, and R. Pfaltzgraff, (eds.) 1997. Security in Southeastern Europe and the US-Greek 
Relationship (Massachusetts: Brassey’s Inc).
N. Stavrou, 1995. “The Dismantling of the Balkan Security System; Consequences for Greece, 
Europe, and NATO” Mediterranean Quarterly 6:1, pp.47-48.
Mitsotakis government pressured by an aroused public and rhetoric of church, focused its effort to 
convince the international community that FYROM had revisionist claims towards Greece. But it was 
hard for the outsiders to be convinced that such a small vulnerable state can pose a threat towards 
Greece. For a detailed analysis see N. Rizopoulos, 1993. “Pride, Prejudice, and Myopia Greek 
Foreign Policy in a Time Warp” World Policy Journal X:3, pp. 17-28; N. Zahariadis, 1996. “Greek 
Policy toward the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” Journal of Modem Greek Studies 14:2,
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international community found it difficult to call this republic by any other name 
than that which it had since 1944.
Greece did succeed in persuading the UN Security Council in 1'993 to accept this 
republic as a member of the United Nations only under the graceless temporary name 
“Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”^ '^. Moreover, from February 1994 to 
September 1995, Greece imposed an economic embargo on the “Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia”. This was an economic pressure to force FYROM to drop 
the ancient Macedonian symbol from its flag, as well as to amend its constitution by 
dropping references to “unliberated” fellow “Macedonians” in neighboring
• 322countnes .
y  /  '
These Greek “successes” came to a high cost in terms of Greece’s international 
standing. The United States and to a certain extent the EU were highly concerned 
about preventing the spread of the Yugoslav conflict in the south. In this direction 
chose to support the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, the only former 
Yugoslav republic that completely escaped armed conflict in the process of 
Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Greek hostility to this republic seemed to undermine 
western efforts to contain the Yugoslav crisis. Greece, instead of a regional 
stabilizer, appeared to have become a destabilizing factor in the Balkans^^^.
pp. 303-327; Y. Valinakis, and S. Dalis. 1996. To Zitima ton Skopion (The Issue of Skopje) (Athens: 
Sideris Publications).
C. Papasotiriou, and D. Konstas. 1999.“Greek Foreign Responses to the Post-Cold War Balkan 
Environment” in V. Coufoudakis, H. Psomiades. and A. Gerolymatos. (eds.) Greece and the New 
Balkans Challenges and Opportunities (New York: Pella), p. 229.
Y. Valinakis, To Zitima ton Skopion (The Issue of Skopje), pp. 194-197.
V. Coufoudakis, 1996. “Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues and Challenges” 
Mediterranean Quarterly 7:3, p. 27.
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Additionally, Greece perceived with fear the activist Turkish policy in the Balkans 
and the Turkish initiative to cultivate political, military and economic relations with 
all the Balkan states and especially with Albania^ '^*. Turkey’s policy in the Balkans 
at a time when Greece was embroiled in problems with Albania and with the 
consequences of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia gave rise to theories of 
encirclement among nationalistic circles in Greece^^^.
Greek policy shifted gradually as Greek forces participated in the NATO 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and with the resolution of the problem with 
FYROM. In September 1995 Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia signed the Interim Accord. With this accord, the Greek side lifted the 
embargo, which had been instituted in February 1994, while the other side removed 
from its flag the ancient Macedonian symbol of Vergina and undertook to amend its 
constitution to remove clauses open to irredentist interpretations^^®. Negotiations 
concerning the new state’s formal name were to continue without much appearing in 
public through diplomatic channels, and that particular controversy no longer
• 327attracted much attention .
During the NATO campaign in Kosovo in 1999, the Greek government withstood 
overwhelming public opposition to bombing Serbia in order to uphold its alliance
S. Konstantinides, 1996. “Turkey: The Emergence of a New Foreign Policy The Neo-Ottoman 
Imperial Model”, Journal of Political and Military Sociology 24, pp.330-331.
The recognition of FYROM by Ankara with the name of “Macedonia” only a few hours after the 
February 1992 Davos meeting was considered in Athens as particularly “provocative”, given the 
especially that Prime Minister Mitsotakis had explicitly asked his Turkish counterpart Demirel to wait 
for an EC-wide decision on this sensitive issue. Y. Valinakis, 1994. Greece’s Security in the post- 
Cold War Era .(Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. SWP-S394), p. 48.
C. Papasotiriou, “Greek Foreign Responses to the Post-Cold War”, pp. 230-232.
C. Rozakis, 1996. Politikes kai Nomikes Diastasis tis Metavatilds Simfonias tis Neas lorkis 
metaxi Elladas kai Proin Giougoslavikis Dimokratias tis Makedonias (The Political and Legal 
Dimensions of the Interim Accord of New York between Greece and FYHOM) (Athens: Sideris 
Publications).
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commitments. The port of Thessaloniki and the natural terrain features connecting 
Greece with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo remain key to 
keeping the logistic lines of communication open to US and other NATO troops. 
The only exception was the banning of Turkish warplanes from crossing over Greek 
airspace as they flew to German and Italian bases to participate in NATO raids on
328Yugoslav targets .
The reorientation of the Greek Balkan policy was very important and showed that 
Greece could utilize its comparative economic and political advantages to help the 
Balkans towards the West and away from instability and crisis. These developments 
were positive for the Greek-US relationship, as the US realized that it could count on 
Greece as a reliable partner in this troubled region even if  the Greek choices did not 
always coincide with the American interests.
5.2 Turkey’s Relations with the US in the 1990s.
During the Cold War period the Turkish-US relationship was based essentially on the 
strategic concerns of both states. Faced with the challenge from the Soviet Union 
and its Warsaw Pact allies, Turkey sought to protect its national security and 
territorial integrity by forging close military and political ties with the United States. 
Turkish officials viewed membership in NATO primarily as a means to strengthen 
Turkey’s bilateral relations with the US. For American policymakers, Turkey was a
J. latrides, 2003. “The United States and Greece in the Twentieth Century”, p.105.
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valuable geostrategic asset against the perceived Soviet threat and for protecting vital 
American interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East^^^.
However, Turkish-American relations have been marred with difficulties and to a 
certain extent Turkish mistrust of US friendship and intentions. This resulted from 
three developments: First, it was the US decision to remove the Jupiter missiles from 
the Turkish territory following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis^^°. The Turkish elite’s 
view was that a bargaining was made by the two superpowers behind its back which 
fostered doubt about the US commitment to Turkish security. Second, in 1964 the 
then Prime Minister İsmet İnönü received what was considered a harsh letter from 
President Lj^ndon Johnson. The letter warned Turkey not to use US weapons in 
Cyprus and that if its involvement there provoked a Soviet military response Turkey 
could not count on US support . Third, the United States imposed arms embargo 
on Turkey after the 1974 Cyprus crisis when Turkish forces captured one-third o f the 
island. The Turks felt let down by their American ally and Turkish reliance on the 
Americans were severely undermined” .^ However, during the Ronald Reagan 
period relations improved between Washington and Ankara” ^
By the end of the Cold War Turkey was one of the states that was profoundly 
affected by the transformation of the political and strategic conditions forming
D. Rustow, 1987. Turkey America's Forgotten Ally fNew York: Council on Foreign Relations); 
M. Evriviades, 1998. “Turkey’s Role in United States Strategy During and After the Cold War”, 
Mediterranean Quarterly 9:2, pp.30-51.
N. B. Criss, 1997. “Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963”, The 
Journal of Strategic Studies 20:3, pp.97-122.
See with more details. Chapter III, pp. 55-58.
As a result Turkish government closed all the American bases in Turkey . The arms embargo was 
lifted in 1978 but still there was a careful standing from the Turkish side. H. Kramer, 2000. A 
Changing Turkey. The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington D.C: Brookings 
Institution Press), pp. 224-225.
E. Laipson, “US Policy towards Greece and Turkey Since 1974”, pp.170-171.
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European security^^''. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw 
Pact removed adversary communist regimes from Turkey’s eastern borders for the 
first time since the end of the Second World War. These historic changes removed 
the perceived Soviet threat from the agenda of US foreign policy after more than four 
decades of US-Soviet rivalry and competition in world politics.
The new post-Cold War order did not lead to fundamental changes in Turkish views 
concerning the importance of the US for Turkey^^^. If anything, Turkey began to 
attach even greater importance to strengthening its bilateral ties with the US in the 
1990s. This was primarily due to growing strains in Turkey’s relations with Europe 
over the issue of Turkey’s full membership in the European Union^^^ and the post-
S. Sayari, 1992 “Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf War”, The 
Middle East Journal 46:1, pp. 9-21; B. Yılmaz, 1994. “Turkey’s New Role in International Politics”, 
Aussen Politic-German Foreign Affairs Review 45, pp.90-98; M. Gönlübol et. al.. Olaylarla Türk 
Dış Politikası, pp.650-654.
There is a broad consensus among Turkey’s important political actors- the military, political 
parties, the media, and major important groups- about the importance of the US for Turkey despite the 
often harsh criticism. C. Çandar, 2000. “Some Turkish Perspectives on the United States and 
American Policy toward Turfey” in M. Abi;^ovitz, (ed.) Turkey’s Transformation and American 
Policy (New York: The Century Foundation Press), pp. 133-146. Even the country’s Islamist political 
forces -  which are by no means pro-western or pro-American -  realize the importance of the US to 
play over a broad range of issues regarding Turkey’s foreign policy concerns and interests. P. Robins, 
1997. “Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan” Survival 39:2, pp. 82-100; K. Courtier, 1997. US- 
Turkish Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (Istanbul: Friedrich Ebert Foundation).
The negative reply of the European Commission in 1989 to Turkey’s 1987 application for full 
membership in the European Community had a very bad impact on Turkey. Additionally, the EU’s 
decision in December 1997 to reject Turkey’s bid for full membership -  while inviting five formerly 
communist countries, including Cyprus, to become candidates and giving another five other East 
European states pre-candidate status -  further exacerbated the problems in Turkey’s relations with 
Europe. This development is generally perceived by most Turks as a “rejection” of their country by 
Europe. So Turkish officials have intensified their efforts to expand Turkey’s political and economic 
relations with the US. See “Special Issue Turkey and the European Union Domestic Politics, 
Economic Integration and International Dynamics” 2003. Turkish Studies. 4:1, pp .2-251; B. Buzan, 
and T. Diez, 1999. “The European Union and Turkey”, Survival 41:1, pp. 42-46. In respect with the 
EU, the United States has been actively pushed for Turkish membership even when it has meant 
friction with some European members. The United States played a critical role in ensuring the 
ratification of the Custom Union Treaty signed between Turkey and the EU in 1995. The United 
States clearly sees the issue of Turkish membership in strategic terms and argues that membership 
would enhance Turkish economic development and democracy, while also helping make Turkey a 
much more stable country in a critical neighborhood. This logic has also been pursued in respect to 
including and actively promoting Turkey as one of the big ten emerging markets deserving US 
investment See A. Makovsky, 1997. “Turkey and the European Union” in The Parameters of 
Partnership: Germany^ The US and Turkey Challenges for German and American Foreign
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Cold War developments in the former Soviet Central Asia, the Caucasus and the 
Middle East.
A key point of convergence between Turkey and the United States was their interest 
in the emergence of democratic, secular, pro-western regimes in Central Asia. 
Turkey came to be regarded as a pivotal state in the geostrategic developments in 
Eurasia, especially the newly independent states in the former Soviet south. The US 
administration furthers this development through bilateral economic cooperation and 
military assistance within the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Turkey 
also strongly engages itself within the NATO framework and has developed 
intensive bilateral ties with these states over a broad range of political, economic, and 
cultural issues .
Turkey was of even greater value for American regional strategic interests as the 
crucial link within the east-west corridor, which is promoted by the United States as 
the best solution for bringing Caspian and Central Asian energy resources to market. 
The strategic idea is to prevent a reemergence of Russia as the dominant political and 
military power in the region^^*. The plan was part o f the American strategy of 
double containment because it could prevent Iran from a stronger engagement in the 
Caspian region’s emerging energy transportation plans” .^
Policy (American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University), pp. 
58-60.
G. Fuller, and et al. 1993. Turkey’s New Geopolitics. From the Balkans to Western China 
(Boulder: Westview Press); O. Tunander, 1995. “A New Ottoman Empire? The Choice for Turkey: 
Euro-Asian Center vs National Fortress” , Security Dialogue 26:4, pp. 415-417.
K. Kirişçi, 1999. "Turkey and the United States: Ambivalent Allies", in B. Rubin, and T. Keaney, 
(eds.) Friends of America: US Allies in a Changing World (London: Frank Cass), pp. 218-226; 
Gönlübol, Mehmet, et. al. Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, pp. 695-708.
K. Kirişçi, "Turkey and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, pp. 225-230.
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The developments in the Middle East seem to offer a mixture of cooperative as well 
as conflicting views between Ankara and Washington. The most notable example 
was Turkey’s support to the allied coalition led by the United states following 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 '^*°. Despite the severe economic costs 
and the criticism within Turkey^'^', President Ozal decided firmly to side with the US 
and Turkey played a significant role in the victory of the allied coalition against 
Iraq '^ l^
In terms of broader Middle East security and stability, Turkish and the US views 
overlap considerably. The development of further relations with Israel especially 
after the 1993 Israel-PLO agreement has the full support from the US side especially 
in the military cooperation^'*^. In addition, Turkey supports the peace process and 
sees its success as the best guarantee against a resurgence of any form of radicalism 
that could damage Turkey. US-Turkish interests also coincide in Turkey’s effort to 
strengthen relations with Jordan and other moderate Arab states. At the same time, 
Turkey’s closer relations with Israel developed counter-alliances against Turkey 
involving Iran, Syria, Greece and Armenia '^*'*.
P. Robins, Suits and Uniforms Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, pp.3l2-318; M. B. 
Aykan, 1996. “Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations concerning Persian Gulf Security in the 
Post-Cold War Era: 1989-1995” Middle East Journal 50:3. pp. 345-358.
Özal decided to close down a double oil pipeline that carried half of the Iraq’s oil exports. In the 
political level. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence and the Chief of General Staff Necip 
Torumtay resigned over disagreements with Özal’s Gulf policy. See N. and H. Pope, 1997. Turkey 
Unveiled Atatürk and After (London: John Murray), pp. 219-220.
W. Hale, 1992. “Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis”, International Affairs 68:4, pp.683- 
687; A. Mango, 1994. Turkey The Challenge of a New Role (Washington DC: The Center for 
Strategic and International Studies), pp. 111-113.
A. Makovsky, 1996. “Israel-Turkish Relations A Turkish “Periphery Strategy?” in H. Barkey, (ed.) 
Reluctant Neighbors: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East (Washington DC: USIP Press), pp. 263- 
275.
The US gave critical support to Turkey in urging Syria to expel the leader of the PKX Abdullah 
Öcalan, in October 1998 to Russia and since then has stood next to Turkey throughout the crisis See 
M. B. Aykan, 1999. “The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish view” Middle East Policy 
VI:4, pp. 174-191; A. Makovsky, 1998/99. “Defusing the Turkish-Syrian Crisis-Whose Triumph?”
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Another area o f cooperation involves UN or NATO peacekeeping and humanitarian 
assistance operations. US-Turkish military cooperation was common in NATO 
exercises. In Operation Provide Comfort, launched in April 1991, the two armies 
actively cooperated in a humanitarian assistance program. The operation came after 
the mass influx of Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq to help them to enable 
repatriation to their homes in northern Iraq. The operation provided the creation of a 
safe zone north of the parallel in Iraq, coercing the Iraqi military to stay ouP'* .^ 
Although the two military successfully cooperated in the operation’s first stages, 
considerable tension emerged between Turkey and the United States over the 
purpose of the operation and disagreement over the status of northern Iraq’s Kurdish 
region. The Turkish leadership wanted to keep Iraq intact and prevent the 
establishment of an autonomous Kurdish political entity in northern Iraq, which 
would be expected to destabilize Turkey’s own Kurdish area.
As a consequence, Turkish-American cooperation in dealing with Iraq has often been 
accompanied with some Turkish mistrust of American moves. This became evident 
in the aftermath of the accord between the two rival Iraqi Kurdish groups that was 
brought about with American mediation in Washington in September 1998, as 
Ankara had been left out of the negotiations^'^^.
In addition, fnctions arose from the US policies on Turkish human rights violations 
and weapons’ acquisition programs. The escalation of human rights abuses as a
Turkish Review of Middle East Studies ISIS: Istanbul: 10, pp. 127-134; M. Mufti, 1998. “Daring and 
Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy” Middle F,a.st Journal 52:1, pp. 34-36.
M. B. Aykan, “Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations, pp.349-351; A. Sever, 1998/99. 
“Evolution of Turkish-American Relations in the Middle East since 1945”, Turkish Review of Middle 
East Studies ISIS: Istanbul: 10, pp.159-160.
H. Kramer, A Changing Turkey, p.227.
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result o f confrontations between the PKK and Turkish security forces between 1992 
and 1996 attracted adverse congressional and public interest, affecting US foreign 
policy toward Turkey. This interest translated itself into legislation cutting of foreign 
aid to Turkey as well as demanding that the Administration prepare reports on the 
use of US military equipment in situations of human rights violations. The powerful 
lobbying capacity on human rights and arms control groups together with anti- 
Turkish ethnic lobbies on the Cyprus and Armenian issues significantly reduced the 
executive branch’s ability to shield Turkey. As a result of these factors, there were 
substantial cuts in US foreign assistance to Turkey during the mid-1990s and the 
transfer of remaining aid was conditioned on Turkey improving its human rights
performance347
In the Balkans, the cooperation had better chance as both Turkey and the US had a 
similar perception of how to deal with the post- Cold War Balkan setting. In the 
Yugoslav crisis Turkey followed a careful stance of non-involvement in the 
beginning, much similar to the US stance. Turkey became involved only by 
participating in NATO sanctions’ enforcement operation when the war spread to 
Bosnia and maintained a military unit as part of UNPROFOR there. This unit 
subsequently became part of the NATO exercises along the Albanian-Serbian border 
in a western effort to deter Serbia from using force against refuges displaced as a
Arms exports were also affected. The US government for a long time found itself unable to deliver 
warships paid for by Turkey, and the Turkish government was forced to withdraw plans to acquire 
large number of US attack helicopters in November 1996. These helicopters were critical for the 
Turkish military’s ability to fight the PKK in the mountainous terrain of southeastern Turkey and the 
northern Iraq. Further, such a helicopter force was also considered important to balancing the larger 
forces of Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors. P. Robins, Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign 
Policy pp. 196-198; C. Migdalovitz, 1998. “Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues”, CRS 
Issue Brief
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result o f the violence in Kosovo. Additionally, Ankara participated actively in the
NATO campaign against Serbia in 1999,348
For the United States having the military of a predominantly Muslim country 
involved in such operation was seen as an important way of assuring the local 
Muslim population. On the other hand, this gave Turkish government the chance to 
be seen doing something for the Muslims in the Balkans whom most Turks see as 
descendants of their Ottoman past.
Immediately with the collapse of the communist regimes in the rest of the Balkan 
states, Turkey sought to improve its existing links with them '^* .^ This policy 
perfectly suited with the American one. Rapid rapprochement was pursued with 
post-Zhivkov Bulgaria^^°, commercial ties were established with Romania and close 
military relations were cultivated with Albania. Turkey followed a careful activism 
in the Balkans mostly inspired by Turgut Ozal’s policy and orientation which 
improved Turkey’s economic, political and military relations with these countries^^'.
What characterizes the relationship between Turkey and the United States from 
1990s onwards is a complex convergence and divergence of interests in bi-lateral and
Hasan. Ünal, 2000. “Turkey, Emerging Regional Power, and the Balkans in the 1990s,” Economic 
Dialogue Turkey, p. 105.
E. ManisalI, 1990. Turkey and the Balkans, (Gime Conference); Ş. Çalış, and B. Akgiin. 2001. 
“Çatışmadan Uzlaşmaya; 21 Yüzyıla Girerken Balkanlar’da Türk-Yunan Rekabeti (From Conflict to 
Compromise: Turko-Greek Rivaly in the Balkans at the Outset of the 21st century )” in 1. Bal, (ed.) 21 
Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy in the Eve of the 21st Century) 
(Istanbul; ALFA Yayım Dağıtım Ltd), pp. 226-233.
E. Giatzidis, 2002. An Introduction to Post-Communist Bulgaria. Political, Economic and 
Social transformation (Manchester and York: Manchester University Press), pp. 149-150; N. Özgür, 
1998. “ 1989 sonrası Türkiye-Bulgaristan İlişkileri (The Turkish-Bulgarian Relations after 1989” in F. 
Sönmezoğlou, (ed.) Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (An Analysis of the Turkish Foreign Policy) 
(Istanbul; Der Yayınları), pp. 359-362.
H. Yavuz, 1998. “Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism” 
Critique. Spring, pp. 565-576.
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regional level. Turkey’s geopolitical location and western, secular credentials are 
factors supporting strategic cooperation. Turkey seeks for American support in its 
effort to upgrade and assure its regional role in the Former Soviet Central Asia and 
the Middle East.
5.3 Change and Continuity in the US Policy towards the Greek-Turkish 
Dispute
The end of the Cold War brought about significant changes in the foreign policy 
priorities and new challenges for both Greece and Turkey and the United States as 
well. However, the bilateral problems^^^ between the two allies as well as the 
Cyprus issue remained intact and relations further deteriorated during the last decade 
of the 20“’ centuiy^^
United States policy towards the Cyprus dispute did not change substantially after 
the end of the Cold War. The US continues to preserve stability in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, a region bordered with conflict zones and prevent NATO from being 
embroiled in local controversies. In order to achieve these goals, the United States 
has tried to remain “neutral” and worked to resolve disputes between the two NATO 
members, Greece and Turkey. Comparing with the 1974-1989 period, the United
Rozakis, 1989. “Oi Ellinotourkikes Sxeseis: I Nomiki Diastasi” (Greek-Turkish Relations; The 
Legal Aspect) in Sixroni Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki (Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy) (Athens: 
Sakoulas Publications), pp. 21-68; E. Kurubaş, 2001. “Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinin Psikopolitiği ve 
Sorunların Çözümü Üzerine Düşünceler” in İ. Bal, (ed.) 21 Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası, 
pp. 243-262.
Yialouridis, Christodoulos and Panayiotis Tsakonas (eds.) 2001. Greece and Turkey after the 
end of the Cold War New York & Athens: Caratzas Publishers.
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States was more active between the two parties. The eruption of the Imia/Kardak 
crisis was stopped only by the American intervention and the deployment of the 
Russian S-300 missiles in Cyprus did not take place after intensive American 
mediation. Additionally, after the mid-1990s American diplomacy became 
reactivated in Cyprus and encouraged some kind of dialogue between the two parties. 
A new important parameter in this triangular relationship in the 1990s was European 
Union, whose policies were welcomed from the American side.
5.3.1 The Imia/Kardak Crisis
The Imia/Kardak crisis was the first “hot” incident in the Aegean in the post-Cold 
War era. A small Turkish cargo ship went aground in late December 1995 less than 
four miles off the Turkish coast on an uninhabited rocky islet group, called Imia by 
the Greeks and Kardak by the Turks. The Turkish captain refused to have his vessel 
rescued by Greek authorities, claiming that he was in Turkish territorial waters^ '^*. 
The two foreign ministries thereafter exchanged information, holding to differing 
positions on the islets sovereignty but refraining from making confrontational 
demands or going public.
One month later this event created more publicity as the local Greek mayor raised the 
Greek flag over this islet. Turkish news reporters took to the scene from a helicopter 
and hoisted a Turkish flag in place of the Greek one. Media in each country
F. Aksu, 2001. “Turkish-Greek Relations from Conflict to Détente the Last Decade”, Turkish 
Review of Balkan Studies. Istanbul: ISIS:6, p 172.
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exaggerated over this issue^^^. Both governments dispatched warships and the Turks
landed a detachment of marines in one of the islets^^^.
Washington moved to defuse the crisis. President Clinton placed calls for a peaceful 
outcome, and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke began intense mediation. American 
diplomatic efforts targeted to bring the situation back to its former status (status quo 
ante) and succeeded in its endeavor . The US position was that 'hn case of not 
opening fire to the Turkish soldiers there is order not to open fire to the Greek 
military team and if the Greek military force withdraws its presence and the Greek 
flag, the Turkish military forces will do the same”, the statement from the US 
emphasizing: ‘‘the party that shoots the first bullet will find the US against i f ’^ ^^ . 
Finally both sides withdrew and a return to the status quo ante was achieved^^^.
It is true that the issue came up just after the accidental grounding of the Turkish 
ship. Until then nobody had doubts about the sovereignty of these islets which 
according to a Turkish-Italian document from 1932 specifically lists these islets as 
belonging at the time to the Italians, which means sovereignty would have
C. Migdalovitz, 1997. “Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues -  Background and Recent 
Developments”, CRS Issue Brief, p.4; A. Kourkoulas, 1997. Imia Kritiki Prosegisi tis Tourkikis 
Politikis (Imia A Critical Approach of Turkish policy) (Athens: Sideris Publications).
C. Migdalovitz, “Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues -  Background and Recent Developments”,
p.4.
F. Aksu, “Turkish-Greek Relations from Conflict to Détente the Last Decade”, p.l74; K. loannou, 
1997. “A Tale of Two Islets: The Imia Incident Between Greece and Turkey” Thesis. 1:1, pp.1-7.
F. Aksu, ‘Turkish-Greek Relations from Conflict to Détente the Last Decade”, p.l74; A Greek 
view for the management of the crisis is provided by the then Greek Chief of Staff in C. Liberis, 1997. 
Ethniki Stratigiki kai Xeirismos Kriseon (National Strategy and Crises Management) (Athens: 
Piotita Publications).
During the crisis in Greece, Kostas Simitis had just come out as the new Prime Minister after the 
resignation of the ill Andreas Papandreou. Simitis at that time did not had the full control of the 
government and in a certain degree there was lack of coordination. On the other hand, in Turkey then 
Prime Minister Tansu Çiller mied a coalition government with the CHP and was in a middle of an 
effort to form a new government after the elections of December 1995. The above statement does not 
argue that the crisis would not have taken place if in both states there were more stable governments 
but the domestic instability might have a part in the escalation of the crisis See Ta Nea 1/2/1996:10; 
Turkish Daily News 1/2/1996: 6-8: Ta Nea 31/1/1996: 7-9 ;To Vima 4/2/1996: A7.
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transferred from Italy to Greece after World War II under the terms of the 1947 
Paris Treaty^^®. The Turkish government, however, asserted that this Italo-Turkish 
protocol had never entered into force and that the rocks themselves had been 
“registered” by the onshore Turkish province of Mugla^* ’^.
In the period that followed, the Turkish government did not just refuse to concede on 
this issue but also insisted that there are “gray zones” in the Aegean and numerous 
small islets or rocks whose sovereignty is unclear despite Greek claims^ *^ .^ Ankara 
did not provide specifics, but neither did abandon the position, which garnered broad 
public credence in Turkey^^^. This aftermath angered Greek public opinion 
enormously. The Turkish government was seen to have embarked on a new and 
more aggressive course, threatening to redraw boundaries throughout the Aegean at
364Greece’s expense .
The Greek-Turkish crisis showed that when the situation is escalated the Greek and 
the Turkish governments have been unable or unwilling to deal directly with each 
other and the mission fell to the Americans. During the crisis both sides followed an 
adamant position, not to lose face, even if the consequence would have been war. 
Afterwards and when the worst was avoided, both decided in favor of a peaceful 
resolution, recognizing that a war was not in either’s side national interest.
Borders, Sovereignty, Stability. The Imia Incident and Turkey’s Violations of International
Law 1996. (The Citizen’s Movement & ELIAMEP).
Y. İnan, and S. Başeren, 1997. Status of Kardak Rocks (Ankara), http://www.kbl.com.tr/kardak/ 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr: M. Fırat, 2002. “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Yunanistan Dış Politikası (Greek 
Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era)”, in M. Türkeş, and İ. Uzgel, (eds.) Türkiye’nin 
Komşuları (The Neighbours of Turkey) (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi), pp.56-59.
TaNea 5/2/1996: 2.
Ta Nea 6/2/1996: 2; Nikos. Kouris, 1997. Ellada-Tourkia: O Penintakontaetis Polemos (Greece- 
Turkey: The Fifty Years War) (Athens: Livanis Publications).
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5.3.2 Initiatives in the Cyprus Issue and the Aegean Dispute
Soon after the serious 1996 crisis Clinton administration took active steps again in 
the Greek-Turkish bilateral dispute and in Cyprus. Immediately after the crisis the 
then Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Holbrooke planned a 
trip to Greece and Turkey to help them achieve a more permanent end to tensions in 
the Aegean. That trip did not take place as the Greek side cancelled the meeting and 
appeared annoyed as the US side did not share the Greek concerns over Turkish 
revisionism in the Aegean and particularly accused Washington that had taken 
Turkey’s side in defusing the Imia/Kardak crisis for forging a humiliating Greek 
back-off^^^. Mr. Holbrooke himself was totally unwelcome in Greece^^®.
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, architect of the Dayton agreements 
in former Yugoslavia had better chance with Cyprus when in June 1997 was 
appointed as US special presidential envoy . His efforts aimed to make some 
progress in the Cyprus negotiations which had reached their lowest point in 1996^^*. 
Leaders of the two Cypriot sides were induced to participate in talks under the UN 
secretary-general’s help in New York and a month later in Switzerland^^^.
Christian Science Monitor: 12/2/1996, p.7.
Vima 4/2/1996, p. A12; To Vima 11/2/1996.
D. Payne, 1998 “The Cyprus problem: A Need to Defend Principles”, Mediterranean Quarterly, pp. 
9-15.
The leaders of the two Cypriot communities agreed based in two declarations -in 1977 and again 
in 1979- to work towards a unified, “bizonal” and “bicommunal” state. Negotiations followed on this 
basis under the UN auspices, and in 1992 the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, proposed 
for negotiations a new plan known as “set of ideas”. The new plan was initially accepted by Greek 
Cypriots xmder President George Vasiliou and with some objections from Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf 
Dentash. Later on as derides came to power both sides abandoned the plan. E. Prodromou, 1998. 
“Reintegrating Cyprus; The Need for a New Approach”, Survival. 40:3, pp. 6-9. N. Uslu, 2001. 
“Kıbrıs Sorunu (Cyprus Problem)” in İ. Bal, (ed.) 21 Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası, pp. 266- 
270; Ş. S. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri, pp.l 11-124.
For an historical analysis of the Cyprus problem in the UN see, M. loannou, 1992. “1 Triakontaetis 
Thitia tou Kipriakou sta Inomena Ethni” (The Thirty years of the Cyprus problem in the United 
Nations), in I Nea Diethnis Taxi, i Ellada, i Tourkia kai to Kipriako Provlima (The New
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Holbrooke then brokered a meeting on security issues in September 1997 and 
another in November. All these meetings did not produce tangible results and even 
worse the Luxemburg EU decision in the end of that year for EU-Turkish relations
affected negatively the whole process371
In the meantime, on the margins of the July NATO meeting in Madrid, with the 
indirect US involvement Greek Prime Minister Simitis and Turkish President 
Demirel signed the Madrid declaration^^^. The six-point declaration had a style o f '‘a 
convergence of views on a basis for promoting better relations”^^  ^ Nevertheless, the 
document did not include potentially significant commitments, in effect achieving 
the Greek agreement to refrain from unilateral acts (such an extension of the 
territorial waters), and for Turkish agreement to refrain from the use of force or 
threat of use of force (as happened in the Imia/Kardak incident). There was.
International Order, Greece, Turkey and the Cyprus Problem) (Athens: Sideris Publications), pp. 365- 
390.
Holbrooke made a proposal to then Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Mr Şükrü Sina Gürel to solve 
the Cyprus problem in the EU framework. The latter denied such a proposal. Interview with former 
Foreign Minister Mr. Şükrü Sina Gürel, Ankara, January 8, 2004.
T. Bahçeli, and N. Rizopoulos. 1996/97. “The Cyprus Impasse What Next,?” World Policy Journal 
Winter, pp. 27-29.
J. Wilkinson, 2000 “The United States, Turkey and Greece -  Three’s a Crowd” in M. Abramovitz, 
(ed.) Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy (New York: The Century Foundation Press),
p. 206.
The principles of the declaration provided for:
1. mutual commitment to peace, security and the continuing development of good-neighborly 
relations;
2. respect for each other’s sovereignty;
3. respect for the principles of international law and international agreements
4. respect for each other’s legitimate vital interests and concerns in the Aegean;
5. a commitment to refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual respect and a willingness 
to avoid conflicts arising from misunderstandings;
6. a commitment to settle by peaceful means based on mutual consent and without use of force 
or threat of force.
See C. Migdalovitz, “Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues -  Background and Recent Developments”, 
pp.7-8.
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however, no follow-on mechanism ; neither side seemed to take the document as a
basis for action, and the “spirit of Madrid” began almost at once to evaporate^^“*.
The decision of the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 to approve 
not only Cyprus^^^ but also ten Central and East European countries for membership
negotiations without Turkey being in that list was a shock for Ankara. This was a 
negative development for Turkey and even worse as the linkage of Turkish 
membership prospects was connected with the progress in the Cyprus problem^^*'.
As a result of it Turkey remained committed to continuing economic cooperation 
with the EU but promptly suspended all political dialogue^’’. Further it hardened its 
position and joined with the Turkish Cypriots to counterattack on the issue of Cyprus 
by suspending UN negotiations and later by abandoning the bizonal, bicommunal 
approach in favor of separation and co-federation. After these developments in the 
EU-Turkish relations Washington could not help much. After a last visit to Nicosia 
in May of 1998 and in conclusive private sector meetings with all parties
378represented, Holbrooke gave up
H. Ünal, 1999. “Implications on the EU-Turkey Relationship” in S. Baier-Allen, (ed.) Looking 
into the Future of Cyprus-EU Relations (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), p. 83; Turkish 
Probe 11/7/1997, p.l5; E. Athanassopoulou, 1997. “Blessing in Disguise? The Imia Crisis and 
Turkish-Greek Relations” Mediterranean Politics 2:3, pp.93-94.
J. Joseph, 1996. “Cyprus at the Threshold of the European Union”, Mediterranean Quarterly 7:2,
pp.l 12-122.’
The Conclusions of the Luxemburg European Council, December 12-13, 1997; Statement of the 
Turkish Government regarding the Conclusions of the Luxemburg European Council, (Ankara, 
December 14, 1997); M. Fırat, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Yunanistan Dış Politikasının”, pp. 62-63.
H. Kabaalioğlu, 1999. “Turkey and the European Union Converging or Drifting Apart?”, Marmara 
Journal of European Studies. 7:1-2, pp.109-165.
Richard Holbrooke in an interview in Los Angeles Times says that negotiations did not even 
started because of the Turkish Cypriot side preconditions, firstly, to be recognized in advance and 
secondly, the derides government to withdrew its application to join the EU. Los Angeles Times 
7/6/199s’.
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Along with the American efforts, two more initiatives were taken by NATO and the 
Dutch Presidency to resolve the Aegean dispute. Soon after the Imia/Kardak crisis, 
NATO Secretary General Javier Solana proposed confidence-building measures 
(OEMs) based on a May 1988 Memorandum of Understanding between Karolos 
Papoulias and Mesut Yılmaz, the Greek and the Turkish Foreign Ministers, 
respectively^’'^  Solana renewed his CBM efforts in February 1997. His proposals 
were strongly supported by the United States, called for
a. a memorandum on military exercises between June 15 to September 15;
b. combat training missions only by unarmed planes;
c. planes to use identification, friend or foe devices (IFF) (instead of submitting 
flight plans) to preclude intercepts, reduce the need to scramble interceptors, 
and decrease the number of mock dog fights;
d. direct communication between Greek and Turkish air defense operations 
offices; and
establishment of a center at NATO Command Headquarters in Naples to 
monitor Aegean airspace operations .
e.
Both parties agreed partly with modifications. Greece agreed to the moratorium on 
military exercises for the proposed period while Turkey agreed to July 1 -  August 15
That memorandum was actually the major achievement of the 1988 Davos process which contains 
Confidence Building Measures, Tension Reduction Measures and Good Neighborliness Measures. 
Turkey and Greece agreed that to;
a respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other and their rights to use the high seas 
and international space of the Aegean
b avoid interfering with shipping and air traffic while conducting military activities in the high seas 
and international airspace; and
c. avoid conducting military exercises in the high seas and international airspace during the peak 
tourism period of July-September and main national and religious holidays.
In September 1988, Papoulias and Yılmaz signed Guidelines for the Prevention of Accidents and 
Incidents on the High Seas and International Airspace, which called, in te r  a lia , for the parties to act in 
conformity with international regulations See C. Migdalovitz, “Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues”,
p4.
380 C. Migdalovitz, “Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues”, p. 5.
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and said it would use IFF during that time. As it has done for decades, Greece 
rejected use of EPF because it carved out a special exception to the Athens FIR, 
which, it said, applies to all countries. Turkey called for an exchange of information 
concerning flights in the Aegean, which Greece considered an infringement of its 
FIR responsibilities. Greece refused to disarm its combat aircraft in its national 
airspace, and said that training flights would not be armed. Greece reportedly agreed 
to hotlines between Athens and NATO, and Turkey and NATO.
The other initiative came during 1997 as the President of the European Union 
Council, the Netherlands, proposed a committee of “wise men” to deal with Greek- 
Turkish Aegean issues^*'. Greece did not accept a direct dialogue with Turkey that 
might be perceived as willingness to negotiate what it views as its non-negotiable 
sovereignty issues or the involvement of third parties. It proposed the creation of 
separate Greek and Turkish committees of non-governmental experts who would 
report to the Dutch Presidency, which would then evaluate the reports for common 
ground. The whole effort did not lead anywhere as Turks pursued a more 
comprehensive agenda and the Greeks feared that this project might urge them to a 
direct dialogue with the Turks.
Regardless of all these efforts and initiatives for the resolution of the dispute, 
subsequent events pushed bilateral Greek-Turkish relations near a breaking point. 
These were the S-300 missiles and the Ocalan affair.
M Aydın, 1997· “Cacophony in the Aegean; Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations”, The 
Turkish Vearhook o f  International Relations XXVII, p.l37.
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5.3.3 S-300 Missiles Crisis
The first issue which resulted in the American involvement again, was the decision 
of the Cypriot government in January 1997, to contract with Russia the purchase of 
S-300 missiles, an anti-aircraft system similar to the American Patriot missile^**  ^
The Turks reacted strongly. They denounced the missile buy as unwarranted 
escalation, denied there was any threat from Turkish planes, and described the S-300 
missiles as jeopardizing not only Turkish Cypriots but the security of Turkey 
itself**^ .^ Ankara said it would “not tolerate” deployment and the general staff was 
directed to take “additional military measures”. Washington decried both the 
deployment and the threat of military action m response .
President derides postponed implementation twice in 1998 and in December of that 
year armounced a decision taken in consultation with Athens to cancel the 
deployment -  the missiles were instead to be sent to Crete. The derides 
government, which backed down despite strong domestic calls, received intense 
pressure from the United States and the Europeans and possible adverse effects on
The purchase of the missiles was a part of the implementation of a military modernization 
program designed to produce quantitative and qualitative improvements in the country’s defense 
capabilities vis-à-vis Turkey, seen as the single major external threat. In addition to a deterrence 
strategy, based on a military cooperation agreement and common defense doctrine instituted with 
Greece in 1993; Greek-Cypriots opened an air base at Paphos, and completed a $425 million purchase 
agreement for 30 Russian S-300 medium-range surface-to-air missiles. According to the Greek- 
Cypriots, this military strategy would reinforce their position in the intercommunal talks and put some 
pressure in the international community to achieve the withdrawal or even a serious reduction of the 
Turkish troops. It would also guarantee the security of the Greek-Cypriot population; as they perceive 
living under a shadow of a permanent menace To Vima 29.11.1998, p.6; 29.3.1998, p.l3; 15.11.1998, 
p.6; 8.11.1998, p.l7; 8.11.1998, p.l4, Turkish Probe 6.12.1998, p.4.
H. Kramer, 1997. “The Cyprus Problem and European Security”, Survival 39:3, p.l9; H. Ünal, 
1999. “Missiles off to Crete, Is Peace Any Nearer?” The Strategist. February-March, pp.35-37; G. 
Ayman, 2002. “A Case of Brinkmanship: S-300 Missile Crisis”, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies 
Istanbul: ISIS: 7, pp.5-34.
Washington had additional concerns. The possible deployment of Russian weapons in the already 
overly-militarized island was undesirable development for the American side. See Interview with 
Nicholas Rpm.s: http: //www.ana.er/hermes/1998/sep/interview/htm.
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Cyprus’s application for EU membership. Although statements from Athens were 
carefully phrased to maintain the credibility of the “joint defense doctrine” *^^ , the 
Greeks did not oppose deployment presumably because it would have been nearly 
impossible to defend effectively against Turkish military action.
5.3.4 The Ocalan Affair
The second event was in the beginning of 1999. After Ocalan’s “European trip” that 
took place following his deportation from Syria, he was finally captured upon his 
leaving from the Greek embassy in Nairobi, Kenya in February 1999. For the Turks, 
that was another evidence that Greece supported The Turkish President
Suleyman Demirel proclaimed Greece to be a “rogue state” and added that “Greece 
did not respect international laws, and supported terrorism, and that such actions 
were not befitting to a country that considered traitors as ally and friend” ®^^.
The Ocalan affair was an important catalyst as the relations between the two 
countries had reached a very low point. After the resignation o f Theodore Pángalos 
and his replacement in the Greek Foreign Ministry by George Papandreou, both sides 
met and announced a process of bilateral talks. During the second half of 1999,
F.letherotipia 6.9.1998, p.4.
Most Turks, especially those in the security forces, have been convinced that the Greek 
government (along with others, notably Syria) gave military training and supplies to the PKK, as part 
of its effort to strengthen PKK secessionist moves in the southeastern Turkey See S. Elekdag, 1996. 
“2 1/2 War Strategy”, Perceptions Journal of International Affairs.III. p.4; Greece and PKK 
Terrorism. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 1999. Greek government always denied these 
allegations argued that provides nonmilitary assistance to Kurds which stemming from its human 
rights concerns, along with other Europeans.. For the events of February 1999 Ocalan was helped 
from unofficial Greek channels and since the whole story became public caused a serious crisis inside 
the PASOK government with the resignations of the Ministers of foreign affairs. Public Order and 
Public Administration. The Greek citizens involved went to court but finally were not found guilty. 
Ta Nea 25/6/2003.
F. Aksu, “Turkish-Greek Relations from Conflict to Détente the Last Decade”, pp. 181-182.
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bilateral relations entered a phase of détente. Although this rapprochement remains 
tenuous, it has brought some positive results in decreasing tension in the Aegean, 
promoting low politics cooperation and opening the way to Turkey’s candidacy to 
the EU.
5.3.5 The 1999 Helsinki European Council Decision
In the end of 1999 the European Council summit was again critical for Turkey. This 
time the decision in December 1999 pleased Ankara as she caught the status of the 
candidate member in the EU but without a timeframe. Greece supported Turkey’s 
EU membership in principle, although emphasizing particular conditions favorable to
Greeks388
The EU’s Presidency Conclusions underlined that “a political settlement will 
facilitate the accession of Cyprus” but added that it was not a precondition^*^. This 
formulation and its acceptance by Ankara clearly angered Denktash, who had hoped 
for direct linkage, in line with his position that accession was unacceptable unless 
Turkish Cypriots agreed to the terms for Cyprus, and Turkey became an EU 
member*^®. The Helsinki conclusions did not name the Aegean, but it was clearly 
there between the lines of language calling on candidates (that is Turkey) to resolve 
“border disputes and other related issues” and failing to achieve this within a 
reasonable time, “to bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The
Kazakos, et al. 2001.1 Ellada kai to Evropaiko Mellon tis Tourkias; Ependitis 18-19/12/1999. 
pp ?n-7.1: Briefing “Time to Find the Right Route to EU”, 13/11/ 2000: 1318, pp. 12-15.
The Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, December 10-11, 1999;Briefing “The End of a 
36-Year Struggle; a Journey Down a New Path”, 13/12/1999: 1272, p.8.
N. Toed, 2003. “Cyprus and the European Union Accession Process: Inspiration for Peace or 
Incentive for Crisis?”, Turkish Studies 3:2, pp. 105-110; A. Theophanous, 2003. “The Cyprus 
Problem: Accession to the EU and Broader Implications”, Mediterranean Quarterly. 14:1, pp. 61-65.
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European Council stated it would review the situation at the latest at the end of 2004, 
in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to
promote their settlement through the ICJ»391
As it is analyzed above, during the last decade and especially under Clinton 
administration, the US policy was active towards the Greek-Turkish dispute. The 
American crisis management role was successful during the serious crisis of 1996. A 
quiet effort led by the United States succeeded after years of patient work in 
reestablishing NATO command and control mechanisms suspended since 1974^^ .^
The relative ineffectiveness of the world’s only superpower in this specific 
peacekeeping enterprise stems in a large extent from the US political considerations. 
The fact that the US considers Turkey more important than Greece in their 
strategic considerations is always a disadvantage in the US mediating efforts. On the 
other hand, America’s Greek lobby ensures through its congressional influence that 
no US administration can deal with Turkey unless it deals with Greece.
The EU parameter has also undermined the US position. Washington and Brussels 
consult constantly, but their perspectives on Turkey have often differed. The United 
States supports the Turkish integration in the EU and sees Turkey as important 
bridge between the west, on the one hand, and the Middle East and the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, on the other. The Europeans, however, tend to see Turkey more like a
Briefing. “The End of a 36-Year Struggle; a Journey Down a New Path”, p.lO; Y. Acer, 2002. 
“Recent Developments and Prospects for Settlement of the Aegean Disputes”, Turkish Studies 3:2,
np. 201-206.
T. Dokos, 2003.“Greece in Changing Strategic Setting” in T. Couloumbis, T. Kariotis, and F. 
Bellou. Greece in the Twentieth Century, pp.46-48.
Interview with former Greek Foreign Minister Mr. Theodores Pángalos, Athens, December 18, 
2003.
175
barrier that stands between Europe and unstable areas in the Middle East or the 
Caucasus^’'*. The EU actions on Turkish and Cypriot membership· issues from 1995 
to 1998 undervalued US presidential envoys’ efforts.
Additionally the EU was literally absent during the dangerous crisis of 1996 despite 
the fact that one of the parties involved was a member of the EU. Also the EU 
initiative, the “wise men” committees, did not offer much in the whole problem.
The search for a more effective US role in the Greek-Turkish dispute will continue 
for the American decision makers. At least keeping and strengthening Greek- 
Turkish detente which continues is a positive element. Furthermore, the involvement 
o f the EU may give the chance for the US to disengage itself to a certain extent from 
the bilateral dispute.
I. Lesser, 1993. “Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War”, in G. Fuller, et al. 
Turkey’s New Geopolitics. From the Balkans to Western China (Boulder: Westview Press), pp. 
100- 102.
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CONCLUSION
The US involvement in the long-running dispute between Greece and Turkey was 
targeting to prevent a war between the two allies and thus the disruption of the 
alliance’s southeastern flank. This was consistent throughout the period under 
review. Especially during the early Cold War years, this would have caused a more 
active involvement of the Soviet Union in the strategic region of Eastern 
Mediterranean. Additionally, the US was trying to mediate between the two parties 
holding an equidistant position, aiding both sides to resolve the dispute and to reduce
tension.
The Greek and Turkish side has viewed Washington’s attitude according to their 
security interests in the region but also according to Washington’s policies in the 
Greek-Turkish crises. Both Greece and Turkey recognized the importance of being 
allies of the US. In the post-war era the governments of both sides sought to secure 
guarantees from the US, pursued their participation in NATO and focused their 
endeavor to improve their relations with the United States.
As the first problems appeared in their bilateral relations, these became priorities in 
their foreign policies and not the alliance’s commitments. This was the case 
immediately after the starting of the Cyprus problem in 1955. Greece 
internationalized the conflict with the Greek appeals in the UN General Assembly 
despite the disapproval of the American side. Turkey, on the other hand was
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determined not to let Greece receive the whole of the island of Cyprus. After the 
1963 crisis both sides agreed that a new settlement needed and welcomed the US 
mediation because they preferred a solution package from outside, rather than 
formulate painful concessions themselves.
Moreover, in the 1970s they mobilized their NATO membership to secure as much 
as possible their respective positions in the Aegean. Greek government under 
Karamanlis was seeking for US guarantees, in order to protect Greek territorial status 
quo. Papandreou went even further asking NATO guarantees against Turkey. But 
Turkey also tried to improve its position with regards to NATO in the bilateral 
dispute by blocking Greek re-entry until 1980.
Both states realized in different years (Turkey in 1964 and Greece in 1974) that their 
vital ally was motivated by its strategic considerations without taking into account 
the vital interests of each country. As a result both Greece and Turkey took their 
distances, concentrated their efforts to decrease their political dependency on the US. 
After 1964 notorious Johnson letter not allowing Turkey to intervene in Cyprus, 
Turkey opted for a more multi-dimensional foreign policy. Furthermore, it initiated 
a rapid process of improving its relations with Soviet Union which had remained 
cool and distant since the early 1950s. Greece, respectively, after 1974, withdrew 
from NATO and shifted to a more European-oriented foreign policy. Major goal of 
the Greek foreign policy became the entrance in the European Community which 
was finally achieved in 1981. Greece managed to strengthen its ties with the western 
European states along with the improvement of bilateral relations with the Balkan 
countries.
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Despite these common themes, the perceptions of Greece and Turkey towards the US 
involvement diverge in a large extent. Since the two NATO countries have not only 
found a way to reach a kind of compromise in their differences but also their 
relations deteriorated further, each side has formulated a different view of the 
American involvement to their respective policies and the intentions regarding the 
involvement.
During the Cold War era the United States was concerned because of the additional 
Aegean problems in the Greek-Turkish relations but it was keeping an equidistant 
position. Additionally, it never attempted to propose a plan as it did in Cyprus in the 
1960s. This equal distant stance o f the US was perceived as pro-Turkish from the 
Greek side and Greece often held the US responsible for the deterioration of the 
Greek-Turkish relations. Turkey, on the other hand, was milder towards the US and 
especially under Turgut Ozal’s premiership in the 1980s.
In the most serious crisis over the Imia/Kardak islets in 1996, the American 
intervention was the catalyst to prevent a war. The main concern of the Americans, 
as always in the past, was to eliminate the immediate threat of war. During the 
escalation of the crisis, they did not try to take the side of one or the other but to 
resolve the crisis. Afterwards, the US kept the usual neutral stance trying to bring 
the two parties closer towards a solution.
The Greek side welcomed the American contribution in finding out a way of 
deescalating the crisis. However, when the danger was over, for domestic 
considerations recalled its earlier stance and accused the US, saying that it
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encouraged Turkish revisionism towards Greece. The Greek side maintains that an 
equidistant US stance benefits Turkey and ignores what they believe is the right 
(Greek) position on the Aegean issues and in Cyprus. Greek political elite and the 
Greek public believe that the United States has always favored Turkey because it has 
greater value in US strategic planning The West has given the Turks to 
understand that during the decades of the Cold War but also after, Turkey is the 
“indispensable nation”, and that the west is willing to close its eyes if Turkey violates 
the human rights of its citizens or bullies its neighbors^‘^ ^
Particularly, in the case of Imia/Kardak crisis in 1996, the issue for the Greek side 
was the respect and continued validity of international agreements and established 
international borders. Washington failed to recognize this important legal principle, 
in order not to displease the Turks. In the Greek eyes, the policy of equal distance 
has alienated the United States, undermined its ability to act as a mediator in the 
region, and has encouraged Turkey’s revisionism in the Aegean and intransigence in
Cyprus” .^
Despite Greece is not satisfied by the American role, by recognizing that Turkey is a 
more powerful player, seeks or demands third party intervention to level or weigh 
them in Greece’s favor. It is a must for the Greek policy makers despite that they
Interview with retired ambassador Mr. Vyron Theodoropoulos, Athens, September 13, 2003 and 
with former Greek Foreign Minister, Mr. Theodoros Pángalos, Athens, December 18, 2003.
V. Theodoropoulos, 2003.“Greek-Turkish Relations: A New Era?” in Greece in the Twentieth 
Century, p.317.
’^’interview with retired ambassador Mr. Vyron Theodoropoulos, Athens, September 13, 2003. Mr 
Theodoropoulos gives an other dimension arguing that the US do not assist Turkey enough to realize 
the benefits of a peaceful neighboring relations with Greece.
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know very well after all these years that the US constant “neutrality” fails to fulfill
that need.^^*.
During the 1990s an important change in the Greek perception towards US took 
place, at least in the level of governments. Comparing with Andreas Papandreou era, 
the relations have improved; Greece has contributed in the NATO Balkan operations 
and has become a key US partner for regional development. The anti-Americanism 
still exists in the public, among the leftist parties and in some members of PASOK 
government who feel nostalgia for Papandreou’s nationalist coronas but it seems that 
it does not affect vital decisions for Greek foreign policy. In addition, anti- 
Americanism is often used as rhetoric serving populist political needs.
In an effort to counter balance the US involvement, the Greek side mobilizes its 
membership in the EU and the Turkish desire to become a member as well. This 
gives Greece an advantage as a prerequisite for Turkey’s accession is the resolution 
of the Greek-Turkish dispute. Moreover, it accomplishes Greek aim of siding with a 
stronger power “against Turkey”. Ajid since the end of the Second World War that 
stronger for the first time is not the “neutral” US^^ .^ This development makes Greece 
more self-confident. Nevertheless, the Greek foreign policy makers know that the 
game of bargaining and compromising inside the EU will carry on since the Greek 
stance toward the dispute has not moved an inch from the legalistic perception based 
on “rights” rather than national interests.
Interview with retired ambassador Mr. Vyron Theodoropoulos, Athens, September 13, 2003. 
Interview with Prof. Theodoros Kouloumbis, Athens, September 20, 2003.
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The Turkish perception of the US is quite different from the Greek one. Turkish side 
does not criticize US neutrality and generally appreciate and expect US services in 
mediating with controversies with Greece. The Turkish side looks more self- 
confident for the US role in the Greek-Turkish dispute and they seem that that they 
do not need further assistance in their bilateral problems with Greece. In the Greek- 
Turkish dispute, Turkish side as the larger power, assumes that it can obtain a more 
favorable outcome from negotiations solely between the two governments and 
usually calls for a bilateral dialogue.
The search for a solution in the Aegean dispute is really a hard task because each 
party preferred different means for the resolution. Greece is in favor of a legal 
solution through the International Court of Justice even though the first Greek appeal 
was negative for Greece. Turkey prefers a political solution through bilateral 
negotiations. Each side has not moved an inch from those positions all these years 
and thus, it is almost impossible to have the slight progress in the Aegean issues.
However, the Turkish perception is different for the US Congress. Congress under 
the pressure of the Greek and the Armenian lobbies was always very critical over 
Kurdish issue and Turkey’s human rights problems. The rise of sharp criticism 
directed by US Congress contributed to the increase of negative attitudes toward the 
US among the Turkish public. The US Congress began to restrict arms transfers to 
Turkey to pressure Ankara to change its policies towards the Kurds, improve its 
human rights record, and make concessions to Greece in the Aegean and Cyprus. All 
these pressures for strengthening democratic institutions much irritate the Turkish
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political elite which expected more tolerance from the US. Furthermore, Turkish 
side can not accept that an ethnic group would dictate and instruct Turkish politics.
Turks more generally believe that the United States is the only power that really 
matters in world politics and that it has the power, capability and political will to 
play a major role in regional issues that concern Turkey. This perception is bolstered 
by Washington’s political leadership and military campaign during the 1990-91 Gulf 
war, America’s role in bringing to an end to the Bosnian tragedy, and by 
Washington’s crisis diplomacy during several political crises between Greece and 
Turkey and especially during the Imia/Kardak dispute. Furthermore, many Turkish 
policy makers think that in comparison with the US, the European states do not have 
the capability or the interest to play a similarly critical role or mediating in regional 
conflicts.
The Turks believe that they are more important ally of the United States, due to their 
proximity to the Middle East and the Caucasus'*®®. So the US help is essential in 
other regions where vital Turkish interests are at stake. Turkey expects US influence 
on Turkey’s relations with Europe*®'. Additionally, as the resolution of the Greek- 
Turkish problems appeared as a precondition for the Turkish membership the US aid 
counts significantly.
It was a common point by Mr Vyron Theodoropoulos, Mr. T. Couloumbis and former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Mr. Theodores Pángalos .
Turkey had vital US support for signing the Custom Union’s Agreement in 1995. Interview with 
former Foreign Minister Mr. Murat Karayalçin, Ankara, January 7, 2004. However, this support was 
not the same the following years. It seemed that the US is not willing to offer the same aid to Turkey 
as the US knows that Turkey’s road to the EU is quite uncertain. Interview with former Foreign 
Minister Mr. Şükrü Sina Gürel, Ankara, January 8, 2004.
183
As Turkey moves closer to the EU and aspires to obtain full membership, its 
domestic politics are coming under increased scrutiny from the Brussels 
mechanisms. Certain part of the Turkish political elite is reluctant and skeptical to 
give up the state’s mechanisms of social control and the army’s prerogatives in favor 
of an elusive and distant European future. Turkey for itself will use its pivotal 
position in Europe’s periphery to gain as much as possible from the two strong 
players, the US and the EU, and giving away as less as possible of what it considers 
Turkish vital national interests.
In the 1990s as the EU emerged as a new factor in the bizarre triangular relationship, 
the United States seemed ready to make more space to the EU to search for a 
solution inside the EU framework. Greece is a member of the EU, Cyprus will 
become officially a member in May 2004 and Turkey is a candidate, so all the 
involved parties in the dispute have vital political links to the EU. The decisions of 
the European Councils in the last nine years have showed that the whole Greek- 
Turkish dispute has moved to Brussels.
Greece uses EU mechanisms effectively and has managed to interrelate her bilateral 
problems with Turkey, along with Turkey’s accession to the EU. She expected that 
the eternal problems of Cyprus and the Aegean would be solved in a “fairer way” 
through EU diplomatic channels'^®^ This accomplishes Greece’s aim, as she is sided 
with a larger power which seems to be more favorable comparing with the US 
against Turkey.
402 Interview with Prof. Theodores Couloumbis, September 20, 2003.
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The decision of the European Council to accept Turkey officially as a candidate 
country at its Helsinki Summit of December 1999 showed that the Euro-Turkish 
relations entered a more promising phase. But the progress of the accession 
negotiations is dependent on the progress of a resolution of the Cyprus and Aegean 
dispute. Ankara is expected to play an active role in bringing about a settlement in 
Cyprus as all parties concerned perceive it as having a key part in achieving the 
resolution of this imbroglio.
The United States seems to encourage a solution of the Cyprus problem and the 
Aegean dispute through EU diplomatic channels and ideas. The Annan Plan 
proposed by the UN Secretary General (which was heavily influenced by the ideas of 
the British special envoy for Cyprus Sir David Harmay), is totally promoted by the 
United States who is actually putting pressure on both sides to accept it. A final 
settlement in Cyprus would be quite useful for the American side as Cyprus can be 
used for the aims of the American strategy in the Middle East''°\
The Annan plan satisfies the basic demands of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the 
island. The plan offers the Turkish community political equality with the Greek 
Cypriots and envisages the formation of a common state composed of politically 
equal component states enjoying legal equality with the central level and exercising 
sovereign powers in their respective spheres of jurisdiction. It also allows for the 
continuation of a Turkish military presence on the island, although on a reduced 
scale and within a certain timeframe. Greek Cypriots would be benefited from the
403 Interview with former Turkish Foreign Minister Mr. Şükrü Sina Gürel, January 8, 2004.
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reunification of the island and will obtain control over a larger proportion of the 
island’s territory'*®’*.
Turkey under these evolutions should take crucial decisions whether it will 
encourage the Turkish Cypriots to accept the Annan Plan in Cyprus. However, 
despite the outside pressures, the Turkish side is not willing to be committed to a 
plan in a hurry'*®^ . It is questionable if Turkey will accept compromises of its rights 
over Cyprus since the island is so indispensable for the strategic interests of Turkey. 
None of the political parties dare to make far-reaching concessions on Cyprus for 
whatever the objective would be. Decision like the compromise of March 6, 1995 
which guaranteed Cyprus that the accession negotiations in return for the lifting of 
the Greek veto on the Customs Union agreement with Turkey, provoked strong 
reactions and criticism in certain part of the Turkish political elite'*®^ .
Concerning the Aegean problems, since the candidate status for Turkey is still quite 
unclear; it is questionable if Turkey would accept a solution imposed by the EU for 
the Greek-Turkish Aegean agenda. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to accept the 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for the resolution of the Greek- 
Turkish problems as the Helsinki summit decision has indicated'*® .^
On the other hand, Turkey expects the United States’ support in her endeavor 
towards the EU. Actually, in the first half of the 1990s the United States was
For more details of the UN plan on Cyprus see http://www.un.org/news.
Interview with former Turkish Foreign Minister Mr. Şükrü Sina Gürel, January 8, 2004. 
Ibid.
See Chapter V, p. 158.
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lobbying strongly for Turkey’s m e m b e r s h i p I t  seemed that at the end of the 
decade the US does not show the same enthusiasm. This might be explained because 
the Turkish membership is still vague and to a certain extent, Turkey is not as such 
loyal ally as the US would expect it to be in the Middle East.
it might be argued that the United States involvement in the dispute was successful 
in its crisis management role. It preserved the stability of NATO in southeastern 
Europe and avoided the unthinkable; the two allies going to war, which would have 
produced severe results for the NATO alliance and the two states themselves. 
However, in their attempt of searching for a solution, the American administrations 
were not very successful. This can be explained by the fact that the solution of the 
Greek-Turkish dispute was never a priority in their agenda and despite the pressure 
that they were able to put on both Greece and Turkey, it was not enough to make the 
two parties move.
On the other hand, both parties have a certain perception for the US which is 
completely different. The Greeks ask from the Americans support and understanding 
for their problems with Turkey. Greece’s perception of its problems with Turkey is 
viewed as a matter of justice. The repeated references to rights rather than interests, 
make negotiations and a bilateral give-and-take with Ankara almost impossible, 
whatever the Americans propose. The Turks on the other side think that they can 
deal with the Greeks by themselves. Turkish side seemed more prepared for such a 
process as it has identified its national interests in a large extent clearer than Greece.
Interview with former Turkish Foreign Minister Mr. Murat Karayaliin, January 7, 2004.
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Greece and Turkey were satisfied with US the crisis management role. Additionally, 
they would have expected more effort towards a solution by the US, but this 
necessarily does not mean that they would negotiate deeper and commit themselves 
to a settlement. Domestic considerations, the danger of a national humiliation, the 
national pride were always in a higher position than a discussion of what is really 
vital and the benefits of a possible settlement of the Greek-Turkish dispute.
Additionally, the US has a certain degree of putting pressure in the two parties but 
there are certain limits to that. The whole history of the dispute and the American 
role in it has shown that whatever the Americans propose, it is the two governments 
that should have the political courage and will to decide and commit. In this respect, 
the involvement of the EU in a sense relieved the US, as the initiatives now would 
start from Brussels and nobody would accuse them as ineffective. With the inclusion 
of the EU in this game, Greece seems to have an advantage since she is already a 
member in the Union and Turkey in on the way to obtain the full membership. 
However, it is still early to evaluate if under this procedure and with the 
encouragement of the US, the Greek-Turkish dispute would be resolved.
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